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ABSTRACT
This study proposes and tests three models of foreign lobbying in the United
States. The "Reaction Model" assumes that the foreign lobbying results largely
from countries' desire to act when issues related to them catch US public
attention. The "Resource Model" assumes that the countries that can afford it
do more foreign lobbying in order to cultivate friendly atmosphere in
Washington. The "Norms Model" assumes that the foreign lobbying is a result
of countries doing in Washington what they are used to doing at home.
This research shows that the "Reaction Model" best explains and predicts the
varying country patterns in foreign lobbying in the US, while the "Resource
Model" and the "Norms Model" also show importance in determining how
much foreign lobbying countries do.
The research has produced country data sets as dependent variables, based on
2,034 records of foreign representation carried out on behalf of 53 countries
between 1988 and 1991. The data have shown significant variations among
different countries.
In explaining the variations, the study has chosen three categories of
independent variables. For the first group, the "issues" variables, several
different measurements are used for measuring politicai and economic issues
raised in the US with regard to each country. The "capabilities" variables are
indicators of national wealth and measurements of countries' knowledge of-
and familiarity with-the US system. They reflect economic and knowledge
resources that allow necessary actions to be implemented. The "norms"
variables reflect the degree of pluralism in each country or the degree of
similarity between the US and foreign country's business practices. They have
been chosen based on the expectation that the norms would limit a country's
set of options in lobbying.
Multivariate regression has yielded various findings. Most importantly, the
frequency of bilateral "issues" raised in the US has the most influence in
determining how much foreign lobbying a country does. In addition, the
countries that are more familiar with the US system ("capabilities") tend to
focus more on advocacy lobbying to the Congress than other countries do. And,
the countries where business cultures are similar to the US ("norms") are more
active in the overall trade lobbies and in the advocacy lobbying to the Congress.
Thesis Supervisor: Kelmeth A. Oye
Title: Associate Professor of Political Science
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Overview
I. OVERVIEW
This research seeks to explain why foreign countries do lobbying in the
United States in the ways they do. To do so, the research has poduced
quantified sets of country variations in disclosed foreign lobbying inside the
U.S., and measured how much of the country variations can be explained by
three groups of variables-issues (reasons to act), capabilities (resources
allowing the necessary actions to be implemented) and norms 'c(hoices of
actions that the actors feel comfortable with).
The object of this inquiry, country patterns of foreign lobbying, is a
relatively unexplored area, which should be included in the study of
international behavior of the states, within the field of International
Relations. The methodology of this proposed research is quantitative, as it
deals mostly with quantifiable variables.
Foreign representation-through which most foreign lobbying is carried
out-is a part of the system that runs Washington. l There is little exception
to the fact that all foreign countries hire lobbyists or agents who will
represent them. 2 In fact, the large spending makes foreign lobbying an
According to a recent estimate, there are about 1,000 embassies, foreign offices and
interest groups located in the Washington D.C. area. They are reportedly spending $8.2
billion every year, accounting for about 4.4% of the $186 billion economy of the greater
Washington area. See Peter Behr, "Foreign Spending Gives Area Boost," Washington Post
(5/5/98), D3.
2 The terms "foreign lobbyists" and "foreign agents" are interchangeably used in this study
as it is in practice. Both of the terms refer mostly to US nationals who are involved in the
business of representing their clients in monitoring and/or influencing-on behalf of their
clients-policy making processes of the US Congress and the Executive agencies, as well
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interesting phenomenon. As the later parts of this study repeatedly show,
foreign lobbying in the US is highly restricted and tightly monitored, unlike
US domestic lobbying. Buying influence with money or votes is nearly
impossible. Unlike domestic interest groups, foreigners can neither make
campaign contributions nor directly mobilize votes in the US. Still
foreigners spend large sums of money every year in Washington. Why do
they do so? The answer may vary, depending on how one defines the nature
of lobbying-foreign or domestic-and its purpose. The literature on
domestic lobbying has been based on a classic cornerstone work done by E.
E. Schattschnlmeider during the 1930s.3 The work established the widely
shared view, popularly maintained even to this day, that lobbying is the
neatly-operated channel through which various pressure groups
methodically inject their competing interests into policy making process and
influence he policy outcomes. In the 1960s, however, another cornerstone
work by Bauer, De Sola Pool and Dexter challenged this view, arguing that
domestic lobbying-even with money and votes-does not really achieve
what public believes it does.4 The three scholars persuasively demonstrated
as legal proceedings and sometimes in business transactions. The term "foreign clients"
refers to non-US firms, governments and government agencies that hire the lobbyists (or
agents) for the purpose of (foreign) representation (or lobbying).
3 E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure and the Tariff(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1935)
4 "It...came as a surprise to discover that the lobbies were on the whole poorly financed,
ill-managed, out of contact with Congress, and at best only marginally effective in
supporting tendencies and measures which already had behind them considerable
Congressional impetus from other sources.... When we look at a typicai lobby, we find that
its opportunities to maneuver are sharply limited, its staff mediocre and its major problems
not the influencing of Congressional votes but the finding of clients and contributors to
7
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that lobbying is often ineffective and unimportant in influencing policy
decisions. That finding raises an important question for foreign lobbying. If
lobbying does not work the way people think it does, why is it that
foreigners-with all the limitations-spend money for it? This study
addresses this puzzle by examining the factors that determine foreign lobby
spending of different countries.
The study starts from the recognition that the pattern and the size of the
hired representation and lobbying vary widely from country to country.
Some countries spend lavishly on hiring large numbers of lobbyists just for
making basic contacts and gathering simple information, which they may be
able to do themselves. Others hire only small numbers of lobbyists to
advance a well-focused agenda to the US government. s The explanation for
these varying patterns and sizes of foreign representation and lobbying is
not readily available. The richest among the countries do not always spend
the largest sums of money. The countries that have the most contentious
enable it to survive at all .... [The lobbying groups'] effect in bottonholing, cajoling, and
persuading congressmen was far less than their effect in organizing and channeling
communications .... Thus, although lobbying by any given pressure group was... limited in
effectiveness, the presence of pressure of [the groups] astride the communication process
was important indeed." See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel De Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony
Dexter, American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade, 2 nd ed. (New
York: Aldine Publishing, 1981), pp. 3 2 4 -3 2 5 . The first edition was published in 1963.
5 In terms of the kinds of activities, the former group is engaged in the so-called
"information lobbying," while the latter is involved in "advocacy lobbying." "Information
lobby(ing)" refers to monitoring activity of the lobbyists, while "advocacy lobby(ing)"
refers to the activities to advance specific agenda (and to influence the policy process). For
more details of these definitions, see Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists,
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)
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issues do not always seem to most actively advance their agenda. This
seeming unpredictability calls for a systemic analysis of the phenomenon.
This study has tackled the task seeking first to specify the country
differences and then to measure the relative weights of three categories of
potential determinants of the country differences. In explaining the behavior
of social actors-including the states-many social scientists have used
explanatory variables that fall into three categories. The first is what I call
"issues." These are external conditions to which 'rational' actors have to
react. The second category may be called "capabilities." They are internal
resources that limit the actors' options in responding to the issues. The third
category is "norms." These are historically and culturally established ranges
of options that the actors are familiar and feel comfortable with. While
selections of these catagories of variables have been common, the majority
of social science research has not dealt with the different categories of
variables simultaneously. My research considers them altogether. Accepting
that issues, capabilities and norms work together; I examine which variable
group matters more than others in different aspects of country variations in
foreign lobbying inside the United States.
This research has proceeded in the following steps: First, country
variations of foreign lobbying were first quantified and then characterized
based on available data. Secondly, the quantified variations were related to
three sets of potential causal variables representing issues, capabilities and
norms. Regression analyses then measured relative weight for each of the




The details for this research method are presented in Section VI. Before
that, Section II explains the significance of the topic and the methodological
approach of this research. Section III discusses models of foreign lobbying
to be tested by the study. Section IV deals with the scope of the study, its
implications as well as the potential. Section V presents the result of a
preliminary research that was originally used to check the feasibility and the
value of the main research. After Section VI presents methodological details,
Section VII discusses the actual regression results of the main research.
Section VIII deals with several major countries' patterns of foreign lobbying
in the US, and the various issue of foreign influence in American politics, as




This study addresses questions that matter for both the US public and
academia. The US public needs better understanding of what foreign
countries do in Washington. Without it, misunderstanding and
misperception have flourished.6 And, as a result, foreign lobbying has often
been the target of unsubstantiated claims and sweeping generalization. In
6 The so-called Asian Money Scandal of 1996-97 was an important case in point. See fn.
12. In addition, a big confused debate occurred in 1996, regarding whether the acting
United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky could or should be approved by
the Congress to become the US Trade Representative. ["USTR Nominee Face Uphill
Climb: 95 Law May Bar Appointment," Journal of Commerce (4/16/96, 3A); "Barshefsky
on Hold at USTR," Journal of Commerce (7/15/96, 2A); John Maggs, "White House Mulls
over Barshefsky Pick," Journal of Commerce (8/1/96, IA); Peter Behr, "Trade Nominee
Faces Senate Grilling on Lobbying Stance," Washington Post (5/20/1993, C 14).]
A short provision was inserted in the 1995 lobbying act, in order to constrain those
with the experience of working for foreign interests as a lobbyist or a lawyer in being
considered for the USTR position. The confusion arose because it was unclear how this
revision should be interpreted and applied to the Barshefsky's case. [Douglas Harbrecht
and Amy Borrus, "A Lobbying Law That's Ethically Backward," BusinessWeek (5/13/96, p.
43).]
This case of inserting a vague clause illustrates the lack of understanding, on all sides
including the ones who initiated and enacted the law, about what foreign lobbying really
does and to what extent it hurts or help the US national interests.
7 Politically it is easy to do so, because the ultimate target is foreigners who have no votes
politicians have to worry about. Note that in 1997 Senator Fred Thompson opened his
Senate Governmental Affairs investigation on campaign finance with a plan to reveal
"Chinese conspiracy" to infiltrate the U.S. establishment and policy circles. Later, it turned
out that the announcement was just to "add thunder" and no such conspiracy was
discovered unring the investigation. See fn. 12. With regard to the Barshefsky nomination
[See fn. 6.], consider the rhetoric in Greg Mastel, "Foreign Influence in Government,"
Journal of Commerce (7/30/96, 7A).
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popular rhetoric it has been argued that Washington lobbyists are sacrificing
American interests to foreigners, by lobbying the US government and
therefore altering policies that should otherwise serve US national inLerests.8
In terms of methodology, it remains virtually impossible to produce a direct
While foreign lobby is easily subjected to harsh rhetoric and tough standards fio
transparency, domestic lobby is not. Consider Dan Morgan and Eric Pianin, "House Kills
Tougher Lobbying Provision: Language Would Have Required 2-Year Wait for Key Ex-
Hill Employees," Washington Post (8/2/96, A10) and "Capitol Offenses: Who Kill the
Lobby Reform?" BusinessWeek (8/19/96, p.4).
8 The books that made such argument include; Pat Choate, Agents of lnfJuence: How Japan
Manipulates America's Political and Economic System (New York: Touchstone, 1990);
Clyde Prestowitz, Trading Places (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1988); Martin Toichin
and Susan Tolchin, Buying into America: How Foreign Money is Changing the Face of
Our ?Vation (New York: Times Books, 1988); Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins,
Selling Out: How We Are Letting Japan Buy Our Land, Our Industries, Our Financial
Institutions and Our Future (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989).
Continuously fueled by this rhetoric, "revolving door" has remained an important
political issue. [See Hobart Rowen, "Foreign Lobbies, Fairness and the 'Revolving Door',"
Washington Post (10/25/1992, HI); Gary Lee, "Trade, National Security and the Revolving
Door: Lawmakers Seek Creation of Professional Corps with Restrictions on Post-
Government Work," Washington Post (4/13/1992, A19); Ruth Marcus, "Lobby Law Puts
New Spin on Revolving Door," Washington Post (3/26/96, Al).]
During the 1996 presidential campaign, the revolving door issue gained more attention,
as Ross Perot nominated Pat Choate as his vice-presidential running mate. [See Bob Davis,
"Perot Picks Choate, Fellow Nafta Foe and Longtime Friend, as Running Mate," Wall
Street Journal (9/11/96, A4); Clay Chandler, "Choate Brings Like Mind to Ticket: Populist
Shares Perot's Dislike of Global Trade, Washington Lobbyists," Washington Post (9/11/96,
A 0); Helene Cooper, "Dole's Claim He Differs from Clinton on Trade is Likely to be
Tested by Perot's Running Mate," Wall Street Journal (9/12/96, A16).]
With the sustained public interests in Washington lobby in general and foreign lobby in
particular, the Congress took a step in 1995 to seek further transparency in lobbying
activities [See "Congress Passes Bill to Disclose Lobbyists' Role," New York Times (11-30-




measurement of influence from either domestic or foreign lobbying.9 But,
the question of measuring influence aside, we need first to understand what
is actually being done in foreign lobbying, how it is done and why it is done.
In 1995, after years of public demand, the US Congress unanimously
passed legislation that limits both foreign as well as domestic lobbyists and
seeks more transparency in their activities.'° Two things were noteworthy in
the aftermath of tv legislation. First, the bill received wide public support.
Secondly, mos. lobbyists-whose activities, according to the popular
perception, were supposed to be limited by the new legislation-welcomed
the measures seeking more transparency. In fact, lobbyists have complained
for years about the "suspicion" and "caricature" image of their activity in
public's mind."l The support from both the public and lobbyists themselves
illuminated the fact that there has been a strong demand in the US to know
what the lobbyists do and why and how they do it in general. This study
addresses those questions with the focus on foreign lobbying.
9 Authors of a comprehensive study on US domestic interest groups maintain, "no scholars
has attempted to give any kind of quantitative assessment of the net impact of interest-group
activity on public policy." See Robert S. Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public
Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1995), p. 324.
10 "Congress Passes Bill to Disclose Lobbyists' Role," New York Tinmes (11-30-95), Al.




In 1996, the so-called Asian Money Scandal broke out. 12 Accusations
and speculations filled the news headlines into 1997. Unsubstantiated
12 1) For the Indonesian scandal, see Glenn Simpson and Jill Abramson, "Legal
Loopholes Let Overseas Contributors Fill Democrats' Coffers," all Street Journal
(10/8/96, Al1); Jill Abramson, Helene Cooper and Glenn Simpson, "Commerce Department:
Where Money and Power Meet," Wall Street Journal (10/11/96, A 14); Jeff Gerth and
Stephen Labaton, "Wealthy Indonesian Businessman Has Strong Ties to Clinton," New
York Times (10/11/96, A20); Charles Babcock and Ruth Marcus, "Indonesian Gift Points
Up What Some Call a Loophole," Washington Post (10/16/96, A6); Glenn Simpson,
"Policy on Indonesia, East Timor Becomes U.S. Campaign Issue," Wall Street Journal
(10/16/96, A10); David Sanger, "Clinton Officials Seeking to Defend Indonesian Policy,"
New York Times (10/17/96, Al); Leslie Wayne, "Tough Task in Campaigns: Policing
Foreign Donations," New York Times (10/17/96, Al); Jeff Gerth, "Clinton and Arkansas
Had Close Ties to Powerful Indonesian Family for Years," New York Times (10/17/96, B9;
Ruth Marcus and R.H. Melton, "DNC Donor Controversy Widens As Republicans Step Up
Criticism," Washington Post (10/18/96, Al); Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Soft
Money, Easy Access: A Money Trail Linking the Democrats with Wealthy Indonesians
Raise Questions about Cash and Power," Newsweek (10/21/96, p.40); Stephen Labaton,
"Democrats Curb Raising Fund of a Top Official: Indonesian Ties at Issue," New York
Times (10/19/96, Al); Jill Abramson and Glenn Simpson, "Lippo Issue Remains at Center
of Presidential Race," Wall Street Journal (10/21/96, A24); "Editorial: Dole, Clinton and
Asian Money" New York Times (10/22/96, A24); Jill Abramson and Michael Moss, "Fund-
Raisers Tap Their Ethnic Roots for Political Parties," Wall Street Journal (10/22/96, A 1).
2) For Chinese money scandal see; Bob Woodward and Brian Duffy, "Chinese
Embassy Role in Contributions Probed," Washington Post (2/13/97, p. 1); Patti Waldmeir,
"Chinese Role Alleged in US Election Funding," Financial Times (2/14/97, p.4); Tim
Weiner, "House Intelligence Committee to Investigate Possible Foreign Influence in '96
Elections," New York Times (3/6/97, A22); Brian Duffy and Bob Woodward, "FBI Warned
6 on Hill About China Money," Washington Post (3/9/97, p.1); Gerald Baker, "US
Confirms China Funds Briefing," Financial Times (3/1/97, p.5); Marcus Brauchli and Ian
Johnson, "Money Flap Undercuts Chinese Lobbying," Wall Street Journal (3/11/97, A19);
Andrew Murr and Melinda Liu, "On the Trail of a 'China Connection'," Newsweek
(3/10/97, p.30); Melinda Liu, etc. "Guess Who Came to Dinner," Newsweek (3/24/97,
p.36); Richard Lacayo, "What Did China Want?" Time Magazine (3/24/97, p.40-50); Bob
Woodward, "Top Chinese Linked to Plan to Buy Favor," Washington Post (4/25/97, p.1);
Daniel Klaidman and Mark Hosenball, "Connecting the Dots: The Feds Explore a China-
14
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claims were easy to raise. But, after the debate that lasted more than a year,
the American public remains still unsure about what how much of the
scandal is true and how much of it imagined. For sure, the scandal has
intensified the myth of foreign influence in the US politics. A careful study
on foreign lobbying will contribute to the public's better understanding of
this very important political issue. 13
In academia, foreign lobbying remains a largely unexplored area, a near
void with only a few case studies.'4 There is no major over-arching
California Money Trail," Newsweek (4/28/97, p.40); Daniel Klaidman, "Cracking a Chinese
Code," Newsweek (6/9/97, p.46); Edward Walsh and Guy Gugliotta, "Chinese Plan to Buy
U.S. Influence Alleged," Washington Post (7/9/97, Al); Nancy Gibbs, "Not Ready for
Prime Time," Time Magazine (7/21/97, p.34-5); Phil Kunts, "Thompson Seems to Back Off
Assertions of Chinese Plot to Buy 1996 Elections," Wall Street Journal (8/1/97, A16);
Paula Dwyer, etc., "Man in the Middle of Donorgate: Was Ted Sioeng Funneling Money or
Just Doing Business?" Business Week (8/11/97, p.84-5).
13 There have been suggestions to add a discussion on theories of democracy in this
research. The suggestion originated from the idea that in this globalized era democracy is
not the domain exclusively granted to the constituents inside a nation state and that we have
to accept extra-national actors as a force affecting national polity. While such discussion
deserves certain merit, a meaningful discourse on such argument is possible only when we
accept the assumption that the foreign lobbying which this study deals with does indeed
influence the US political system to a significant degree. Unfortunately, the focus of this
study is not about such influence and therefore the result of this study has little to offer to
support such assumption. (See Chapter VIII Section 4 where the issue of foreign influence
is discussed.) For this reasons I decided not to deal with theories of democracy in this
research.
14 UMI Dissertation Abstract record yields only two dissertations on the subject of"foreign
lobby(ing)," "foreign representation" or any other related words: Ann Preston,
"Cornmmodification of Information and the Foreign Agents Registration Act: The 1983 U.S.
Efforts to Neutralize Canadian Films," (Ph.D., diss., Ohio University, 1992); Chung Hee
Lee, "Foreign Lobbying in American Politics," (Ph.D., diss., University of Missouri, 1988).
15
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theoretical work on the subject. More studies are needed to lay foundations
for studying foreign lobbying and to incorporate it into the study of
International Relations. Foreign lobbying relates to the theory of
international behavior of states, the core of International Relations theories.
Until recently, International Relations theorists have accepted "the level of
analysis problem," believing that the systemic and state level explanations
of international relations need to be separately dealt with.' 5 This study
explores the possibility of simultaneously comparing different levels of
explanations for a state behavior. By employing multivariate analysis
methods, this study demonstrates that variables of various dimensions may
be measured and compared together in explaining the state behavior.
The central method of inquiry for this research is regression analysis. It
measures and compares three groups of explanatory variables, "issues,"
Both of them are historical surveys. There are, however, several short cases studies
provided in relation with theories of public relations and trade policy. See Jarol B.
Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the Evolution of
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Chung-In Moon, "Complex
Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States,"
International Studies Quarterly 32, (1988): 67-89.
1'5 J. David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Klaus
Knorr and Sydney Verba, eds. The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1961).
There have been a few recent efforts where international and domestic explanations for
state behavior have been weighed in comparison. However, direct challenges to overcome
this "level of analysis problem" have been generally limited. [See for instance, see Jack
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991); Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:
The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, 3 (summer, 1988); and
Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993)]
16
Significance
"capabilities," and "norms" in context of various countries' foreign
lobbying inside the US.
"Issues" are the externally given situations that demand rational actors'
action. In foreign lobbying, such issues include a bilateral political conflict
with the United State or a Section 301 designation under the US trade law
that would adversely affect the foreign country in question.
"Capabilities" are the resources whose presence can allow a country to
be more active in foreign lobbying efforts in the United States. Such factors
include a country's per high capita income that can allow more active
spending in Washington lobbying or long years of diplomatic ties with the
US that can allow better connections in-and better understanding of-
Washington.
"Norms" limit the choices for a course of action. When the norm factors
are in effect, social actors-including the states-react to a new unfamiliar
situation in certain ways because they are the ways the history and socio-
political institutions have made them act in other familiar and repeated
situations. In foreign lobbying, a relatively centralized political system with
few politically active interest groups at home may act as such a determinant
for the country's pattern of foreign lobbying in Washington. Representatives
from such a country may focus their lobby on the US Executive Branch
rather than the Congress. They may be repeatedly told that the Congress can
make or break policies, but it may be hard for those representatives to
internalize such foreign knowledge and put it into actual practice.
Many social researchers-especially those engaged in case studies-
have sought to highlight the importance of just one of many categories of
17
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causal variables. In doing so, researchers often ignored the fact that behavior
of social actors-including the states-is determined, in most cases, by
combinations of multiple categories of variables. This research attempts to
overcome this shortcoming and measure how much of these three chosen
categories of variables matter, in combination with one another, in
determining country patterns of foreign lobbying in the United States.
Before moving onto the specific methodology of such measuring, the
next section discusses the scope of this research, what kinds of limitations
the research may face and what potentials it presents.
18
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III. MODELS OF FOREIGN LOBBYING
Why do countries spend the money in foreign lobbying as they do? The
following presents models that offer different explanations.
1) REACTION MODEL
Foreign countries may spend money in foreign lobbying in the US,
because they want to react (or respond) to situations in Washington. For
instance, when the mood of the U.S. Congress becomes highly critical of a
certain country, the country may feel that the Congress needs to be better
informed of the facts, and/or it may feel that the Congress needs to be led to
view the issue from a different angle (a case of reaction). Of course,
alternatively, it may feel that there is little it can do about it (a case of non-
reaction). Foreign countries also have to react to similarly high attention of
the US executive branch and the US media.
What is important to note is that, while an external factor exists as a
reason to act (situation), a representative may not have an idea of exactly
what to do (response). In other words, with or without their own strategy of
action, decision-makers of foreign countries may be pressured to just "do
something." We need to recognize these two subdivisions of distinct
possibilities under the reaction model-one, fully rational response based on
clear strategy of action and the other, a more passive-reactive do-something
approach.
In both cases, a country faces two choices in responding to the situation.
It could try to do it by itself through its representatives sent from home. Or,
it can hire professional representation. There are cases that can be dealt with
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through the former method, direct interaction. But, the latter is often more
preferred over the former for several reasons. First and foremost, there are
only a limited number of cases, where foreigners acting alone, without
professional assistance or representation, may be effective. Many believe
even the quality of a short press release can be significantly enhanced, if
there is a help from public relations professionals. In other words,
foreigners-whether based in their home countries or posted in
Washington-face series of obstacles in identifying and carrying out
necessary actions. Language and cultural barriers are the most important
among them. In addition, successful operation in Washington requires a
wide range of specific knowledge and broad contacts; starting from the
understanding of the workings of the systems in Congress, in the executive
branch and on the grassroots level, to the protocols and subtleties required
for dealing with Congressional members, their staffs and media. But, it is
rare for foreigners to be posted in Washington for extended period time long
enough to develop those knowledge and contacts. People who have personal
and professional bases at home countries want postings in Washington as a
valuable stepping stone. But, they want it to be limited for only a few years,
because their ultimate objective lies in going back home and getting
promoted there. For this reason, while many countries see values in having
Washington experts among their professionals, it remains difficult to fully
train them in reality. These difficulties often lead the foreign countries to
rely upon the hired representation for identifying and carrying out necessary




The word, "reaction" in this reaction model needs explanation. Ideally,
foreign countries' efforts to shape the issues in the US would work best, if
they are carried out ex-ante, before the issues become fully publicized. But,
such case is rare, for a variety of reasons. First, prediction and anticipation
in issue management are difficult even at home. Foreign countries therefore
have great difficulty in preparing themselves for future issues raised in the
United States. Secondly, even if a country largely anticipates an issue to
arise in the US, until it is certain (usually meaning, until it happens), it is
difficult to commit its resources. Thirdly, even when the issue is sure to
arise and even if resources are available, the organizations (i.e. foreign
governments and corporations) are slow to act-until the issue surfaces-
because of other organizational priorities and inertia. For these reasons, it
would be safe to assume that the issue salience (measured ex-post) and
spending in foreign representation would be correlated.
It is important to carefully consider, in this reaction model, whether the
majority of issues raised would indeed result in expenditure for
representation. The model assumes that they do. Most bilateral disputes-
both political and economic-would fall into this category. As the data in
this research show, Japan has spent a great amount of money to address
trade and other economic disputes with the United States. The Soviet Union
before its demise had spent a significant amount of money to publicly
address political problems with the United States. Domestic political issues,
when raised in the US, have resulted in considerable amounts of spending
for representation in the US. Human rights situations in various countries
were good examples. When South Africa during the apartheid years
attracted much attention in the US, the ruling party of the white minority
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and the African National Congress representing the black majority were
both engaged in issue management in the US. When the US public opinion
was critical of the British policy towards Northern Ireland, the British
government dealt with it though such method among other means. Even,
when domestic election of a foreign country attracts a lot of attention in the
US, major contending candidates would want balanced-if not positive-
coverage in the US media and better image among the US policy makers. In
such case, they hire representation in the US. Of course, not all ssues raised
in the US require or cause response from a foreign country. The nature of
some issues may be such that there is little a foreign country can do about it.
On other issues for which responses are desired, foreign countries may be
incapable to respond. However, the reaction model is based upon the
expectation that a large of number issues do require and do cause responses
in the form of spending in hired representation.
Thus, the reaction model predicts that there will be a significant
correlation between the frequency of bilateral issues being publicized and
the amount of efforts put out in the form of foreign representation
(measured by the sizes of expenses and time committed). This study tests
the prediction by measuring the power of issue salience ("issues") variables
through multivariate regressions. In case this model is more important than
others, it is expected that a large number of multivariate regressions-
measuring the significance of the issues variables, while controlling other





This model is based on an assumption that foreign countries would be
more active in hiring and utilizing foreign representation, if and when they
have more economic resources and more knowledge of the US political
system. In the aforementioned reaction model, foreign countries are
assumed to act when a relevant issue emerges. In this resource model,
foreign countries-that are rich and/or well informed of the US-are
assumed to put their emphasis on long-term commitment and continuous
attention to cultivation of Washington atmosphere through maintaining the
hired agents of representation.
7
'he rationale and the need for the sustained attention and commitment
are clear. Public image of a country can not be established or changed
overnight. It takes a serious long-term commitment. Similarly, mechanisms
of issue management in Washington entail long target lists of policy makers,
professionals and related organization. For instance, an action on a trade-
related issue on the Capitol Hill involves several Senate and House
committees and subcommittees including Senate Finance Committee, its
Subcommittee for International Trade, Foreign Relations Committee on
both chambers and many more. That means contact management involves a
large number of congressional members, their staffs and committee staffs.
Furthermore, on-going working relationship with journalists who cover the
Capitol Hill is also very important. If one aims at a truly effective issue
management in Washington, relationship with all the relevant people needs
to be-not just worked on, occasionally on an ad hoc basis, but-built for a
long time and maintained consistently.
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When consistent efforts are maintained, it will be much easier to prevent
potential issues from becoming publicized. By default, post-hoc issue
management can never be as effect as preventive one. The objective of post-
hoc issue management is "minimization." That accepts a certain amount of
damage already done, while the objective of preventive measure is seeking
zero damage. The easiest way to seek the preventive strategy is through
consistent engagement. Otherwise a country has two choices that are
inferior to staying engaged. One is to seek a preventive strategy through
staying alert and getting engaged when a potential issue is detected, the
other to give up a preventive approach and to seek a post-hoc option
through focusing on issue management after an issue becomes publicized.
There is no question that the latter is far less effective than any preventive
strategy, while the former is risky and difficult. Clearly, therefore, the
countries that can afford the resources would prefer the option of continuous
engagement.
Despite the necessities, not all countries will stay engaged in cultivating
the basis for friendliness in Washington. Not all countries will act to prevent
potentially contentious issues from becoming contentious. Not all countries
are fully aware of these necessities and capable of committing itself in the
long run. It is assumed for this resource model that the knowledge of the US
system varies among different countries and those countries that are better
informed of the US political system are more likely to stay engaged. Since
resources are limited, countries of relatively higher levels of awareness will
be more willing to assign higher priority to consistent foreign representation
and commit its resources to it. This study proposes the measurements of the
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knowledge of the US system and seeks to measure the correlation between
the measurement and the spending in the foreign representation.
It is also assumed for this resource model that the countries with more
economic resources are more likely than others to stay engaged in foreign
representation. This is based on expectation, if other variables are held equal,
countries with more economic resources will find it easier to allocate
resources to foreign representation as a choice for expense among
competing priorities. Furthermore, rich countries may have additional
reason to stay engaged. They would naturally have more commercial and
political interactions with the United States, since rich countries are more
likely to trade more with the US and to be part of international consultation
mechanisms such as G-7 and North Atlantic dialogue. More commercial
interaction and more political engagement increases probability of bilateral
issues to arise.
This research tests these expectations and assumptions through utilizing
various measurements of economic capabilities ("capabilities variables")
and will seek to measure the correlation between those measurements and
the expenditure in foreign representation. If this model is more important
than others, it is expected that a large number of multivariate regressions-
measuring the significance of the capabilities variables, while controlling
variables representing the other two models-would produce high levels of
significance.
3) NORMS MODEL
In this model, it is assumed that different country behavior in foreign
presentation in Washington is most likely to be driven by what they do and
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how they operate at home rather than what they need to do and how they
need to do it in Washington.
Achieving an optimum operation overseas-including the activities
related foreign representation in Washington-often requires total
assimilation with-adaptation to-the local norms and practices. But, in
reality such total conversion is extremely difficult, if not nearly impossible.
Therefore, the decision makers of different foreign countries often analyze
the situation from their own frames of reference and perspectives developed
in their own home countries, set directions based on their norms and values
built at home, and carry out the missions through the steps that they feel
comfortable executing. In other words, native norms and values limit the
choices of both ends and means.
In terms of more specific examples in foreign lobbying or representation,
those countries where pluralism is actively practiced will not only be
naturally familiar with how the system works in Washington but also will be
far better prepared to get involved in the Washington system than other
countries where pluralism is a foreign concept. That means more pluralistic
countries would be more active in foreign lobbying and representation in
Washington. There are many examples supporting such case. Countries
from Western Europe are known for their activism with the US Congress
and the media. Those countries are active in trying to prevent issues from
becoming contentious and minimize the issues that have already become
publicized. The Washington system works through complicated web of
formal and informal channels of communication between the government,
interest groups and media. People with rich experience with a pluralist
system at home have great advantage in getting used to the Washington
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system and participating actively in it. When one detects an issue on the rise,
he/she from such pluralist system would have a first hand instinct for
deciding what needs to be tackled first. Having an initial frame of reference
prepared grants a significant advantage in starting an action. They can rely
on their experience at home in deciding what to do. When one has a clear
map of how he/she sorted through and maneuvered a pluralist system back
home, he/she can devise and implement the necessary action much more
quickly and effectively. Even when the systems of Washington and home
differ significantly, what one learns of Washington gets processed and
practiced much easily and readily. What they learn would naturally make
sense, when they hear it. Therefore, they can quickly internalize the
knowledge and act on it. Naturally, being more active would mean more
expenditure in professional representation to undertake a large number of
operations.
On the other hand, a relatively centralized political system with few
politically active interest groups at home may act as an opposite driving
force for the country's pattern of foreign lobbying in Washington. People
from a country with centralized political system may focus their lobby on
the US Executive Branch rather than the Congress. They may be repeatedly
told that the Congress can make or break policies, but it may be hard for
those representatives to internalize such foreign knowledge and put it
quickly into actual practice. No matter how often they are told that the
Congress is important, some of the decision makers will often have
difficulty understanding what it truly means. Even when the top decision
makers understand the notion and fully accept the premise, there will be
many people at the working level who still do not understand-or at least do
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not feel comfortable with-the notion and hold back or undermine the full
implementation of a right policy. And, even when the people sent to
Washington understands what needs to be done to tackle the pluralist
system of Washington, they would have a great difficulty making the
decision makers at home agree with them. For countries with centralized
political system, it is more likely that decision makers at home need to
review most options for action and make final choices, precisely because of
their hierarchic decision making structure. In such cases, required actions to
steer through the pluralist system overseas often do not make sense for the
final decision makers at home. For those people, what they do there at home
often dictates what they ask their colleagues in Washington to do. Thus, the
influence of norms would be significant.
In short, the norms model predicts that the practices at home would
dictate the pattern of activities in Washington. The politically centralized
countries would concentrate on contacting the executive branch, while
relatively more pluralist countries would expend efforts and resources to
deal with the US Congress and the media more than other countries do. This
study seeks to test this prediction by finding measurements of pluralism and
interest group politics at home and correlate them with the measurements of
foreign representation activities in Washington. In case this model is more
important than others, it is expected that a larger number of multivariate
regressions-measuring the significance of the norms variables, while




The discussion so far presents three competing models for explaining
the country behaviors in foreign representation in Washingtolln, the issues-
driven Reaction Model, the capabilities-driven Resource Model, and the
norms-driven Norms Model. The three models are not assumed to be
entirely mutually exclusive. This study seeks to determine which model
makes more sense than others. This examination will be carried out based
on the multivariate regression method.
Many social researchers-especially those engaged in case studies-
have sought to highlight the importance of one of many categories of causal
variables. In doing so, researchers often overlooked the fact that behavior of
social actors-including the states-is determined, in most cases, by
combinations of multiple variables. This research attempts to measure how
much of the three chosen categories of variables matter, in combination with
one another, in determining country patterns of foreign lobbying in the
United States.
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IV. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY: LIMITATIONS AND
POTENTIALS
Relying upon disclosed information, this study examines how foreign
countries carry out lobbying activities in the United States and why they do
the way they do it. A potential problem lies in the possibility that not all
foreign lobbies may be disclosed. However, this problem may be
manageable. This optimism depends on two conditions:
a) How much of foreign lobbying is not captured by a study on disclosed
foreign lobbying.
b) Whether, and to what extent, the undisclosed foreign lobby affects the
pattern of disclosed foreign lobbying.
The following examines these conditions respectively.
1. UNDISCLOSED FOREIGN LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
The record of disclosed foreign lobbying does not include; 1) illegal
lobbying activities (i.e. making financial contribution prohibited by law),
2) foreign lobbying carried out by US domestic political groups under
the auspices of foreign countries, or 3) foreign lobbying independently
carried out by US domestic political groups without foreign countries'
efforts to organize and/or motivate such lobbying.16
16 Many foreign countries are engaged in cultural dimensions of public relations efforts
including running cultural and/or information centers, providing support for language
education and cultural promotion programs, etc. (The United States government is also
engaged in similar efforts overseas through the U.S. Information Agency. It is sometimes
called "public diplomacy.") The source for this study, the record of disclosed foreign
lobbying includes information on those of these activities that were run either by US
"agents." (See fn. 2 for definition.) or by foreign entities directly-as long as there were
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A. Illegal Lobbying Activities
Literature on American domestic lobbying converges on oe point of
agreement: It is impossible to conduct a large-n study on undisclosed
means of lobbying, and in fact it is extremely difficult to do any study
on the subject. 17 The same limitation applies to studying foreign
lobbying. We simply can not detennine exactly how extensive the
undisclosed foreign lobbying activities are.
At the same time, however, it is feasible to infer that unreported and
illegal means of foreign lobby are rare, precisely because of the
openness of the U.S. lobby system as well as stringent legal requirement
transfer of funds from overseas-which covers most of the cultural aspects of public
relations as efforts to influence the host country, the United States.
17 Richard A. Smith, "Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress," Legislative Studies
Quarterly 20, (1, 1995) p.89-139; Scott and Itai Sened, "The Role of Lobbyists:
Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences," American Journal of Political Science 37, (3, 1993)
p.834-866; David Austen-Smith, "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and
Votes," American Journal of Political Science 37, (3, 1993) p.799-833; David Austen-
Smith and John R. Wright, "Counteractive Lobbying," American Journal of Political
Science 38, (1, 1994) p.25-44; John E. Chubb, Interest Groups and the Bureaucracy: The
Politics of Energy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983); Donald DeKieffer,
How to Lobby Congress (New York: Dodd, 982); John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access:
Congress and the Farm Lobby 1919-1981 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991);
H. R. Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America: A New Intensity (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990); Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists Survey, (Ann
Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1972); Norman Orstein and
Shirley Elder, Interest Group, Lobbying and Policy Making (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1978); Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public
Policy, 3rd ed (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); Karl Schriftgiesser, Lobbyists: the Art and
Business of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951); Jarol B. Manheim,
Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the Evolution of Influence
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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for disclosure. Compared with other countries, the US is considerably
more open to foreign representation. The US allows foreign countries to
advance their causes as long as 1) the means are lawful and 2) they
disclose to the US government all of their activities of representation
including to the lobbying activities. This openness significantly reduces
the need for illegal lobbying. The range of goals that foreign countries
can achieve only through illegal lobbying is believed to be limited in the
United States.
The cost of illegal foreign lobbying may be also prohibitively high
and the chance of success may be extremely low. Foreign country
representatives have to assume that their activities are constantly under
the microscope of the US government and the US media. Recently,
Indonesia and China have been accused of "attempting" illegal lobbying
through "attempting" to channel campaign contributions.'8 During the
1980's Japan was accused of"buying influence," even though no illegal
activities have been reported. 19 The last time an actual case was found
was nearly three decades ago. The so-called the Koreagate scandal broke
out during the early 1970s, when a Korean-American businessman was
found to have provided money to US Congressional members. The
points are simple: 1) The activities of foreign representation are closely
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watched, and 2) the cases of successful illegal foreign lobbies-even if
they exist--are too few to be a concern for this large-n study.20
B. U.S. Domestic Political Groups and Their Involvement in Foreign
Lobbying
There have been a few well-known lobbies in the United States, each
of which has advanced a cause in favor of a specific foreign country.
They included the China Lobby, pro-Israel lobbies, pro-South
Vietnamese lobby, and anti-Castro campaign. This research does not
cover those lobbies for two reasons: a) Those lobbies have been mostly
run by US domestic groups. And, b) only limited number of countries
have enjoyed such support from domestic groups in the United States.2'
1 > Domestic Rather Than Foreign Lobbying
Works on the China lobby have consistently demonstrated that it
was largely a political phenomenon driven by the US domestic
actors. A handful of Americans-who were committed to (and/or
had economic interest in) non-communist China-orchestrated the
20 Cases studies on major illegal foreign lobbying cases-if methodologically possible-
will have their own merit. But this is a study about the overall picture and not about a few
exceptions.
2' The question of ethnic groups and their influence on the pattern of disclosed foreign
lobbying is discussed in Chapter VIII. Section 1. See pg. 80.
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anti-Chinese Communist movement. 22 The pro-Israel Lobbies were
also largely US domestic political phenomena. The lobbies have
included a large spectrum of US domestic Jewish groups with
vatying and often conflicting positions. Various Jewish lobbies have
worked with the Israeli government in fact, but only when the both
sides had a common agenda.23 Media reports on the most active
among the Jewish lobbies, such as the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, confirm that the pro-Israel lobbies were US
domestic lobbies in their scopes of activities and ways of
24 25
operation. 24 Anti-Castro lobby also has been a similar case. So was
22 Thomas Eugene Graham has confirmed such characterization in his dissertation, Getting
Right with China: Membership, Scandal, and Weakness of the China Lobby (Ph.D.
Dissertation: Northern Illinois University, 1994). Ena Chao has argued that the China
Lobby was a product of US partisan politics and personal -i.e. ideological- commitment to
anticommunist activities against the Red China. See. Ena Chao, The China Bloc: Congress
and the Making of Foreign Policy, 1947-1952 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1990). There are a few academic books published on the subject.
They all confirm the same position. See Stanley Bachrack, The Committee of One Million:
China Lobby Politics, 1953-1971 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1976): and
Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York, NY: Octagon Books,
1974).
23 There have been many examples in the past. One recent example is discussed in "Will
American Jewry Always Fly Israel's Flag?" The Economist (11/19/1987, p.47-8).
24 Jacob Weisberg, "The Lobby with a Lock on Congress," Newsweek (10/19/1987, p.46-
7); Chuck Alston, "AIPAC Working to Shore Up Its Clout with Congress," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report (2/18/1989, p.297-300); Lloyd Grove, "The Men with Muscle:
the AIPAC Leaders, Battling for Israel and Among Themselves," Washington Post
(6/14/1991, B ); Peter Beinart and Hanna Rosin "AIPAC Unpacked," The New Republic
(9/20&27/1993, p.20-23); and Michael Englehardt, The Foreign Policy Constituencies of
House Members (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1985). The pro-
Israel lobby's preeminence was recently challenged, as the Middle East Peace Process
34
The Scope of the Study
the pro-South Vietnamese lobby during the Vietnam War.26 Studies
on these lobbies require extensive analysis of the US domestic
political system, domestic political groups and the US interest group
politics, which is beyond the scope of this study.
This study is about explaining behavior of different countries, with
explanatory variables attributed to each country (outside of the
United States). Therefore, this study focuses on foreign lobbies
managed by foreign countries, and foreign lobbying done by US
domestic groups had to be excluded. 27
unfolded under Bush and Clinton administrations. See Robert Greenberger, "Politics and
Policy: Pro-Israel Lobby Sees Role Shrink As Enemies Turn Into Friends and Leaders
Forge Own Ties," Wall Street Journal (4/26/1994, A24);and Robert I. Friedman, "The
Wobbly Israel Lobby: For the Once Potent AIPAC, It's Been a Very Bad Year,"
Washington Post (11 /1/1992, C 1).
25 Jeffrey Bimrnbaum, "Politics and Policy: Cuban-American Contributors Open Checkbooks
After Torricelli Exhibits an Anti-Castro Fervor," Wall Street Journal (8/3/1992, A20)
26 Pro-South Vietnamese lobby was similar to the old China lobby in the sense that it was
driven by ideologically motivated individual Americans and that the lobby lacked overall
coordination and coherence. Will Brown, The Vietnam Lobby: The Americans Who
Lobbied for a Free and Independent South Vietnam in the 1940s and 1950s (Ph.D.
Dissertation: Columbia University, 1993).
27 A key assumption for this dichotomous approach is that the primary concern for these
domestic lobbies for foreign cause is their own self-interests as defined by the US political
system. One of the factors that can challenge this assumption is the so-called "dual loyalty"
problem. The notion "dual loyalty" means that minorities in the United States sometimes
face conflict between their loyalty to the United States -which is their home country- and
also the loyalty to the country of his/her ancestors. In academia, Don Nakanishi has
examined the issue of dual loyalty in his In Search of a New Paradigm: Minorities in the
Context of International Politics (Denver: University of Denver Press, 1975), in which he
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2> Exceptions Rather Than Rules
More importantly, these domestically driven lobbies have been
exceptions rather than rules. Except the countries mentioned above,
it is rare to find countries with political support bases inside the
28United States.2 In order to better understand a specific country in
question and/or the US political system, studies of these exceptional
cases will be highly useful. Nonetheless, those exceptions-no
matter how spectacular they may be-can not provide the sense of
discussed mixed feelings of minorities in US politics. Recently, it became a political issue
after the 1996 Presidential Campaign when the aforementioned political contribution from
Indonesian business clan to the Clinton Campaign and other campaign contribution from
Asian-American communities became controversial. It showed the "dual loyalty" problem
is as much of a perception as reality and that it could be used as a tool for political scape-
goating for specific ethnic groups. See Michael Fletcher, "Coalition Says DNC Fund
Raising Flap is Generating 'Asian-Bashing"' Washington Post (10/23/96, A16); and
"Review and Outlook: In Defense of Asians" Wall Street Journal (1 0/23/96, A22).
As a recent example, a Korean-American employee of the US Navy voluntarily handed
over a series of classified information to the Korean government and was arrested. This
case again brought to the surface the question of dual loyalty of ethnic groups in the U.S.
However, the ethnic component of the issue quickly dissipated as such incident based on
ethnic loyalty was seen as rare and unimportant. R. Jeffrey Smith and Peter Pae, "Navy
Worker's Case Raises Issue of Ethnic Sympathy," Washington Post (9/26/96, A 15).
28 Besides, most of those exceptional lobbies-the China Lobby, pro-Israel lobbies, pro-
South Vietnamese lobby, and anti-Castro campaign-did not last long. [The Jewish-
American pro-Israel lobbies have been the only ones with strong and consistent political
presence. But, even the pro-Israel lobbies were not entirely immune to the issue specificity
problem. See the end of fn. 26.] The majority of those lobbies existed based on specific
issues and later disappeared as the issues lost their momentum. This is another reason for
excluding those domestically driven lobbies from this study of systemic international
lobbying. This study explores the systemic transnational lobbies that last as long as
diplomatic ties with the US remain in place.
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the overall picture of how countries try to convey their views and
positions to the US government and public, which this study seeks to
do.
C. Foreign Countries' Efforts to Organize Support in the U.S.
What if foreign countries try to influence and steer such US
domestic groups to act in their favor? Potentially, this is a very
important question for both theory and practice. All the countries
mentioned above (e.g. Taiwan, South Vietnam, Israel etc.) are believed
to have tried to influence the US domestic groups that were lobbying for
their causes, even though the historical studies on those lobbies almost
unanimously show that such efforts produced little results.2 9
Two points need to be noted. First, such practice is expected to be
extremely limited at any given time.30 Those efforts have been made
only when foreign countries had specific US political groups to
influence. The number of countries that have such US domestic groups
is considerably limited. Secondly, most of the efforts to influence
29 See fn. 22, 24, and 26.
30 This is a question of whether foreign countries try to control the specific US ethnic
political groups for extended period of time. It is different from the question of whether or
not foreign countries try to influence general public opinion in the U.S. Numerous countries
have indeed tried to influence the US public through general public relations efforts. Jarol
B. Manheim presents many cases of such public relations efforts in his book, Strategic
Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: the Evolution of Influence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
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domestic groups are captured in the quantitative data that this study uses
any way.31 Keeping in mind these two points, consider the following
cases with regard to China, Japan and Mexico.
For the past few years, the term "New China Lobby" has begun to
emerge in the US news media. The New China Lobby and the old China
Lobby have differences and similarities. The old China Lobby advocated
support for the Kuo Min Tang government (and later Taiwan) for three
decades from the 1940s, on the basis of anti-communism. The New
China Lobby on the other hand allegedly advocates friendly policy
toward the mainland China based on commercial realism, emphasizing
US economic stakes in the mainland China. In this respect, the two
China lobbies are completely different. In terms of political bases in the
United States, the New China Lobby is driven by US domestic political
constituents, just like the old China Lobby. The difference is, the old
China lobby was driven by a few ideologically committed individuals,
while the New China Lobby is allegedly driven by mostly US
transnational corporations with existing or prospective economic
interests in China. Media reports note that China, without ability to
direct control the US firms, uses the strategy of threat-raising the
possibility of closing its market to the US businesses-to mobilize the
support for the US government's friendly approach to China issues.3 2
3' See fni. 16.
32 Jim Hoagland, "Latest Trade Darling," Washington Post (3/24/1994, A29); A.M.
Rosenthal "On My Mind: The Client is Lenin," The New York Times (3/25/1994, A29);
Michael Weisskopf, "Backbone of the New China Lobby: U.S. Firms," Washington Post
(6/14/1993, Al).
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According to media reports, Japan also tried to approach American
interest groups that have an interest in a harmonious relationship with
Japan. 33 The Japanese approach is different from that of China. It is not
the strategy of threat but the strategy of conveying information,
highlighting how important Japan is to the particular American group's
self-interest. Similar efforts were made by Mexico recently, even though
the efforts were focused exclusively on the issue of NAFTA. 34 These
efforts by Japan and Mexico are reflected in the data of disclosed
foreign representation and lobbying that this study uses. The countries
by and large have no choice other than using hired representation in
these efforts. The efforts to reach out to the US public require significant
amounts of manpower and expertise. On their own, foreign countries
have only limited manpower and expertise in the United States. That is
why they have to hire the professionals in the US foreign representation
industry. And, when they do so, their activities are reported.3 5 This study
uses the data compiled based on those reports.
33 Stephen Engleberg with Martin Tolchin, "Foreigners Find New Ally in U.S. Industry,"
New York Times (11/2/1993, A1)
34 Stephen Engleberg, "Mexico Gains Allies in U.S. on Trade Agreement," The New York
Times (11/2/1993, B3); Bob Davis, "Politics and Policy: Mexico Mounts a Massive
Lobbying Campaign to Sell North American Trade Accord in U.S." Wall Street Journal
(5/20/1993, A18); Stephen Engleberg, "Mexico Gains Allies in U.S. on Trade Agreement,"
New York Times (11/2/1993, B3)
35 In the aforementioned case of China, their strategy of threat however does not need such
assistance and therefore is not reflected in the numerical data that this study uses.
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2. WOULD UNDISCLOSED LOBBYING ACTIVITIES AFFECT DISCLOSED
FOREIGN REPRESENTATION?
It is possible to raise a question whether country patterns of
unreported lobbying (which this research can not examine because it is
rare and there is little data available) somehow affect the country
patterns of the reported for:ign lobbying (which is the subject of this
research). If such effect existed and were found significant, this study
would have had to incorporate the effect as one of the key causal
variables. However, such effect is presumed to be significantly limited
for the following two reasons.
1) As discussed earlier, very few countries are believed to be engaged
in undisclosed lobbying activities. To the extent that this is true, it
should not matter much at all, whether the pattern of unreported
foreign lobbying affects patterns of reported foreign representation,
except of course for an extremely small number of countries.36
2) Through a survey of media reports, it would be possible to identif",
for the most part, which countries have been active in undisclosed
lobbying activities. Therefore, influence from undisclosed foreign
lobbying to the disclosed foreign representation-no matter how
limited-will not be left out as an omitted variable. The chapter VIII
deals with this variable by comparing patterns of reported foreign
lobbying between those countries that are allegedly active in
unreported lobbying activities and other countries that are not. For
instance, Israel is compared with other countries in terms of how
36 See section .A. of this chapter, on pg. 31.
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they spend money differently in their disclosed lobbies in
Washington.3 7




This study originates from a preliminary research, which had found a
strong possibility that distinct country patterns exist in foreign lobbying in
the United States and highlighted the need to explain those varying patterns.
The preliminary research was based on the same the data source that the
main study later used; the Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of
the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938, as amended, for the Calendar Years 1988, 1989. 1990 and
1991.38 This data collection contains detailed and extensive records of
which country spent how much money to which foreign agent for what
purpose.3 9
The preliminary research collected and analyzed data for four countries,
China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The data analysis for the four countries
has yielded clear country patterns. Taiwan and China demonstrated opposite
characteristics in most aspects of their foreign lobbying. First of all, Taiwan
was shown to focus heavily on advocacy lobbying as opposed to simple
38 The complete citation is; Attorney General of the United States, Report of the Attorney
General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the Calendar Years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1991).
39 The Attorney General's Report contains a chapter for each of 180 countries. Each
country chapter includes sections each of which lists a foreign agent's name (a U.S. firm
representing its foreign principal), one of its clients (which may be a foreign government,
corporation, industry association, organization, or others), amount of money paid to the
agent for representing the client, brief description of activities and numbers of months
involved for each year from 1988 to 1991.
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contact and information gathering.4 0 Also Taiwan data showed heavy
concentration on advocacy lobbying to the Congress. The difference with
the other countries was clear as shown in Table 1. This finding supported
the already existing media perception of Taiwan as one of the most skillful
engineers of foreign lobby in Washington.4 1 Another revealing aspect about
Taiwanese lobby in Washington is its stable relationship between the clients
and their agents, as shown in Table 2. This stability may be also related to
the alleged Taiwanese success in Washington lobby.
Table 1. Advocacy Lobby: percentages within trade-related lobbying
activities 42
.Total Executive Congress
China 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Taiwan 35.90% 25.64% 25.64%0/
Korea 9.09% 7.27% 0.00%
Japan 22.33%/ 15.21% 12.30%
40 See fn. 5 for definitions for advocacy lobby and information lobby.
41 "Taiwan, Trying to Win Status in Washington, Targets Grass Roots," Wall Street Journal
(May 16, 1995): Al. "In Its Contest With Taiwan, China Turns to P.R. Experts," New York
Times (Feb. 2, 1996): Al. "Taiwan Won Platform Terms with Democrats," Wall Street
Journal (Octber 25, 1996): A16. It will be interesting to ask whether the lobbying pattern
shown in Tables 1 and 2 above has to do with Taiwan's alleged success, but that is beyond
the scope of this research because it would be extremely difficult to define and to measure
so-called success and to correlate it to the pattern in Tables 1 and 2.
42 The second column-called "total"-includes all kinds of advocacy lobby activities
related to international trade and it is not a sum of the columns three and four. Some foreign
representation projects aim to lobby both the executive agencies and the Congress.




Table 2. Average months for each case hiring foreign agents for trade lobby
I China Taiwan Korea Japan I
11.89 28.82 20.64 24.17
China exhibited patterns that were nearly opposite to those of Taiwan, as
partly shown in Table 1. As it may well be expected, the overall size of
China's Washington lobby was small relative to those of other countries.
Advocacy lobbying was virtually non-existent for China. There was
virtually no lobbying directed to the Congress. China has been found to hire
a relatively small number of very expensive political lobby services. None
of the political lobby projects have been reported as advocacy lobbying
however. Rather, they were reported as arranging contacts with US
executive branch officials. The Chinese paid large sums of fees for those
services, as the Table 3 shows.
Table 3. Political lobby: per case expenditure and total number






The preliminary research has found that Japan and Korea were situated
in-between China and Taiwan in terms of their overall characteristics of
foreign representation in the US. In other words, Japan's overall patterns
were closer to those of Taiwan, and Korea seemed to share some
characteristics with China. For example, Chinese and Korean data showed
strong foci on executive branch contacts, as Table 4 indicates. Regarding
this observation, it is possible to infer that the two countries focus on US
executive branch contact because the political systems in China and Korea
are executive branch centered and the Chinese and Koreans thus-perhaps
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subconsciously-naturally looked to executive branch contact as the way to
reach out to the United States government.43
Table 4. Executive Branch Contact: percentage within the trade-related
lobbying activities
China I Taiwan I Korea I Japan [
44.44% 5.13% 30.91% 16.18%
In addition to the "norms" at home, period of learning allowed
(knowledge "capabilities") may play a role. Ever since the Kuo-Min-Tang
years of the 1930s, Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan) has a long history of
skillful lobbying in the United States. This seems to show in the difference
between Korea and Taiwan in terms of their foci in political lobbying. As
the Table 5 shows, Korea's political advocacy lobbying-as oppose to those
in "trade" lobby-was solely directed at Executive Branch officials, while
Taiwan directed its political advocacy lobbying efforts exclusively to
Congressional members. The main research explores this relationship
between the lobbying patterns and the length of diplomatic ties with the
United States.
Table 5. Percentage of advocacy lobby within political lobbying activities
Advocacy Lobby Advocacy






43 Based on this observation, the main research sought ways to test a hypothesis that the
degree to which domestic political power is concentrated on the executive branch at home
has much to do with this kind of executive branch-centered approach to lobby in
Washington. But the effort failed for this study, because I could not find a large-n data set
on domestic political power balance. However, the hypothesis remains interesting and can
be tested if and when necessary data become available.
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As it may well be expected, Japan was engaged in a far greater number
of trade-related lobbying cases, which Table 6 shows. More interesting and
less obvious than these absolute numbers is the question of resource
allocation. Tables 7 and 8 show that Japan placed much more emphasis on
trade-related lobbying and much less emphasis on political lobbying, when
compared with the other countries. In fact, in Tables 7 and 8 seem to
indicate that political and economic development levels may have
something to do with the resource allocation for overseas representation.
Based on this expectation, I collected and analyzed data for a great number
of other countries during the course of the main research, in order to
examine whether we can predict patterns of overseas representation of a
country based on its gross national income, trade volume, and other socio-
political variables. The results will be discussed in the following chapters.
Table 6. Size of Trade-related Lobbying
Cases Cost ($) Time
(months)
China 6 $486,591.80 107
Taiwan 36 $12,018,360.12 998
Korea 54 $19,018,476.53 1105
Japan 299 $207,647,380.79 7096
Table 7. Trade-related Lobby: sizes relative to all representation activities
China Taiwan Korea I Japan1
39.13% 67.92% 68.75%1 85.12%
Table 8. Political Lobby: sizes relative to all representation activities
China Taiwan I Korea Japan 
13.04% 13.21% 17.75% 4.41%
Explanation for these variations in country patterns are not readily
available. Three of the four countries, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, were all
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more or less dependent on the United States for their exports during the
period from 1988 to 1991. All of them also had trade surpluses and trade
friction with the U.S. during that time. It was also the time when
"aggressive unilateralism" was on the rise in the U.S. 4 4 If perfect rationality
had prevailed in the policy-making mechanism in all three, we should
expect to see at least some similarity in the weight given to Congressional
advocacy lobbying in trade-related issues. But, country differences-rather
than similarities-were salient in the preliminary research results. That
indicates that in addition to maximizing based on strategic rationality, there
must be an array of other factors that may affect the behavior of foreign
lobbying. The main research sought to examine what those factors are and
44 Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick, Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade




how important they are in determining the country patterns of foreign
representation in the United States. 45
45 One may argue that not all patterns of foreign representation are determined by the
factors that are attributed solely to the countries that are represented. That is to say that
variables intrinsic to the U.S. could also determine the patterns. For instance, if the US
Congressional members are more interested in Taiwan than other countries for instance, it
is natural that Taiwanese representatives are more involved with the Congress. This is in a
nutshell a concern for reversed causality problem. In the main research, this problem is
factored in as the issues frequency variables, the variables to which rational actors are
supposed to react to. (See fn. 55.) This does not completely solve the reversed causality
problem but handles it adequately.
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VI. DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
Many have long noted differences in foreign lobbying among different
countries.4 6 But, no one has attempted either to characterize the country
differences systematically or to analyze the causes for such differences, not
to mention the degree to which the causes affect the patterns. This research
has aimed to accomplish those three tasks.
1. DATA COMPILATION
I used, as the data source for dependent variables, the Report of the
Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the
Calendar Years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991.47 This source contains records
4 6 See f. 14 and 41.
47 The complete citation is; Attorney General of the United States, Report of the Attorney
General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the Calendar Years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1991). The report is generated based on the
Foreign Agents Registration filings.
The Reporting Requirements and Enforcement: The Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938, As Amended, requires organizations acting in furtherance of the interests of
foreign principal to file notarized reports every year, to the Foreign Agent Registration Unit
of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice, describing in detail their
activities and related expenses. The law also requires all publications of the registered
organizations to be submitted with reports to the Department of Justice. Also, "each partner,
officer, director, associate, employee, and agent" of a registered organization is required to
file statements every year "describing in detail all services" rendered to the registered
organization. The Justice Department examines all fillings. It has so far investigated a few
suspected cases of wrongful reporting, imposed fines and made corrections for the incorrect
filings.
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of which country spent how much money to which foreign agent for what
purpose. 48 The Report is divided by country chapters. Each chapter has
sections, each of which lists name of a foreign agent (a U.S. firm
representing its foreign principal), and its client (e.g. foreign government,
corporation, industry association, organization, etc.), amount of money paid
to the agent for representing the client, description of activities and numbers
of months involved each year from 1988 to 1991.
I selected 53 countries out of 180 and analyzed each of their 2,048
records.4 9 Based on the reported description of the activities. I coded each
case into several categories. I set up a computer database and entered the
codes and analyzed results for each record into the database. Some of the
coding categories required dummy variables "1" for "yes" and blank ("0")
48 The Attorney General's Report contains a chapter for each of 180 countries. Each
country chapter includes sections each of which lists a foreign agent's name (a U.S. firm
representing its foreign principal), one of its clients (which may be a foreign government,
corporation, industry association, organization, or others), amount of money paid to the
agent for representing the client, brief description of activities and numbers of months
involved for each year from 1988 to 1991.
49 Out of 180 entities registered (several colonial islands are registered as separate entities),
these 53 had more hired representation than the rest and were believed to have significant
levels of interaction with the United States. The 53 countries selected were as the
following; Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Great Britain, Greece, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Rornania, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, USSR,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
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for "no". The following is a screen copy of the data entry form for the
database.#0 I S_ . -
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Based on my judgment, I coded and entered the information, as the
following 50.
Agents: I classified the agents into consulting firms, law firms, U.S.
liaison offices, an individual representative of the client, think tank, or
free lancing individual lobbyist. In the screen copy above, "cs" in the
agent section for example stands for "consulting firm."
so50 Even though, I used my own judgment in coding the activity descriptions (written in full
sentences), any possibility of misjudgment seemed limited. The activity descriptions for the
absolute majority of the cases were unambiguous.
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Clients ("Princip"): I classified the clients into the categories of; foreign
government (including embassy), foreign government agency, business
association of a foreign country, or foreign company. In the screen copy
above, "ic" in the client section for instance stands for "(individual)
foreign company."
Representation Activities: As shown in the screen copy above, I
classified the nature of activities into; information collection and
analysis ("Info Lobby"), advocacy lobby ("Advc Lobby"), and/or public
relations services ("PR Lobby"). Many cases have been classified into
more than one category.
Services: Also, as shown in the screen copy above, I classified the
specifics of the activities into; analysis and advice on US government
policies ("Policy Advs"), analysis and advice on legislative and legal
matters ("Legal Advs" and "Legis Monit"), legal representation ("Legal
Rep"), advice on media relations ("Media Advs"), advocacy lobby to the
executive branch of the US government ("Gov Advc Lo"), advocacy
lobby to the US Congress ("Cong Advc L"), directly contacting-or
arranging contacts with-US executive branch officials ("Gov Cont")
and Congressional members or their staff ("Cong Cont"), efforts to
influence or to utilize media ("Med Camp"), public relations efforts
without direct involvement of established media ("Pub Camp"), and/or
promotion of public events ("Evnt Prom"). Many cases have been
entered with several of these categories checked.
Purposes for Representation ("Activity Code"): I categorized each
case into; political lobby, trade (and business) lobby, business
management and marketing, or others. Each case was labeled under just
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one category. In the screen copy above, "tl" in the activity code section
stands for "trade and business lobby." After this data entry, because of
the focus of the research being foreign lobbying and because of the
subsequent choice of the dependent variables (See the section 2.A.
below) serving that purpose, In the actual regression, I included only
the records of lobbying activities (those entered here as "political
lobby" or "trade (& business) lobby") and excluded those records
classified as business management and marketing, investment
promotion, trade promotion, etc.5 1
As the screen print above shows, I also entered amounts for money
("Charge [YY]") and months ("Mon") an individual client spent for each
case of representation.
Upon completion of this data entry, I produced country data sets, by
aggregating and dividing the data entered for each country. The country data
sets included totals and per case averages of all the aforementioned data
entry categories, including the various classification codes.52 From this
country data set, specific measurable dependent variables were selected for
the next step.
5 Even though I used only the record of foreign lobbying for the main regressions of this
study, I also produced distribution of all foreign representation activities (including
business and marketing assistance, investment promotion, trade promotion, etc.) in a
separate report.
52 The results were compiled in the separate report discussed above.
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2. VARIABLE MEASUREMENTS
The data set specified above produced measurements of country
differences in foreign representation in the United States. For this research,
I selected the following measurements of country differences in (trade
and political) lobbying categories only. 5 3
A. Dependent Variables: country characteristics of foreign lobbying in the
US
1) Pattern Variables: These variable measurements were supposed to
show relative concentrations on various activities of lobbying cases for
different activities, services and purposes categories discussed above
* Number of total lobby cases to the Congress divided by the number
of total lobby cases to the executive branch (LbTotCong/Ex): The more
a country focused its overall lobbying efforts on the Congress rather
than the executive branch, the higher this measurement will be.
· Number of advocacy lobby cases to the Congress divided by the
number of advocacy lobby cases to the executive branch
(AdvLbCong/Ex): The concept is the same as above but is applied only
to advocacy lobby.
* Number of advocacy lobby cases divided by number of information
and/or contact lobby cases (AdvLb/flnfCntLb): This was to measure to
what extent a country is engaged in advocacy lobbying activities (that
53 See above fn. 51. See also the Appendix lII: Dependent Variable Measurements for
details. Due to the large number of measurements, the size of the potential set of dependent
variables was nearly infinite, which could be dealt with in future researches.
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are more proactive) rather than being engaged in (rather passive)
information and contact lobby cases.
2) Size Variables: several measurements for the sizes of lobbying
activities
* The absolute sizes of trade-economic lobbies are measured in
months (TrdLbTotMth) and dollars (TrdLbTot$) spent.
* The absolute sizes of political lobbies are measured in months
(PolLbTotMth) and dollars (PolLbTot$) spent
As anticipated, the measurements of the dependent variables varied widely
across countries.
B. Independent Variables
The following categories of measurements were obtained as the possible
independent variables to be tested. Several measurements were chosen for
each category of causal independent variables in order to increase the
validity of the findings about each category.
1) "Issues": independent variables that were expected to cause rational-
choice-making actors to react to and to result in country variations of
dependent variables.
- An independent variable measurement (IssFrqEx/IssFrqCong)
was produced by dividing "IssFrqEx" by "IssFrqCong" shown
below.
* Bilateral issues frequency with the US government involved
(IssFrqEx): This was to measure the degree to which the
55
Data Collection & Analysis
executive branch of the US government was concerned about
a particular country. The higher the measurement of this
variable, the more foreign lobbying the country involved was
expected to direct to the US executive branch. The data
source was the Lexus-Nexus Search on articles from major
newspapers for the period of 1987 through 1991.54 The
measurement was the number of articles that included the
words "US" and the specific country name but not
"Congress". 55
* Bilateral issues frequency with Congress involved
(IssFrqCong): This was to measure the degree to which the
US Congress was concerned about a particular country. The
higher the measurement of this variable, the more foreign
lobby the couitry involved was expected to direct to the
Congress. The data source was the same as IssFrqEx. The
measurement was the number of articles that included the
specific country name and the term "Congress."56
- Bilateral general issues frequency with US (IssFrqGen): This was
to measure the degree to which Washington in general was
54 The 1997 data was included additionally to account for time lag between issue
occurrence and reaction.
55 The Lexus-Nexus Search command was "U.S. government w/30 (country name) and date
aft 1/87 and bef 1/92 and not Congress."
56 The Lexus-Nexus Search command was "U.S. Congress w/30 (country name) and date aft
1/87 and bef 1/92."
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concerned about a particular country. The higher the measurement of
this variable, the more publicized the bilateral relationship was, and
therefore the more active advocacy lobby was expected. The
measurement was sum of IssFrqEx and IssFrqCong for each country.
- Bilateral trade issues frequency with US in general (IssFrqTrd):
This was to measure the degree to which overall Washington was
concerned about trade issues with a particular country. The higher
the measurement of this variable, the more active trade lobbying the
particular country was expected to carry out. The data source was the
same as IssFrqEx and IssFrqCong above. The measurement was the
number of articles that include the words "US," "trade" and the
specific country name.57
- Bilateral trade volume with US (TrdVoUs): The more a country
traded with the US market, the more active trade lobby the country
involved was expected to carry out. The data was obtained based on
each country's exports to and imports from the US for the period of
1987 through 1990.58
- Trade action cases (TrdActCas): The measurement was the annual
average of section 301 cases for each country during the period
57 The Lexus-Nexus Search command was "U.S. and trade and dispute! w/30 (country
name) and date aft 1/87 and bef 1/92."
58 Direction of Trade Statistics, 1984-90 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
1991).
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1985-1990. The more such investigations occurred, the more active
the trade lobbying the country involved was expected to carry out. 59
- Bilateral non-trade issue frequency with US in general
(NonTrdIss): The source and methods were same as IssFrqTrd
above, except that the measurement was number of articles without
the word, "trade." The reason for separating trade and non-trade
issues was to use them in trade and non-trade representation
separately.60
- Total bilateral aid from the U.S. (BltAidUs): The more a country
was dependent on the US for aid, the more active foreign lobby
activities the country was expected to carry out. 6 1
2) "Capabilities": The following independent variables were expected to
influence rational-choice-making actors in reacting to situations.
- Years of diplomatic ties with the US (DplTieYrs): This
measurement was expected to indicate the length of time a country
59 The source was Thomas Bayard and Kimberly Elliot, Reciprocity and Retaliation in US
Trade Policy (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994) Summary
Table, p. 355-369.
60 The Lexus-Nexus Search command was "U.S. government w/30 (country name) and date
aft 1/87 and bef 1/92 and not trade."
61 For this research the only data I could find that had reasonable consistency was the 1982-
90 total from Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter (Detroit, MI: Gale Research,
1995)
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has experienced the workings of the US system. The longer the years
of interaction with the US, the more active the country's Washington
operation was expected to be.62
- Newsweek magazines' annual circulation (NwkCrtTot): This is a
measurement of each country's average circulation for the time
period of 1987-90. It was used as a measurement of a country's
understanding of the US system.63 The underlying presumption was
that higher the value, the more likely it was that the country was
active in Washington operation. Unlike major US newspapers or
CNN, Newsweek magazine was unique and more useful for this
measurement purpose, because it has been distributed worldwide at
least for more than last 10 years.
- Number of foreign students sent from each country to the US
(FrnStdUs): The purpose of measurement and expectations for
correlation were similar to those of DplTieYrs above. Data was not
available for every year. The sample data from the period of 1979-80
was used in order to account for time lag.64
62 Years were counted as of 1988, excluding years of diplomatic severance. See John
Findling, Dictionary ofAmerican Diplomatic History, 2nd Ed (New York, NY: Greewood,
1989).
63 Data was provided directly from the Newsweek Circulation Department in New York
through hand written fax.
64 The source was Open Door 1991/92 (New York: Institute of International Education,
1993). There are series of studies on how studies abroad affect socio-cultural and political
system at home. A good starter on such literature is an article by Gerald W. Fry, "The
Economic and Political Impact of Study Abroad" in E. Barber, P. Altbach, and R. Myers,
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- Gross national product - GNP (GrsNtnPrd): The larger the
domestic economy, the more financial resources the country would
have and the more the Washington operations it could afford.65
- Per capita GNP (PerCapGnp): The idea was similar to GNP
measurement (GrsNtnPrd) above. The richer the country in the per
capita measurement, the more financial capabilities the country
would have and the more the Washington operations it could
afford.66
3) "Norms": Social actors, including that of the states, are influenced by
historically formed social structure, expectations and institutions. The
following variables, when correlated with dependent variables, were
expected to indicate to what extent systems and rules at home were
reflected in the patterns of various countries' foreign lobbying.
Eds. Bridges to Knowledge: Foreign Students in Comparative Perspective (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
65 1989 GNP data in 1989 constant dollar value was used based on Bureau of Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990 (Washington D.C.: US Department of
Commerce, 1990). Before choosing GNP (GrsNtnPrd), I have considered using government
budgets or budget of foreign ministries as possible alternatives. But, I realized that for
many countries government budget is just a partial source for funding foreign
representation. Often private companies spend more than their governments.
66 1989 per capita GNP data in 1989 constant dollar value was used, based on Bureau of
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990 (Washington D.C.: US Department
of Commerce, 1990).
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- Number of private associations (PrvAsnTot) and number of
political parties (PolAsnTot): These were used as measurements for
degree of pluralism at home. The expectation was that, the more
pluralistic the home political setting, the more at home their
Washington operatives would be with the US system, and therefore
they would be better positioned to carry out more active and a wider
variety of Washington lobbying.
- Per capita campaign spending (PerCapCam): 6 7 The key to the
Washington representation is money. It was expected that how
political money is spent at home should be somehow reflected in
how their representatives spend money in Washington. The purposes
for both categories of spending at home and abroad are similar. They
are designed to advance certain interests and causes. If a country was
familiar with financial spending in interest group politics at home,
the same would be expected for its operations abroad.6 8
- Corruption Index (CrpIdxRtn): Every year Transparency
International, a private organization, conducts survey on
international business people's perception and publishes a report
called the "Corruption Perception Index" which contains
67 The source was; The Center for Responsive Politics, The World of Campaign Finance
(Washington DC: 1993).
68 There are existing studies on public campaign finances and party finances in different
countries. But, it was difficult to find data that could be used across different countries. See
Herbert Alexander and Rei Shiratori, eds., Comparative Political Finance Among
Democracies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Herbert Alexander, ed., Comparative
Political Finance in the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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measurements of how "corrupt" people think each country is.69 For
the purpose of this research, this variable was used as a similarity
measurement. I assumed that countries with higher scores in the
Corruption Index (CrpIdxRtn)-the "cleaner" countries-would be
more similar-in terms of their socio-political norms and
institutions-to the United States. The rationale was that the index
was created based on interviews with Western-mostly American-
business executives about their perception of how easy it is to do a
business in the countries surveyed. It was expected that the countries
that are more similar to the US would show more active foreign
lobbying in the United States.
In addition to this list of norm variables, two additional points need
mentioning. First, I wanted to use data on frequency of regime changes
69 The source was; Transparency International, 1996 Transparency International
Corr'ption Perception Index, (Press Release, June 2, 1996) p.6 . At a first glance, the
Corruption Index may seem to have little relevance for a study of foreign representation in
the US for two reasons. First, the report defines corruption as "the misuse of public power
for private benefits." Foreign representation in the US, on the other hand, is reported and
disclosed under the Foreign Agents Registrations Act. For that reason and others, foreign
representation in Washington, in general, has little to do with illegitimate misuse of
resources. Second, the Corruption Indexes have been produced only for the past three years,
while the dependent variable measurements in the proposed research are five to nine years
old.
For the first problem, I assumed that a large part of what the Western public perceives
as corruption in those countries often includes many different kinds of non-market
transactions and typical advocacy lobbying with purpose of advancing specific interests and
causes. On the second problem, while acknowledging that time lag would make the design
less than perfect, I did not expect that the problem would be serious enough. The time lag
62
Data Collection & Analysis
(RgmChnFrq) as a possible indicator of active pluralism at home. I ran
regressions with other variables and found absolutely no significance
with RgmChnFrq. For the sake of simplicity, I decided to drop
RgmChnFrq from the list of variables. Second, I intended to find
measurements for power balance between executive branch and
parliament in different countries. If found, such measurements could
have been used as useful "norm" causal variables to explain differences
in lobbying patterns. I searched for such measurements in various
comparative politics literature and internet-accessible data archives. I
also asked several experts of comparative politics and posted inquiries
in various internet discussion groups for political science research.
Unfortunately, no suitable measurement has been found.
3. CORRELATION COEFFICIENT MEASUREMENTS: MULTIVARIATE
REGRESSION
Next step was to measure the weights of independent variables in
determining the values of dependent variables. The following equation (1)
represents the notion that the dependent variables (Y)-the pattern or sizes
of various countries' foreign representation in the US-are functions of
three categories of independent variables; issues, capabilities, and norms.
Y = f(Issues, Capabilities, Nonns) (1)
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was at most nine years between 1987 and 1996. I did not expect that a country's culture
could significantly change within such length of time.
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Specifically, the function (1) can be further illustrated as the following
equation (2).
Y = 130+ 13S + BcC + BnN + (2)
With; Y = measurement of a dependent variable
130 = constant
3s = coefficient for an independent variable in the "issues" category
S = an independent variable measurement for the "issues" category
B3c = coefficient for an independent variable in the "capabilities"
category
C = an independent variable measurement for the "capabilities"
category
3n = coefficient for an independent variable in the "norms" category
N = an independent variable measurement for the "norms" category
= an error (disturbance) term
A computer statistics program, JMP of the SAS Institute, ran this
multivariate regression and produced coefficients 13s, 3c, and Bn, along
with constants B3o and disturbance terms . The three coefficients B3s, Bc,
and 3n indicated how important each of the three categories of independent
variables-issues, capabilities, and norms-was in determining patterns or
sizes of different countries' foreign lobbying activities in the US. Further
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VII. FINDINGS FROM THE REGRESSION
The research has found that the issue salience-how often a specific
country is mentioned in the media-most influentially determines how
active a country becomes in foreign lobbying in the United States-when
measuring in terms of foreign lobbying expenditure. Therefore, the issue-
driven "Reaction Model" of page 19 works best in explaining-and even
predicting-how much a country spends in foreign lobbying in the US.
However, there are evidence that the capability-driven "Resource Model"
and the norm-driven "Norms Model" are also important.
In short, countries are most likely spend money in foreign lobbying
when they become a target of-mostly negative-media attention. But,
level of weaith and knowledge, as well as degree of pluralism at home also
have influence in making a country active in foreign lobbying in the US.
1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The following summarizes several important findings with regard to the
independent variables chosen for this research. More detailed findings are
discussed in the appendix I, section 2.
A. Issue Variables
Among the three groups of variables, the issues variables showed the
strongest effect on the dependent variables, indicating that the Reaction
Model is the most robust model.
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- Bilateral trade issues frequency with US (IssFrqTrd): This variable was
the measurement of the degree to which bilateral trade issues attract the
attention in the US media (the number of newspaper articles printed).
The variable showed a very strong positive effect on how much trade
lobby a country carries out in the U.S. The confidence levels were
consistently so high, that it seemed possible to predict a county's
approximated level of trade lobby expenditure, based on the average
IssFrqTrd parameter and an actual IssFrqTrd measurement.
- Bilateral non-trade general issues frequency (NonTrdlss): This variable
was the measurement of the degree to which bilateral issues (excluding
trade-related ones) attract attention in the US media. The variable was
found to have significant effect on how much political lobby a country
carries out in the U.S. Like the case of IssFrqTrd, prediction seemed
plausible.
- Bilateral trade volume with the US (TrdVolUs): Interestingly and quite
surprisingly, this variable's effect on the size of trade lobby was found
to be insignificant when other variables such as Newsweek Magazine
circulation (NwkCrtTot) and the number of foreign students in the US
(FrnStdUs) were controlled. NwkCrtTot and FrnStdUs were the
measurements that reflected each country's knowledge of the US system.
This finding indicated that countries carry out more trade lobby in the
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US, when they know the system better than others and not necessarily
because they trade with the US more than others do.70
- Section 301 trade action cases (TrdActCas): The variable was found to
have more effect on the dollar measurement of the trade lobby size
(TrdLbTot$) than on the monthly measurement (TrdLbTotMth). The
reason may be that the countries designated-or those correctly
anticipated designation-under section 301 may have been charged
more by their agents for the usual or more intensive lobbying efforts and
also those countries may have been desperate enough to pay more for
those services. It seems however that the designated countries did not
necessarily set up additional contracts of lobbying only because of the
301 designation.
- Total bilateral aid from the U.S. (BltAidUs): I expected that recipient
countries of US foreign aid would be active in political lobby.
Interestingly, however, BltAidUs was found to have little effect on
either pattern or size of political lobby.
70 In this research, I originally sought to include level of export dependence on US market
(export to the US divided by a country's total export) as an independent variable. I ran
regressions with the variable and found no effect on any of the dependent variables.




In addition to the utmost robustness of the Reaction Model, the research
found that the Resource Model is also reasonably important, as the
capability variables showed considerable significance. Among the capability
variables, the publicly shared knowledge of the US system was found to be
important, while economic capability was found also important with a lesser
degree.
- Knowledge of the US system, measured in Newsweek Magazine's
circulation (NwkCrtTot) and the number of students sent to the US
(FrnStdUs): These variables showed considerable effects on making
countries focus more of their advocacy lobby on the Congress rather
than the executive branch. They were found to have significant levels of
positive effects on the size of a country's trade lobby as well, even when
the volumes of trade were controlled.7 ' In addition, NwkCrtTot was
found to have considerable positive effect on the size of political lobby.
On the contrary, FrnStdUs was found to have no similar effect.
- Economic capabilities, measured in gross national product
(GrsNtnPrd) and per capita GNP (PerCapGnp): Richer countries were
found to have channeled more of their advocacy lobby to the Congress
71 One may argue that knowledge variables such as NwkCrtTot could be just indicators of
the level of bilateral interaction, rather than determinants for lobbying pattern. Such
argument seems unsupported however, since one of such indicators of interaction size,
TrdVolUs, has been controlled together with NwkCrtTot and FStdUs. Thus, these
familiarity variables (NwkCrtTot and FmStdUs) are believed to have independent effects.
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than to the executive branch. Also they were found to have carried out
more advocacy lobby than information-related activities.72 In addition,
they were found to have done more trade lobbies in the United States,
even when their bilateral trade volumes were controlled. The economic
capabilities seemed to have similar effects on political lobbying, even
though the results were slightly less robust.
- Years of diplomatic ties with the US (DplTieYrs): This measurement
was chosen as another variable that could reflect the knowledge of the
US system. Interestingly, however, no significant regression result was
found.
72 There may be several possible explanations. First, since richer countries may have more
economic and political interaction with the United States, they might have more agenda that
need to be tackled through advocacy lobby. This possibility, however, is not supported by
related evidence. The general bilateral issues frequency (IssFrqGen)-a more direct
measurement for the size of bilateral interaction-did not show strong effect on the
dependent variable (AdvLb/InfCntLb) in no. 33-52. Secondly, the relationship between
higher per capita GNP and more advocacy lobbying may have something to do with the fact
that advocacy activity is relatively more expensive than information-related activities. In
order to check such possibility, I calculated monthly average charges. The charge for an
advocacy case was $31,682.33, while an information-related charge was $28,516.10.
However, depending on the viewpoints, this price difference of about 10 percent may not
be significant enough to be a decisive cause for the difference in the outcome. Thirdly,
since richer countries-with higher per capital GNP-would have more opportunity to
interact with the United States, they would have better understanding of the US system and
; ould be better prepared to carry out more proactive advocacy activities than passive




The research has found that the Norms Model has considerable
significance, even though it was the least robust among the three models. As
discussed below, some of the socio-political conditions and norms at home
were found to matter in determining country characteristics of foreign
lobbying in the United States.
- Measurements for Pluralism: The number of private associations
(PrvAsnTot) showed considerable effect on the size of trade lobby. The
number of political parties per million people (PolAsnTot) showed some
effect on the size of the political lobby as well.
- Corruption index (CrpldxRtn): Countries with higher scores in the
Corruption Index (CrpldxRtn)-the "cleaner" countries-were believed
to be more similar to the United States in terms of their socio-political
norms and institutions. The rational was that the index was created
based on interviews with Western-mostly American-business
executives about their perception of how easy it is to do a business in
the countries surveyed. This research has found that countries with
higher scores in the Corruption Index (CrpldxRtn)-the countries whose
social norms and institutions are presumably similar to those of the
US--irect their advocacy lobby significantly more to the Congress than
to the executive branch. Those countries were also found to do more




2. DEPENDENT VARIABLES: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The focus of the research has been to analyze the effect of the causal
independent variables through multivariate regressions. However, before
running the regressions, the results of the data compilation revealed several
interesting aspects of the selected dependent variables as well. The
dependent variables described how various countries behave in foreign
lobbying in the United States. Complete details of these findings were
compiled in a separate large-size date collection.
The second point to note is how the chosen dependent variables have
differed in terms of the regression results. Even with the same independent
variables used for different dependent variables, some dependent variables
yielded strong regression results, while others did not. The following
sections A through C summarize note-worthy findings and important issues
raised-with regard to the dependent variables-that were obtained in the
regression process.
A. Pattern Vs. Size Variables
I set out with three dependent variables that were to indicate the patterns
of foreign lobbying carried out by different countries. The three "pattern
measurements" included; 1) number of all lobbying cases-both advocacy
and non-advocacy-to the Congress divided by the number of all lobbying
cases to the executive branch (LbTotCong/Ex), 2) number of advocacy
lobby cases to the Congress divided by the number of advocacy lobby cases
to the executive branch (AdvLbCong/Ex), and 3) number of all advocacy
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lobby cases divided by number of all information and/or contact lobby cases
(AdvLb/InfCntLb).
I also chose four other dependent variables that indicate the size of-or
degree of activism for-trade and political lobbies for each country. Those
four "size measurements" included; the sizes of trade lobby measured in
months (TrdLbTotMth) and dollars (TrdLbTot$) spent, and the sizes of
political lobbying measured in months (PolLbTotMth) and dollars
(PolLbTot$) spent.
Regression results of the pattern measurement variables (LbTotCong/Ex,
AdvLbCong/Ex and AdvLb/InfCntLb) were in general weaker than those of
the size measurement varial les (TrdLbTotMth, TrdLbTot$, PolLbTotMth
and PolLbTot$). There may be several possible explanations for it.
1) Problems in dependent variable measurements: While the size
measurements, TrdLbTotMth, TrdLbTot$, PolLbTotMth and
PolLbTot$ were real numbers; the pattern measurements,
LbTotCong/Ex, AdvLbCong/Ex and AdvLb/InfCntLb were ratios.
This difference of measurement may affect difference in regression
outcomes. As measurements, ratios are ess significant in magnitude
than real numbers. Therefore regressions with ratios may produce
outcomes that are less robust in general.
2) Problem in availability of independent variable measurements: I
originally intended to find measurements for power balance between
executive branch and parliament in different countries. If found,
such measurements could have been used as useful causal variables
to explain differences in lobbying patterns and they could have
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shown strong relationship with the dependent variables. I searched
for such measurements in various comparative politics literature and
internet-accessible data archives. I also asked several experts of
comparative politics and posted inquiries in various internet
discussion groups for political science research. Unfortunately, no
suitable measurements were found.
However, these problems with the pattern measurements aside, it needs
to be emphasized; 1) that the pattern measurements still generated
interesting results with some of the independent variables, and 2) that the
size measurements produced significant and important results with most of
the independent variables chosen as discussed in the section 1 of this
chapter.
B. Differences between Trade and Political Lobbies
As noted, I used four size measurement dependent variables for trade
and political lobbies; TrdLbTotMth, TrdLbTot$, PolLbTotMth and
PolLbTot$. I measured their relationship with; 1) knowledge (capability)
variables, such as the circulation of the Newsweek Magazine (NwkCrtTot)
and number of students sent to the U.S. to study (FrnStdUs); and 2) the
similarity (norm) variables, such as the number of private associations
(PrvAsnTot) and number of political parties (PolAsnTot) at home, and the
Corruption Index (CrpldxRtn). The results of the regressions showed that
the countries that are more familiar with, and similar to, the US (higher in
each of the fours measurements; NwkCrtTot, FrnStdUs, CrpldxRtn, and
PolAsnTot) tend to do more trade lobby in the US, when other variables-
such as bilateral trade volumes-are controlled. Those countries with higher
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NwkCrtTot and PolAsnTot measurements were also found to do more
political lobby (but not those with higher FmStdUs or CrpldxRtn).73
C. Size Measurement Variables: Monthly Vs. Dollar Measurements
Among the four size measurement dependent variables, TrdLbTotMth
and PolLbTotMth were in monthly terms, while TrdLbTot$ and PolLbTot$
were in dollar terms. The regression results indicated that monthly
measurements were relatively better in reflecting overall level of a country's
lobbying activities, while dollar measurements were perhaps better for
indicating intensity of specific missions. In particular, dollar terms
highlighted time-specific and event-specific variations. In trade lobbying,
for instance, TrdLbTot$ showed a close tie with section 301 trade action
cases (TrdActCas), while TrdLbTotMth did not. In political lobbying, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait showed some of the highest PolLbTot$ without the
PolLbTotMth matching them. This discrepancy was due to the Gulf War.
Following the outbreak of the war those two countries spent significant
amounts of money to cultivate supportive atmosphere in Washington. But,
before the war, they were not big spenders of political lobbying. In short,
monthly and monetary measurements of foreign lobbying had their own
separate merits measuring different aspects of lobbying activities, as
illustrated in these examples.
73 For details, review and compare the results for tables 13 through 16 in the section 2 of
Appendix I. These results as a whole shed an important light on the difference between
trade and political lobbies. That is, trade lobby is carried out by diverse-both private and




3. OTHER RELATED FINDINGS
The regre3sion based on three categories of independent variables has
been the core of this research. However, along the process of the research
other questions have emerged, relating to the data used in the research. They
were addressed when possible. The following are those findings.
* EXPORT DEPENDENCE AND TRADE LOBBY: Even if a country heavily
depends upon the US market for its exports, that does not necessarily
mean the country will put significant amount of time and money into trade
lobbying in the US.
A country's export dependence on the US market is measured in terms
of the export to the US divided by its total export overseas. As the
footnote 70 notes, I originally sought to include this measurement as an
independent variable that may affect the size of trade lobby. When I
measured the correlation, I found-to my surprise-that very few of such
exists.
* US SUBSIDIARY POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION AND TRADE LOBBY: If a
countries has US subsidiary companies making large political
contributions in the US, that does not-compensate for and therefore-
reduce the size of the country's spending in directly hired trade lobby. In
fact, those countries spend more in hired trade lobby.
One may expect that a country would spend less in hired trade lobby,
when US subsidiaries owned by its companies contribute more money for
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political causes. The evidence showed the opposite, as the appendix II,
section 1 illustrates. Big spenders in trade lobbying also had US
subsidiaries making large political contributions as well. This may be
another evidence that trade lobby is almost never centrally coordinated.
* SECTION 301 DESIGNATION AND TRADE LOBBY: One may expect that
when the US government designates a country for unfair trade practices
(such as under the US trade law section 301), the trade lobby activity of
the designated country would surge. The evidence shows that it is not the
case, as the appendix II, section 2 illustrates. Countries in general do not
seem to react to the US's section 301 trade cases in such responsive way.
* FAMILIARITY WITH THE US AND REACTION TO THE SECTION 301
DESIGNATION: One may expect that a country with significant presence in
and familiarity with Washington (such as Canada) would not show
dramatic reaction to trade cases such as the section 301 designation. The
evidence does not support such hypothesis however, as the appendix II,
section 2 shows. Furthermore, data show that it is difficult to anticipate a
county's reaction to trade cases, as the contrasting cases of China and
India in the appendix II, section 2 also illustrate.
* BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE AND TRADE ISSUES: As noted earlier, this
research has found that the more often trade issues are raised in the United
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States about a particular country, the more active trade lobby the country
is likely to do. Then, what causes the frequency of trade issues (TIF) to
rise? Additional regression has found that balance trade balance plays an
absolutely critical role, as the appendix II, section 3 shows.
* BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE AND THE SECTION 301 DESIGNATION: When
the US has a large bilateral trade deficit with a country, does the country
have a relatively higher chance to be designated under the Section 301 of
the US trade law for unfair trade practices? The causes of the 301 trade
action has attracted attention before and a similar correlation has been
studied elsewhere.7 4 The appendix II, section 4 shows that the correlation
in this study was significant enough, but only when Japan's case was
included.
* MILITARY SPENDING AND POLITICAL LOBBY: One may expect the
countries with higher level of military insecurity would spend more for
political lobbying in the United States in order to secure US protection.
Testing this hypothesis was difficult for a variety of reasons associated
with defining and measuring the notion 'military insecurity.'
One of proposed methods was correlating military expenditure and
political lobby spending in the US. Data analysis here has produced two
74 Marcus Noland, "Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR," International
Organization 51, 3 Summer 1997, pp.3 6 5 -8 7 .
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interesting results: 1) Both of domestic military spending measurements,
one per capita and the other per GNP, shows significant correlation with
political lobbying expenditure in the US measured in dollar terms (the
graphs c and d of the appendix II, section 5). However that is not the case
with time measurement (the graphs a and b). 2) The finding in 1) led me
to check another set of correlation. I have found that the big military
spenders spend large amounts of money in small number of political
lobbying cases.
This leads to three conclusions: A) A military issue-related political
lobbying requires more spending than other cases of political lohhying. B)
For that reason and others, military and security related lobbying cases do
not last long. C) A large number of long-term political lobbying is not
related to military and security issues.
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VIII. FOREIGN LOBBYING IN THE U.S: KEY ISSUES,
MAJOR PLAYERS AND OVERALL IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE U.S.
Relating to the findings of the main research, this section discusses
some the countries that are most active in foreign lobbying inside the US.
The last sections of this chapter also discuss the US Senate investigation of
the Asian Money Scandal and the issues of foreign lobbying and foreign
influence in American politics.
1. ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN THE US AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON DISCLOSED
FOREIGN LOBBYING
It is widely recognized that American policies are influenced by its
ethnic groups when they form large voting blocs.7 5 Taking into account this
significance of ethnic groups, before dealing with specific countries, let us
briefly revisit a question raised in Chapter IV, section 1: The question of
whether (and how) undisclosed lobbying for foreign interests may affect the
patterns of disclosed foreign lobbying.7 6 It is possible to wonder whether
those countries supported by large domestic ethnic lobbying inside the US
may look less (or more) active in those countries' disclosed lobbying
activities. As a way to deal with this question, it has been suggested to
incorporate the sizes of the ethnic populations as a causal variable affecting
the sizes of disclosed foreign lobbying. However, actual implementation of
the suggestion seemed too difficult. For instance, countries such as Israel,
75 Paul Glastris, "Multicultural Foreign Policy in Washington," US. News and World
Report (7-21-97), p. 32-35.
76 See p. 33.
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Ireland, and Italy may be presumed to have large numbers of American
citizens sympathetic for those countries' causes. But, when it comes to the
questions of how to define Jewish Americans, Irish Americans and Italian
Americans and how to measure their population sizes; there seems to be no
easy solution. And, when Canadian Americans, German Americans and
British Americans enter the consideration, the task looks even more
daunting.7 7
The only way to tackle the question within the framework of this study
was to look at the ranked sizes of foreign lobbying, with particular attention
to those specific countries.78 However, after a careful observation, I found
no particular pattern indicating any relationship with ethnic groups. Most of
those countries with presumably large ethnic groups in the US were ranked
high in the lists. This meant that having more ethnic population in the US
does not necessarily reduce the size of disclosed foreign lobbying. The
opposite inference (that more ethnic population in the US may increase the
size of disclosed foreign lobbying) did not necessarily seem to hold either,
because other countries presumably without significant sizes of related
ethnic populations in the US were ranked in top as well. In short, the top-
ranked countries seemed simply the ones that are close to the US in terms of
77 And, furthermore, Mexican Americans (both citizen and non-citizens) may raise entirely
different sets of questions, since their large size of non-citizen and illegal immigrants may
have ways of exercising political influence, that is different and can not be adequately
compared with those of other ethnic groups.
78 See Appendix III.
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higher levels of political and economic interaction, regardless of related
ethic groups in the US.7 9
2. COUNTRIES MOST ACTIVE IN FOREIGN LOBBYING: THE RESEARCH
FINDINGS ON THEIR PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS
In this study, sizes of trade and political lobbies were measured in terms
of months (time length of a lobbying activity contract), number of cases, and
dollars (charge for a contract). The results are ranked by country and they
are listed in appendix III by categories of those separate measurements. The
numbers of the months and the cases were better measurements for showing
overall size of a country's long-term lobbying activity. Dollar measurements
were less consistent, because charges varied widely depending on the kind
of an activity contracted and the urgency of an issue. For instance, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia suddenly spent a lot of money to gamrner US political
support during the Gulf War. Such incident was well captured in the dollar
measurements, while their otherwise (relatively) low level of political
lobbying activity during normal years was better captured in the other
measurements.
As the appendix III shows, Japan, Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany,
Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan were consistently ranked on the top in both
trade and political lobbies between 1988 and 1991, the period for which
79 It is true, however, that this finding only partially answers the question on the relationship
between ethnic politics and pattern of disclosed foreign lobby. In order to address the issue
more fully, it will be necessary to carry out qualitative case studies with more narrow focus
on those particular ethnic groups.
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data were available for this study. However, there were other countries such
as Israel and South Africa that were active in political lobby alone. The
following discusses these key countries' ranks and activities one by one.80
Further discussion actual foreign lobbying operations by some of the major
countries, such as China, Japan, Taiwan and Israel, are presented later in
Section 4.C. of this chapter.
A. Canada
In trade lobby, Canada was ranked as number two in both time (months)
measurement and number of cases, and it was ranked number three in
money spent. Canada hired a large number of major lobbying firms for both
information and advocacy lobbying purposes with regard to trade issues. It
also maintained several local governments' (e.g. Ontario, Alberta, British
Columbia) representative offices which carried out various trade lobbying
activities.
In political lobby, Canada did not hire many lobbying firms. The country
was noticeable only in the expenditure category as number four. This
relatively high rank in the expenditure category resulted from the fact that
the Quebec government maintained a large representative office in the US
and ran political lobbying operations in support of the cause of Quebec.
80 The country discussion that follows is primarily based on the quantitative data sets that
this study has produced. For further discussion on some of these countries' activities, see
section 4. B. of this chapter from p. 107.
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In the information versus advocacy cases division, about 70 percent of
Canada lobbying cases were for information collection and analysis, while
about 30 percent of the cases were of advocacy purposes. There were 66
advocacy lobbying cases. All of them were directed to the Congress, while
46 of them were also directed to the executive branch.'
B. China
China was not an active player of trade lobbying during the period of
1988 and 1991. It was ranked around the middle in all of the trade lobby
measurement categories. In political lobby, the number of cases for China
was inconspicuous, ranked around the average of all countries But, China
was number eight in the time measurement and, more notably, number five
in the expenditure. This was due to its operation of "China Books &
Periodicals, Inc." Through this company, China distributed in the US, a
large amount of printed political materials such as the government-run
newspapers, the Party documents, and other state-produced journals,
targeting mostly Chinese-American population. China hired just three
lobbying firms for political purpose during the four-year period. These firms
helped the Chinese mostly in setting up contacts with US executive branch
officials, which many Western countries might have done by themselves
without such outside help. The record showed no advocacy lobby. This
altogether shows that the Chinese were ineffective in political lobbying in
the US during the period. There seem to be some evidence that China is
81 These counts are not mutually exclusive. Some advocacy cases target both the Congress
and the executive branch.
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now trying to break out of this pattern.82 However, during the period of
1988 and 1991, China seemed to be still learning about foreign lobbying in
the US and was far from being a major player in the game.
C. France
In trade lobby, France was ranked as number four in both the time
measurement and the number of cases. It was number two in the
expenditure rank. France kept a relative balance between hiring a large
number of major lobbying firms on one hand and maintaining representative
offices of major corporations-that directly carried out various trade
lobbying activitieson the other. The information-advocacy cases division
was about two to one. France had 21 advocacy cases. The targets for those
cases were evenly split between the Congress and the executive branch.
France was not shown to be active in any category of political lobbying
activity measurements.
D. Germany
In trade lobby, Germany was consistently one of the top ten players, but
it belonged to the lower side of that list, ranked as number seven in both the
time measurement and the number of cases, and number nine in money
spent. Germany relied mostly upon major lobbying firms for its trade
lobby. 8 3
82 See, for instance, "In Its Contest With Taiwan, China Turns to P.R. Experts," New York
Times (Feb. 2, 1996). Also the so-called the Chinese Money Scandal that broke out in
1996 and 97 may be viewed as a reflection of this effort. See fn. 12.
83 The only exception was Daimer-Benz's arge representative office that directly carried
out trade lobbies.
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In political lobby, Germany did not spend much money, ranked around
the middle in the expenditure ranking. But, it was a major player; in the time
measurement, where it was ranked number three, and in the number of cases,
where it was ranked number five.
The information-advocacy case division was seven to three. There were
15 advocacy lobbying cases. The Congress-executive branch division in
terms of targeting was three to four.84
E. Great Britain
In trade lobby, Great Britain was ranked as number three in both time
(months) measurement and the number of cases, and number four in the
expenditure category, directly following Canada in all three categories.
Great Britain relied upon a large number of major lobbying firms for their
trade lobbies. Great Britain was not a major player in political lobby, ranked
below average in the time measurement and the number of cases and
slightly above average in the expenditure category. The information-
advocacy case division was five to four. There were 62 advocacy lobbying
cases. The Congress-executive branch division in terms of targeting was
nearly even.
F. Israel
As noted, Israel was not a major player in hired trade lobby. However, in
hired political lobbying, it spent more than any other countries, nearly twice
the number two and three - Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that had to spend
84 See fn. 81.
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extraordinary amount during the Gulf War. In the number-of-cases
measurement, Israel was ranked number four, and number five in terms of
the time (months) measurement. The information-advocacy division was
about nine to five. There were 10 advocacy cases reported. Among them,
the Congress-executive branch division in terms of targeting was five to
eight. Data analysis suggested that Israel was focusing more on grassroots
public relations campaign than on direct advocacy lobbying to the US
government.
G. Japan
In trade lobby, Japan was undoubtedly the top. In the time measurement,
Japan's record was more than twice that of Canada, the number two. The
size of expenditure was also twice that of the second, France. In number of
cases, Japan also excelled Canada, the number two, by three to two. Japan
was engaged in trade lobby with a broad front, based on a large number of
its companies maintaining their presence for direct lobbying as well as
hiring a large number of lobbying firms.
In political lobbying, Japan was again at the top in the time
measurement. In the number of cases, it was number three, however. And,
the expenditure for political lobbying was rather surprisingly number 14.
These altogether showed that Japan was engaged in a very consistent but
low-intensity political lobbying.
A big difference from the developed Western countries was its
information-advocacy case division of seven to two. This showed Japan's
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propensity to (and preference of) monitoring rather than aggressive lobbying,
in comparison with Western countries. Of its proportionally small number
of 73 advocacy lobbying cases, the Congress-executive branch was almost
even, with a slight tilt to the Congressional side.
H. Korea
In trade lobby, Korea was ranked as number five in both time (months)
measurement and the number of cases, and number eight in expenditure.
Korea hired a relatively large number of major firms. But, the top five
expenditure cases went to various representative offices engaged in trade
lobbying activities.
In political lobby, Korea was number eight in the number of cases. In
the measurements of expenditure and time, Korea was ranked around the
middle of all countries. This showed that for a short period of time Korea
sought to advance a specific agenda on a wide front. Such surge was
observed right before the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul. Korea tried to
secure a positive image of the country and a full support from the US in
ensuring a large number of countries' participation in the Olympic Games.
T>, fact that the total expenditure and time measurements still remained
around the mid-level, despite the Olympics efforts, indicates that Korea's
political lobbying efforts for other issues remained lower than those of most
other active countries.85
5 There may be several explanations for this. First, facing a common threat across the DMZ
of the Korean Peninsular, the US-Korean relationship may have been stable to such extent
that Korea did not need as much political lobbying as other countries did. Second, the
Koreagate incident of the 1970s may have created among Koreans the aversion to political
lobby in the US. Third, the American (or Western) style political lobbying may have been a
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The information-advocacy division of all lobbying cases was highly
unusual, at seven to one. This showed Korea's preference for monitoring
rather than aggressive lobbying. The degree was much more one-sided than
that of the Japanese case. Korea had just six cases of advocacy lobbying,
extremely low in proportion. Even more surprisingly, all of them were
directed only to the executive branch.
I. Mexico
In trade lobby, Mexico was ranked number eight in the time
measurement, number six in the number of cases, and number twelve in the
expenditure. Mexico's record indicates a very unstable trend in Mexico's
spending in trade lobby in the US. Between 1988 and 1989, its spending
dropped by three seventh. Then, in the following year the spending grew
more than ten times. The next and last year of 1991, the spending almost
doubled again. This two years' increase in spending perhaps had to with the
progress of NAFTA. Mexico mostly relied upon major US lobbying firms
for their trade lobby. In political lobby, Mexico's activities were not
significant, compared with other active countries, in any measurements.
The information-advocacy division for Mexico's lobbying activity was
five to four. There were 36 advocacy lobbying cases. 31 of them were
directed to the Congress, while 16 of them were directed to the executive
foreign idea to Koreans, given their political history where they lacked pluralism during the
late 1980s and the early 1990s. The Koreagate itself had shown this lack of understanding
and experience, since they tried to influence Washington by handing over cash to
politicians, a culturally typical behavior inside Korea from the 1940s until the 1970s.
Perhaps, the low level of Korea's political lobby during the late 1980s thorough the early
1990s may be explained by all these three explanations together.
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branch.86 This observation showed that Mexico's primary concern with its
relationship with the US was, unsurprisingly, economic, and that the country
knew how to do effective lobbying in the US when necessary.
J. South Africa
South Africa was somewhat similar to the case of Israel. It was not a
major player in trade lobbying. But, in political lobbying it was consistently
ranked as an active couitry in various measurements. It was ranked number
two in the time measurement and number six in the number-of-case
measurement. In the expenditure category, it was number seven. Through
the transfer of power from President Botha to President de Klerk, South
African government of the Nationalist Party increased its political lobbying
in the US in an effort to rectify its political image of the days of apartheid.
The government hired a large number of lobbying firms. Some of the
contracts were expensive. ANC also had a case of supporting its
representatives in the US but its expenditure was reportedly minimal.
K. Taiwan
In trade lobby, Taiwan was ranked as number six in the time
measurement, number eight in the number of cases, and number thirteen in
the expenditure. The size of Taiwanese lobbying for trade issues was
smaller than what I expected based on their reputation for the lobbying
power. Taiwan hired a number of relatively small Washington firms with a
moderate level of spending and maintained stable relationships with them.
This pattern may reflect Taiwan's reputation of efficient lobbying. In
political lobby, Taiwan was number ten in the time measurement, number
86 See fn. 81.
90
Foreign Lobbying ,n the U.S.
fifteen in the number of cases, and quite surprisingly number 21 in the
expenditure. The information-advocacy division was eight to five. There
were 19 advocacy cases. Same numbers (13 of them) were directed to the
Congress and the executive branch.87
L. Other Noted Players in Political Lobbying
In various trade lobby measurement categories, most of the countries
discussed above-with exceptions of Israel and South Africa-consistently
remained at the top. In the political lobby measurement categories however,
there were more irregularities. Those countries that stood out in some of the
political lobby measurement categories may be categorized into two groups.
The first group was noticeable in the spending category. It included Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey. Their political lobby efforts were centrally
managed by the governments. They set up a small number of very expensive
contracts with just two or three major firms. The second group was
noticeable in the time and the number-of-cases categories. It included
Nicaragua and Angola. Their political lobby efforts were carried out by
diverse and often competing groups, that included the governments and
various opposition groups. They reported large numbers of cases, but their
level of national aggregate spending for political lobby was generally low.
Saudi Arabia was ranked number two in the political lobby spending. In
1988 and 1991, Saudi Arabia spent about $1 million each year for political
lobbying in the United States. If the pending had remained at a similar level
in 1989 and 1990, Saudi Arabia would have barely joined the top 10 of
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political lobby spending. But, in fact, it spent as much as $14 million in
1989 and $5.8 million in 1990. This dramatic surge contributed to being
ranked as number two in the expenditure. The surge in the spending had to
do with two events, the Gulf War in 1989 and 1990 and a large exhibition
and celebration Saudi Arabia staged in their country in 1989 in order to
improve its national image. The Saudis relied upon just five Washington
firms for their political lobbying efforts, a small number comparing with
other major players. The largest contract was carried out in 1989 for $13.4
million a piece, serving both the exhibition promotion and Gulf War
political campaign.
The story about Kuwait is similar to that of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait was
ranked number three in the political lobby spending. Interestingly, Kuwait
did not have any political lobby reported during 1988 and 1989. Then, the
spending surged in 1990 with $7 million and was doubled in 1991 with $14
million. Obviously, this surge had to do with Gulf War and its aftermath.
One largest annual contract cost Kuwait $10.7 million between 1990 and
1991.
Turkey was ranked number six in the spending category, but it had only
ten cases of political lobby cases reported. Most of them, quite expensive,
had to do with American aid and the US visits by high officials including
the head of the state.
Nicaragua was ranked number two in the number-of-cases category for
political lobbying and number four in the time measurement. But, its
aggregate spending did not make to the top ten. Both its government and
87 See f. 81.
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various opposition groups seemed to have tried to build their support bases
in the US. With limited funds however, they had to rely on various
Nicaraguan ethnic groups as well as their representatives residing in the US,
instead of hiring expensive US lobbying firms.
Angola was ranked number one in the number-of-cases category, but its
spending and duration of the efforts did not even reach the average of the 53
countries examined. With limited funding, the MPLA-led government,
FNLA opposition, UNITA opposition and several other groups relied upon
their representatives and various supporters residing in the US and
occasionally hired some US lobbying and PR firms for brief periods of time.
3. FOREIGN LOBBYING AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS
A. Limits of Foreign Lobbying in the United States
Foreign lobbying carried out in the United States is fundamentally
different from domestic lobbying by US domestic interest groups.
Foreigners are significantly restricted in their access to US policy makers.
Foreigners have neither the votes nor ways to make political contributions.
They do not belong to the "revolving door" system and thus have no future
jobs to offer to US policy makers. Thus, foreigners lack the incentives to
offer both elected and appointed US government officials.
First of all, foreign lobbying is subject to entirely separate sets of rules
and disclosure requirements than those applied to domestic lobbying. The
Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) remains the key US law
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regulating the lobbying by foreign interests and their US agents. The
objective of FARA is to ensure transparency and public disclosure of
foreign lobbying efforts in the US. Under FARA, the foreign agents and
entities are required to file a registration statement on the purpose and the
personnel structure of their affiliated organizations. Registered foreign
agents are required to report semi-annually the nature of their activities and
related expenses to the Department of Justice. The reported information is
made available for public inspection.88 FARA applies to a wide range of
activities including not only advocacy lobbying but also public relations
activities, various consulting, information services and even financial
activities, most of which domestic lobbying is not required to report on.89
Any informational material produced by, or on behalf of, foreign interests
must be submitted to the Justice Department for public inspection. These
restrictions and disclosure rules partly result from the overall public
perception and suspicion of foreign lobbying that are relatively more
negative in comparison with that of domestic lobbying. This persistent
88 Individual and independent activities (without the help of US foreign agents) of
diplomatic officials and officers of foreign governments are exempted from FAR reporting
requirements. Activities related to religious, scholastic, or scientific purposes, along with
others, are also exempted.
89 The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) expanded registration requirements for US
domestic lobbying activities, even though, for domestic lobbying activities, the level of
reporting requirements is still much less stringent and much less wide in scope. Some of
foreign lobbying activities and the related agents are required to file disclosure information
under LDA.
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public suspicion has long played an important role in limiting the permitted
scope of foreign lobbying activities in the US.90
Secondly, foreigners do not have votes. As observed in the section 1 of
this chapter, in theory, a few ethnic groups with large size of voters
concentrated in certain electoral districts may be mobilized to pressure
elected officials for foreign causes. But, such possibility is limited by two
factors. First, foreign countries that have such potential ethnic groups are
rare exceptions. Second, even such countries with potentially sympathetic
ethnic groups can not take the groups as a readily available resource of
support. Being essentially groups of US citizens, those ethnic groups can be
mobilized only when a group's interests and the foreign country's interests
overlap.
Thirdly, foreigners and foreign entities are not allowed to offer political
contributions to electoral candidates. Only permanent residents and branch
companies registered as American entities, with local source of revenue, can
make such contributions. When such contribution is made by a company of
foreign origin, it is often subject to careful scrutiny by law enforcement
agencies and disclosed to public, as the Senate investigation of the previous
section has shown. However, the Senate report acknowledged that foreign
money, no matter how small each transfer may be, continues to flow into
90 The recent Asian Money Scandal has further negatively affected the US public
perception of foreign lobbying, regardless of the actual findings of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee's 1997 investigation. The negative public perception of
foreign lobbying is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the he instatement of the FARA nearly
six decades ago was the result of the very public suspicion of foreign influence over the US
policy making process. The suspicion remains to this day, along with the general distaste
for the more pronounced influence of domestic interest groups.
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US campaign financing. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that impact
of such money is significantly limited as compared with political
contributions originated from domestic sources. Even though foreigners
may expect certain returns from the money donated, US political candidates
have very little incentive to feel obligated to return the favor, since the
foreigners lack votes in actual elections.
Fourthly, foreign interest groups, whether governments, private
companies, or other associations or organizations, do not belong to the US
"revolving door" system. In other words, US government officials can not,
in general, expect future employment with foreign interest groups. This
makes the working relationship between the US government officials and
foreign interest groups fundamentally different from that of government
officials and domestic groups. Comparing with the interactions with
domestic groups, US government officials lack incentive to be sensitive to
foreign interest groups' needs. One important point is that some officials
may expect future employment in the US lobbying firms with foreign clients.
In that case, the officials will have interest in maintaining the US lobbying
industry. Thus they will be interested in feeding information to the US lobby
firms-but not directly to the foreigners-that will make the officials look
good to the firms and will make the firms look good to their foreign clients.
However, whether they-in this process-would undermine the US national
interests is a separate question that depends on expectations and
understanding between the US lobby industry and the US government
officials. Those foreign clients who operate in the field often sense that the
US government officials and the US lobbying firms share rather clear
understanding of proper code of conduct. That is, the government officials
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seem to pass along enough non-confidential information to support the
lobbying industry but not classified information that may harm the US
national interests. US officials seem to clearly understand that both constant
refusal to cooperate and over-enthusiasm for providing information could
undermine their individual professional reputation as well as the system of
cooperation between themselves and the US lobby industry in the long run.
Under the so-called the "revolving door" system, US lobbyists see the
US government as their future employer as well, which make US lobbyists
with foreign clients sensitive to the need of the US government officials. In
fact, some foreign clients feel that the lobbyists-they hire-act as the
conduits-if not agents-for the US government and channel the argument
of the US government. The argument channeled through the lobbyists have
more credibility than those directly from the US government, because of the
fact that the lobbyist are supposedly paid to work for the clients.91 US
foreign lobbyists act between foreign clients and the US government. They
can not maintain their business without either of the two. But facing the
question, 'which is more important,' the US lobbyists have to take into
account the fact that foreign clients come and go but the US government
stays, together with the US lobbyists themselves, in Washington. Therefore,
the lobbyists have to care more about their working relationship with the US
government and their reputation among the US government officials than
91 It is interesting to note that, in some of the foreign representative organizations from East
Asia, the reports from US lobbyists carry more weight than the reports from their own local
staff. When important information is conveyed over the phone to headquarters, it is
sometimes asked to have it printed in the form of a lobbyist's memo rather than in an
internal report. This ironic phenomenon is not limited to just one country but rather
common among representatives from different East Asian countries.
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achieving foreign client's goals. Furthermore, if a reputation of selling the
national interests is established, a US lobbyist will risk losing his/her
contacts with the US government and will soon lose the business itself.
This issue of the ultimate loyalty gets further complicated, due to the
operational logic of foreign clients themselves. In general the effectiveness
of foreign lobbying project can not be measured either immediately or even
in the long run. Therefore, foreign clients lack incentive to care seriously
about the ultimate loyalty issue.9 2 Foreign operatives are obliged to care
more about how they look to the authorities and their clients at home rather
than what their efforts achieve in the forms that are immeasurable.
Therefore, the usual flow of less-than-critical information is satisfying for
many foreign clients.
The so-called White Hose coffee of the Asian Money Scandal is a
related case in point about the true motive of foreigners. Asian businessmen
who joined President Clinton for coffee were much more likely to care
about the photographs taken with Clinton than how carefully Clinton
listened to their cases, if they had any. Pictures with Clinton, when taken
home, can help them project their image of having good connections in the
US and can produce immediate business payoffs at home, rather than in the
United States. It is most likely that, whatever agenda the Asian businessmen
might have had, they clearly understood the US President would not be
bought over coffee. They most certainly would have believed that, whatever
they paid, just the pictures with the US President and therefore the
92 In this respect, the issue may not be about loyalty but simply about limits. The loyalty
question exists only when the clients truly care about it. Since they do not, the clients will
accept the reality as "being limited."
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established fact that they met with the US President were worth the cost of
payment, without expecting anything beyond that.
In sum, foreign lobbying operates under entirely different legal
restrictions and incentive systems, which make it very different from
domestic lobbying. An array of rules and interests, that are different from
those of domestic lobbying, make foreign lobbying in the US a self-
sustaining system that runs based on its own systemic logic and individual
incentives and produce outcomes that are vastly different from what the US
general public seem to be suspicious of. The findings from a year-long time
investigation of the so-called "Asian Money Scandal"-which had been
originated from the public weariness of possible foreign influence-lend
strong support to this point.
B. The 1997 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's Investigation
on the Asian Money Scandal
In March 1997, the US Senate voted to let Senator Fred Thompson of
Tennessee, the chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
(from here on "the Committee"), to initiate his Committee's investigation of
the wrong doings of campaign finance during the 1996 federal elections.
With a funding of $4.35 million allocated for the investigation, the
Committee held public hearings from July until October 1997. The
investigation ended in the following DecemLer. The Committee released its
report in March, 1998.
Three legal actions resulted from the investigation. One was about the
actual violation of election law, and the other two were about hindering the
Committee's investigation itself. First, Maria Hsia was indicted for
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laundering campaign contributions. Second, Yah Lin "Charlie" Tri was
indicted for obstructing the Committee's investigation. Third, the Attorney
General requested an independent counsel to investigate Interior Secretary
Bruce Babbitt for lying to the Committee.
The March 98 Committee report contained little conclusive information
about illegal foreign efforts to influence US politics and policy making.
Senator Thompson's initial claim that a Chinese plot to influence the US
government "affected the 1996 presidential race" produced no real
evidence.9 3 The Committee report mentioned "circumstantial evidence" that
such plan existed and that the Chinese tried to execute the plan, which "the
Committee [could] not determine conclusively." 9 4 With regard to the
foreign money issues, parts of the report were devoted to highlight the
following points.
- John Huang collected large amounts of money from Asian-American
communities in an undiscriminating manner, sometimes allowing
money from suspicious foreign sources to flow in to help Clinton's
reelection. Huang in several occasions used the White House coffee
to bring in foreign nationals, mostly Asian businessmen, to raise
contributions.
93 The US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or Improper
Activities in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns: Final Report, (March 10,
1998), p. 4565.
94 Ibid. p. 33 and 46.
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- "Charlie" Trie has contributed a large sum of money, some of which
came from potentially illegal foreign sources, possibly including a
foreign criminal.
- Huang, Trie and Maria Hsia arranged the President and Vice
President to meet, privately or in small groups, with Asians nationals
such as Johnny Chung, Ted Sioeng, Ng Lap Seng, Wang Jun and
Eric Hotung, whose backgrounds and ties to foreign governments
remain unclear.
About the "China Plan" the report, at one point, stated the majority
Republican view as the following:
"[The] Committee has received ... information that high-level PRC government
officials devised plans to increase China's influence over the US political process
and to be implemented by diplomatic posts in the US. Some of Beijing's efforts
appear relatively innocuous, involving learning more about Members of Congress,
rebuilding PRC lobbying efforts in the US, establishing closer contacts with the
US Congress.... But, the Committee has learned that Beijing expected more than
simply increased lobbying from its diplomatic posts in the US. Indeed, as the
Committee examined the issue in greater detail, it found a broad array of Chinese
efforts designed to influence US policies and elections through, among other
means, financing election campaigns.... The Committee has identified specific
steps taken in furtherance of these plans. Although some of the efforts were typical,
appropriate steps foreign governments take to communicate their views on United
States p!icy, others appear illegal under US law. Among these efforts were the
devising of a seediag strategy of developing viable candidates sympathetic to the
PRC for future federal elections; the creation of a "Central Leading Group for US
101
Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.
Congressional Affairs" to coordinate Chinese lobbying efforts in this country; and
PRC officials discussing financing American elections through covert means."9 5
The chapter 18 of the Committee report was devoted to this issue. But,
beyond essentially reiterating the argument above, the chapter did not
provide any further significant details.96 Among others, the chapter noted
the following points:
"It is important to understand that there is no consensus among the [US
intelligence] agencies concerning where the [China] plan ends and ... [the related]
PRC activities in this country begin."9 7
"While the Committee still cannot determine conclusively whether the PRC
funded, directed or ecouraged the illegal contributions in question, all of the
information related herein, taken together, constitutes strong circumstantial
evidence that the PRC government was involved."9 8
To this view, the minority Democrats noted, in the report, the following
points.
On the China Plan:
"Although the evidence presented to the Committee supports the conclusion that
the plan was implemented in a number of ways, there was ultimately insufficient
evidence presented to the Committee to show that the plan involved the Chinese
95 Ibid. p. 47.
96 See ibid. p. 2501-15.
Ibid. p. 2509.
98 Ibid. p. 2510.
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government making contributions to the presidential campaign, let alone that any
Chinese money had actually made its way into any federal campaign, presidential
or congressional. Based on the information available to the Committee to date, the
China plan was found to be of minimal significance." 99
About John Huang:
"Some members of the Committee viewed Huang as a potential espionage agent,
and spent considerable time attempting to establish that he relayed classified
information to his former employer, the Lippo Group, or to the Chinese
government when he was employed by the Department of Commerce. Huang
offered to testify without immunity from prosecution for any acts of espionage or
improper transfer of classified information. The Majority [Republicans] did not
pursue this offer. The evidence before the Committee does not support the
allegation that Huang served as a spy or a conduit for contributions firom any
foreign government, including China." 00°°
About "Charlie" Trie:
"The evidence before the Committee does not support the allegations that Trie
was acting on behalf of a foreign government or that he was improperly attempting
to influence American foreign policy. However, there can be little doubt that Trie
hoped to promote his business interests by capitalizing on his earlier friendship
with President Clinton."' 0l °'
On the "foreign money" issue:
09 Ibid. p. 4566.
o0 Ibid. p. 4567.
'o' Ibid.
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"While the [examples in the Committee report] clearly show that foreign money is
a problem in the political process, the dimensions of the problem must be kept in
perspective. It should be noted that the amount of foreign money that made its way
into the election campaigns was a small fraction of the total amount of money
contributed and the amount of the contributions received."1 0 2
At the end, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's investigation
did not find conclusive evidence for what the Americans feared most,
foreign money channeled into the American election and to the US policy
makers and used to influence the election and policy making process against
the American national interests. In fact, the failure to find clear evidence
after a long and highly publicized investigation supports the point that the
common public suspicion on foreign lobbying is often groundless.
C. Strategies for Foreign Lobbying in the United States
The case of the Asian money scandal only highlights the argument of
section A that-under the sets of rules and incentives that are different from
those of domestic lobbying-foreign interests have limited means to
achieve their objectives. Accepting the given limits and restrictions,
however, there are different strategies that may be devised for different
purposes and circumstances.
102 Ibid. p. 4568.
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In 1988, Chung-In Moon observed the set of strategies available for
foreign lobbying, as shown in the Table 9 below. 0 3 Two points need to be
noted. First, the choice among the four approaches depends on the nature of
an issue in question and the specific policy making stage within which the
issue lies. When a minor regulatory change is the objective and no US
interest group is affected either positively or negatively, only the
"bureaucratic approach" may suffice. When a major decision making, such
as a designation for unfair trade practices under Super 301, has already
passed beyond the jurisdictions of assistant and deputy secretaries and
reached the Cabinet, a clear explanation conveyed to the top decision
makers (the "power approach") on how such designation could hurt "US"
national interest would make sense.
Second, with regard to most of the major issues, the combination of all
four approaches would work best, even though, as noted, the emphasis for
each approach will vary over the course of issue development and US
decision making process. In pursuing the four-track combination approach,
a key to success is to clearly identify the interests of the "US groups" that
are to be contacted and to relate properly the issue to those specific interests
identified. When there are no US domestic groups with solid interests to be
shared, a foreign interest group will have a great difficulty in advancing its
position, whatever the issue is. The next section includes-after a few key
[03 As noted earlier, both the preliminary and the main researches in this study found a
strong possibility that a centralized domestic political system may favor the so-called
"power approach" (and perhaps the "bureaucratic approach") shown in the Tabil 9, because
that is what the foreigners from such countries understand most readily and feel most
comfortable with. In contrast, those countries with long tradition of pluralism at home and
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initial points-the cases that show different combinations of these various
strategies.
Table 9. Strategies of Foreign lobbying in the United States
Strategies Targets Mediums Rescurces Tactics
Power top decision Power brokers, Access to Personal contact
Approach makers of influence political power and persuasion,
executive and peddlers, PR and vital intermediation,
legislative firms, law firms information, public relations
branches and consultants revolving door
connections
Technocratic middle-level Lawyers, Legal and early warning of
Approach decision makers technical technical policy trends,
of executive and consultants expertise, administrative
legislative revolving-door intervention and
branches, media contacts persuasion,




Coalition top and middle- Public and Alliance issue linkage,
Building level decision private interest formation grassroots
Approach makers, media gro'ps, through mobilization,
interest groups mobilized by purchasing policy
mutual interests, power, intervention and
often through corporate persuasion
the involvement constituents, and
of lawyers and other mutual
consultants interests
Grassroots legislative Public and Constituency Letter writing,
Mobilization branch, media private interest influence and voting record,
Approach groups, pressure (based personal




of lawyers and etc.)
consultants
Adopted from Chung-In Moon, -'Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying:
South Korea in the United States," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988), p. 69.
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D. Successes and Failures of Foreign Lobbying in the United States:
Cases
In discussing successes and failures of foreign lobbying, we immediately
run into a measurement problem: How do we measure success in foreign
lobbying? It is highly likely that details of some of the most successful
foreign lobbies-especially advocacy lobbies-may not be revealed. Even
with regard to the widely publicized efforts, the processes through which the
efforts produce results are rarely known, except to the people who are
directly involved in the processes. Also there is a possibility of bias. Almost
every one involved in a successful case may want to claim credit, while in a
unsuccessful case the effort for lobbying itself may be denied. In any case,
in order to discuss successes and failures of lobbying, we can rely only upon
whatever the information is available from the cases where the lobbying
efforts have been publicized. For these reasons, it will remain difficult to
produce a scientific study on effectiveness of-either foreign or dornestic-
lobbying.
What brings success or failure in foreign lobbying in the United States?
An answer will depend on the nature of an issue, the country in question, as
well as the organization of the country that is represented in each case.
However, a few general points may be mentioned. These points include; a
large community of government and private sector policy makers who share
good understanding of Washington, clear objectives assigned to and
proactive management of the hired lobbying firms, and efforts to link issues
to the specific interests of the constituents for US politicians (e.g. American
voters and corporations).
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With regard to the shared understanding among policy makers, two
points need to be noted. First, on the individual level, acquiring good
understanding of Washington is a challenging task for a foreigner. It
requires, as a prerequisite, good understanding of a wide range of cultural
subtleties of the US as a whole and also of Washington as a set of culture
that is distinct from the country. Many people in different countries are led
to believe that they have enough knowledge of how Washington operates.
But, for most of them, the understanding is based on what they read and
were taught without sufficient level of direct exposure. When it comes to
foreign lobbying in the US, such indirectly acquired knowledge of foreign
individuals is often insufficient to produce specific and tangible actions and
results, even with the help of top Washington firms.
Secondly, beyond the individual level, Producing specific and tangible
results of foreign lobbying in the US requires a community of decision
makers, back at home, sharing good understanding of Washington. That is a
major challenge, considering the aforementioned challenge in the individual
level. Nonetheless, since a case of foreign lobbying usually requires
sustained funding and attention, organizational support at home is critical.
Attention from a few well-educated individuals by itself is not enough.
The Washington embassy of a particular country often reflects the
overall level of understanding of the US of that particular country. Activities
of embassies are not subject to foreign agents' reporting requirements. This
is dlue to a variety of reasons including the international norm respecting
confidentiality of diplomatic missions. However, embassies in Washington
carry out various efforts to advance its national interests. In a proposed
lobbying cases, the embassy may play important roles of conveying official
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messages to the US authority on specific issues and feel the atmosphere
among the US decision makers before one of its interest group represented
takes the first step of lobbying. It will be generally difficult to expect a case
of successful lobbying from a country; 1) when its embassy is unable to
produce and present effective positions and arguments to reach beyond the
Executive Branch and to the Congress and the US public in the first place,
2) if it does not understand the US lobbying mechanism, or 3) it is incapable
of putting its understanding into practice. Until recently, the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China has been often viewed as having at least some
of these problems
The next issue is about management of lobbying firms. With little
exception, countries hire Washington lobbying firms for a variety of
purposes. But, it is believed that a large number of firms hired-along with
a long time and a large amount of money invested in those contracts-do
not necessarily guarantee successful outcomes. Successful outcomes result
from successful management of project by the clients. Success in managing
a lobbying project depends on many factors. One that stands out is whether
the client has the clear idea of the objective to be achieved. If a client relies
upon a firm for ideas as well actions, the cost will be considerable high and
there will be little guarantee that tangible results will be materialized.
The last issue is about connecting with the US voters. Precisely because
the US law imposes restrictions upon the scope of foreign lobbying
activities, foreign advocacy lobbying in particular is always most effective
109
Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.
when it wins sympathy and support of American voters or interest groups.'04
Undeniably, US government officials and lawmakers are first and foremost
sensitive to the demands of their own domestic constituents. Therefore the
chance for success in advocacy lobby improves significantly when foreign
interests identify the coinciding interests of US domestic groups, educate
the groups for the interests at stake and let the US groups to act.
The following discussions of foreign-related advocacy cases and the
activities of some of the major countries should help further highlight the
three points raised so far.
China and "New China Lobby" by the US Private Sector
Lobbying by and on behalf of China tends to be dominated by the annual
Congressional renewal of China's trading status as the "most favored
nation" (MFN). The MFN question has occupied the center of US-China
relations, since all other issues (e.g. human rights, proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, etc.) are reviewed together in conjunction with the
MFN debate. It is generally believed that the US business community itself
has probably spent more on this annual ritual of China MFN renewal debate
than it has on any other issues. The reason for the need of this feverish
lobbying effort by US businesses is simple. As China has many supporters
among US businesses, it has as many enemies among US social issues
groups. The lobby these issue groups carry out is called the "Reverse China
Lobby." Even within the business community, there are groups that do not
104 This relates to the point repeatedly made in this study regarding the old and new China
Lobby.
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want automatic renewal of MFN. Such business groups are found, for
instance, among the industries dependent upon intellectual property rights.
In addition to the reverse-China lobby groups, the persistent existence of
contentious issues such as human rights, democracy, weapons proliferation,
etc. make the annual MFN lobby very expensive for the US businesses that
want a permanent MFN for China.
What role does China play in this? In comparison with other major
embassies, the PRC's Washington Embassy has maintained low profile in
Washington. There have few outreach efforts or formal coordination of
MFN coalition, even though the Chinese officials do talk informally with
the representatives of US businesses about the MFN renewal. The Chinese
government is not known for skillful handling of the US Congress. The size
of the Congressional Affairs staff has been increased since recent criticism
of weak congressional relations. The result of this change is yet to be seen.
The Embassy has shad a long contract with one of Washington's major law-
lobbying firms. But the firm's activities seem to have been mostly
legislative monitoring and analysis, and maybe very few, if any, advocacy
lobbies.
While the Chinese maintain low profile in direct advocacy lobbying, it
has been generally believed that the Chinese government has exercised
pressure over US firms discreetly but effectively using the access to its vast
market as a leverage. The Chinese government seems to have made it often
clear that the interest of US companies investing in China may be adversely
affected, should its MFN status is revoked. Such threat would be all the
more credible for two reasons: First, the socialist government exercises
enormous power over its highly regulated economy. Secondly, intense
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international competition over the Chinese market gives China readily
available alternatives to US suppliers of investment capital, technology, and
products, such as those from Europe. The Chinese efforts do not end with
threats. Sometimes, they use the highly controlled and already gigantic
economic power to offer positive incentives. For instance, before the 1993
MFN decision in the US, China dispatched a large scale buying mission to
the US. The mission signed more than a billion dollar worth of contracts for
buying airplanes, cars, and oil production equipment.
With or without these threats being credible, several coalitions of US
businesses are known to exist and promote causes in favor of China. An
informal coalition called "China Normalization Initiative" has been in place,
led by the Boeing Corporation and joined by Motorola and TRW among
others. The primary purpose of this coalition is to establish China's
permanent MFN status. With this goal in mind, the coalition has been also
known to lead MFN renewal efforts every year. The members of the
coalition have staged grassroots mobilization efforts through contacting
related suppliers in each base region. For instance, Boeing covered the state
of Washington, while Motorola and TRW covered California and Texas
respectively. Another organization "US-China Education Foundation" was
created under the leadership of Boeing. The organization has run a major
PR effort orchestrated by one of top US PR firms it hired. The effort
extended to state level pro-MFN coalitions.
The US-China Business Council and the Emergency Committee for
American Trade have formed a large business coalition promoting the
causes of annual MFN renewal and permanent MFN status for China. The
coalition includes about 1,000 companies and works with major US trade
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associations such as US Chamber of Commerce, National Association of
Manufacturers, National Foreign Trade Council, National Retail Federation
and the Business Roundtable. This coalition is believed to be coordinating
advocacy lobby targeting congressional members and PR campaigns for
general pubiic.
US business' efforts to advocate the commercial engagement with China
have extended beyond forming these coalitions. Companies and their
representative organizations have hired one time or another many renowned
former US foreign policy makers, such as Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig,
Lawrence Eagleburger, etc. and have had them speak for the cause of the
engagement.
The point made earlier still remains. The "New China Lobby" is a US
domestic lobby, where domestic groups act because they see specific and
tangible gains (or losses). It should be noted that these US companies do not
work to improve China's overall image, which is another equally urgent
problem for China. US companies work on Chinese MFN, because it is their
self-interest to do so. Foreign interests sometimes have initial leverage to
highlight specific gains for US groups. China has that in this case.
Lobbying by and for Israel
Israel government has hired several major lobby and PR firms to
advance its causes. A few private companies and organizations of Israel also
have hired similar firms. The areas of Israeli interests are broad including
ensuring continued foreign aid to Israel, and economic and technological
cooperation and exchange with the United States. However, this study has
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found that the reported size of the official representation does not fully
match the US public perception of Israel as the source of the most powerful
foreign lobbying in the US. In fact, the root of the public perception lies in
the unique situation where powerful US-domestic pro-Israel groups play key
roles, which other countries can not easily imitate.
Israel has the US Jewish community, potentially an unparalleled asset
for lobbying in the United States. Theoretically, the country is capable of
carrying out perhaps the most powerful lobbying to the US government,
based on the political power of the American Jews. But, that is only when
the American Jewish community agrees with the position of the Israeli state
and feels strong enough about it. The limitations imposed by this situation
are as clear as its advantages.
To begin with, it is important to note that the power relationship of the
Israeli state and the American Jewish community is very unique. While
other foreign governments have proactively sought-or hoped-ways to
encourage the US minorities of the shared origin to work for them; in the
case of Israel, it was historically the American Jewish community that has
been more proactive in defining the direction and the agenda. This has to do
with the fact that the Israeli state is much younger than the American Jewish
community. When the Israeli state was created in 1948, it was the Israelis
who were the "new" Jewish community, struggling to survive in a hostile
environment. Other Jewish communities around the world, including that in
the United States, had had much longer experience in the effort to survive.
Therefore, the American Jews in particular, cared deeply about the survival
of this new state, which was extremely poor and dependent upon foreign
aids. Under these circumstances, donations from American Jews during the
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early period accounted for one quarter of the new state's budget. Together
with this enormous assistance, the American Jews created during the early
1950s an organization called the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) devoted to political lobbying and advancing agenda that-they
believed-served to strengthen US-Israeli relations.
AIPAC's operation has been exceptionally effective and successful. The
group has been accepted as a mainstream US domestic political organization.
AIPAC demonstrated effective skills for advocacy, based on active voter
mobilization and direct political contributions from its members to political
candidates.'05 AIPAC's 55,000 members include many pro-Israel fund
raisers. There are about 45 pro-Israel political action committees (PACs)
most of whose members belong to AIPAC. Former AIPAC officials serve in
Democratic National Committee and work for the Speaker of the House.
The majority of US congressional members are expected to appear in
AIPAC annual meetings. Vice President Al Gore, UN Ambassador Bill
Richardson, Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstadt, House leaders such
as Gingrich and Gephardt spoke at the recent annual meeting.
With this firm root in the US politics AIPAC remained a US interest
group rather than the arm of the Israeli government. AIPAC has maintained
conservative and kept closer ties to the Likud Party of Israel. As the Labor
Party led by Yitzhak Rabin came into power and started the Middle East
Peace Process, AIPAC had to stand on sidelines as Rabin maintained a
105 AIPAC has clamned that it is not a political action committee (PAC). In 1990 review,
Federal Election Commission confirmed it. However, in 1996 the US Court of Appeals
declared the review an error, forcing FEC to reopen the AIPAC case. If named as a PAC,
AIPAC will have to disclose details of its fund raising and campaign expenditures.
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direct and unusually close relationship with the White House. With its direct
involvement drastically reduced, AIPAC's response to the Middle East
Peace Process and its relationship with the Israeli government remained
tenuous at best, and the organization searched for a different agenda to work
on independently such as supporting Senator D'Amato's Iran-Libya
Sanction Act. With the successful enactment of the law and the
assassination of Rabin, AIPAC has been expected return to the center stage
of Israel-US interaction. But the future of this American political group
remains uncertain, as the stated position of the Israel's Likud government
and the actions of AIPAC continued to show signs of disagreement, even on
such basic issues of US aid to Israel.
Japanese Lobbying Operations in Washington
Japan has had enormous interests in maintaining good bilateral
relationship with the United States, as its security guarantor and the most
important market for its goods. For that reason, Japan has sought-not
always successfully however-to engage in pro-active and sophisticated
lobbying effort to the US government. Since the security side of the
relationship has been managed mainly through official government-to-
government interaction, the lobbying effort-the unparalleledly largest size
among all countries-has focused mainly on economic issues as the data of
this study have demonstrated. The Japanese government itself has hired a
large number of major law, lobbying, consulting and PR firms, as do the
numerous Japanese companies. Also, major local governments such as those
of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Fukui, and Hokkaido hire such US firms to
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promote trade and tourism. The Japanese External Trade Organization
(JETRO) is engaged in coordinating the trade promotion efforts by these
various entities. The Japanese central government has exerted remarkable
efforts to improve US understanding of its culture and society. Such efforts
include the support for the Japan Information and Culture Center (JICC) in
Washington. Strategically located in the center of Washington's major US
media organizations, JICC provides informational and cultural events and
material to the US public.
Virtually all major Japanese corporations, such as Sony, Toyota, Nissan,
Toshiba and NTT, hire many of the most prominent US lobbying firms.
Their spending level is the top among all the countries. The regressions of
this study showed that their level of spending is exceptionally high, always
far out, away from the cluster of other countries. The multivariate
regressions show that being an extreme outlier, Japan's exceptionally high
level of spending can not fully explained by any of combination of the
variables chosen. For example, frequency of bilateral trade issues being
raised, volume of trade, size of the economy, or even the trade balance
could not fully account for the magnitude of the high spending level. In
addition to the factors measured in this study, such as bilateral trade
imbalance with the US, the attention the bilateral US-Japan trade
relationship was attracting and the ensuing surge of trade conflicts; there
must have been immeasurable factors. They may include the degree to
which the Japanese felt they were misunderstood by the US and the degree
of cultural frustration that the Japanese felt when they tried to explain their
position to the US public. Another factor may have to do with the fact that
the Japanese have often aimed hiring the most expensive lobbyists. Three
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former United States Trade Representatives have been hired to represent the
Japanese corporations: Robert Strauss (Fujitsu), William Brock (Toyota),
and William Eberle (Nissan).
Whatever the explanation for the high Japanese spending level may be,
there is one thing the level of spending indicates: The Japanese have fully
recognized the importance of US domestic public opinion in connection
with US policy towards Japan. Especially the US public's growing concern
over the increasing Japanese investment in the US during the late 1980s and
the early 1990s must have played a critical role in increasing the Japanese
grassroots outreach efforts. In fact, many different cases of Japanese efforts
highlighting the benefits of the Japanese investment in terms of job creation
and economic growth began to attract public attention around this period.
The Japanese auto makers have been particularly active in this regard, trying
to convince the US public that the Japanese cars made in the United States
were American products produced by American workers. Along with the
efforts by the firms, various business organizations-such as the Japanese
Automobile Manufacturers Association-that represent these firms also
have hired major US lobbying firms and exerted similar efforts.
Cases of Japan's Success: the Fuji-Kodak case and the 1995 US-
Japan auto dispute
A success in foreign lobbying in the US may be defined as that in
preventing the US government from taking an adversary action with regard
tc a specific country. With that definition being accepted, Japan-despite
the exceptionally high level of spending for lobbying-has not often been
regarded as being very successful in trying to persuade the US of its
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positions in trade dispute cases. But, two cases stand out where Japan
exerted all-out efforts and was regarded as relatively successful-not in
terms of the aforementioned definition but simply-in minimizing the US
offensive. They were the Fuji-Kodak dispute and the 1995 US-Japan auto
cases.
i) Fuji-Kodak case
In December 1997, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has raised
Fuji's hand over Kodak regarding the long running dispute between the two
companies, determiaing that the case did not stand. This was a dispute not
just between the two companies, but also involving the two countries, the
United State and Japan. From before the dispute had reached WTO and ever
since the case began to be fought out inside the United States, Fuji had
launched a large scale public relations campaign refuting Eastman-Kodak's
claim that Fuji (and Japan) have limited foreign access to Japan's
photographic film market. This case marked an interesting contrast with the
1995 auto case, in that the level of US public attention was much lower in
this film case than the auto case to be discussed later. But, regardless of this
low level of public attention, Fuji mounted perhaps the largest public
relations battle ever recorded so far in international trade dispute cases. The
amount of efforts Kodak put into this case was also monumental and
perhaps had am escalating effect on Fuji response. Nonetheless, it is
generally regarded that-even though Fuji did not succeeded in minimizing
Kodak's offensive-the Japanese company outdid the American company
in making its case the public of the US and to WTO.
Fuji hired top Washington firms, in all three areas of support needed in
trade cases; legal counseling, public relations, and advocacy lobbying. The
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PR company hired has long boasted the Fuji case as one of its best
credentials. Thanks in part to the PR company's support, Fuji maintained a
very vigorous media profile. The film company placed full-page
advertisements in major US newspapers, refuting Kodak's allegations and
highlighting Kodak's alleged lack of marketing efforts in Japan. In addition
to the efforts toward the general public, Fuji also targeted key congressional
members. They sent them cards signed by, and the pictures of, the American
workers of Fuji production facilities within each member's districts,
emphasizing its job creation in America and weaknesses of Kodak's
arguments. It is generally viewed that these efforts raised doubts on-and
indifference to-Kodak's position within the US, before the case went to
WTO.
ii) 1995 US-Japan Auto Dispute
In 1995, the United States and Japan narrowly averted an all-out trade
war over the issue of US access to the Japanese auto and auto parts markets.
The United States had insisted on establishing quantitative targets with
Japanese commitment. Facing the Japanese refusal, the US government had
even announced the list of Japanese cars to be affected by the resultant US
sanction. With the sanction deadline approaching, the two countries agreed
to end the dispute with Japanese commitment to take voluntary actions
without quantitative targets. During this incident, Japan waged a large scale
lobbying campaign addressing to the US general public and policy makers.
At the time of the auto dispute, Japanese government and corporations
hired about 70 lobbying firms. The government alone had more than 30
such US firms working on advocacy lobbying, public relations and legal
counseling. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) led the
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government side efforts together with the assistance from JETRO. The goal
of the Japanese campaign was to counter the US claim that serious trade
barriers existed in Japan and acted as significant impediments to US auto
exports to Japan. Japan hammered away two main points in their messages:
First, the Japanese automobile market was already open. Second, a new
bilateral agreement was ineffective, if reached under the threat of a sanction.
Using press conferences and written statements, Japan emphasized the lack
of US auto makers efforts for marketing in Japan. The most often mentioned
example was the lack of right-hand drive models. The Japanese also
aggressively used data and numbers, countering the numbers presented by
the US side. They emphasized fact that there has been a consistent growth in
the number of US cars sold in the United States since the mid 1980s. The
message was actively disseminated and became well-known and widely
recognized-therefore effective-when repeated consistently.
Japanese auto makers waged a public relations campaign as active as-
if not more than-that of the government. The Japan Automobile
Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and Keidanren, the largest industry
association of Japan, worked closely with the companies. The private sector
led campaign carried an essentially same message as its government
counterpart. But, the campaign was supported by a significant resource
unmatched by any. It was their production basis inside the US. Toyota,
Nissan and Honda released media releases highlighting the number of jobs
they created in Kentucky and Ohio. They highlighted the importance of
bilateral trade relationship and the potential harm the US trade sanctions
could bring to the US consumers. Japanese auto makers worked closely with
the American Automobile Dealers Association (AIADA), organizing US
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domestic support. Representing over 10 thousand auto dealers marketing
foreign brand vehicles, AIADA disseminated series of position papers
warning that a US trade sanction would hurt over two thousand US auto
dealers selling Japanese cars and threaten the job security of their 81
thousand employees. These domestic groups exerted a significant pressure
for the Administration in taking its final position.
These campaigns by the Japanese auto makers, their US domestic
supporters and the Japanese government resulted in Japan's achieving its
original objective; avoiding quantitative targets for market access. The
agreement called for building even more Japanese production facilities in
the United States. These campaigns without an exception required
significant financial resource, since almost every one of them was designed,
organized and carried out by the public relations and lobbying professionals.
This was a case of exemplary success for professionally managed public
relations campaign representing foreign interest.
Taiwan's cases of success
Taiwan is one of a few countries whose Washington operation is
generally viewed as successful. The key reasons for this success are; firm
focus on a few key objectives, allying with a few key individuals and
organizations to advance the objectives, proactively using the alliances to
convey its message to key policymakers.
It is generally viewed that Taiwan has maintained its focus firmly on a
few clearly defined objectives. The goals are making US take occasional
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symbolic actions of political recognition, continuation of bilateral trade and
military support. This small number of clear objectives made it possible for
Taiwan to establish and carry out effective strategies for achieving those
objectives. Also, the small number of clear goals produced a set of short and
unambiguous messages. They were easy to repeat and to convey effectively
to key policy makers in Washington. Taiwan formed and utilized strong ties
with human rights groups, members of the Congressional and state
governments, and several US business groups. Taiwan took full advantage
of mutual interests with these groups depending on the issues. Taiwan has
been highly proactive in seizing the opportunity to ad ance the specific
goals when situations arose.
In 1989, immediately following the Tiananmen Square crackdown,
Taiwan contacted human rights groups in the United States, urging for an
action. It ran advertisements in several major newspapers, in alliance with
the human rights groups decrying the Tiananmen situation. These endeavors
allowed Taiwan to take full advantage of the situation and enhanced
Taiwan's position vis-a-vis China in terms of political recognition. In 1995,
Taiwan wanted have its president, Lee Teng-Hui, attend the 5 0 th reunion at
Cornell University as a political action symbolizing to overcome China's
insistence for non-recognition of Taiwan. In order to do so, Taiwan hired a
number of top Washington representatives. They then contacted
conservative Congressional staff members who were skeptical of the US's
One China Policy. The staff members worked hard to build wider range of
support in both chambers. Eventually the both chambers passed a resolution
calling for granting visa to Lee. When Lee visited the United States,
extensive media coverage of his visit highlighted the Taiwanese success in
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destabilizing the administration's One China Policy. Taiwan carried out a
similar effort to mobilize support in the Congress, when China had a
military demonstration during Taiwan's election in 1996. The Congress
again passed a resolution issuing a warning for US military response against
any frther show of force by China.
Taiwan has also worked hard to build ties with the Congress and state
governments, through privately funded trips to Taiwan. Congressional
staffs' fact-finding trips are common on Capitol Hill, but among the
congressional staffs the Taiwan trips are known as the best deals in terms of
the attention to details and treatment of the visitors during the trip. The
same applies to the state government officials visit to Taiwan. President Bill
Clinton is known to have visited Taiwan four times and never visited China
before he became the President. Many people noticed the apparent good
feeling toward Taiwan during the first term of the Clinton administration.
For a specific example in addition to the uneasiness in overall relationship
with Beijing, Taiwanese government officials were allowed in 1996 to visit
their counterparts in most US government agencies for the first time since
1979. The Taiwanese efforts to cultivate relationship with the US state
governments resulted in 23 states and 107 US cities forming various forms
of official trade ties with Taiwan.
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General Lessons: How to Improve Foreign Lobbying in-and
Transnational Communication with-the United States
i) Money does not buy influence in foreign lobbying
US citizens and oreigners together share the view that lobbying is an
action of "buying" influence and that the same applies to foreign
lobbying.' 06 One of the key points of this study is that, as repeatedly
emphasized, such is not the case. First of all, lobbying is an act of
communication. That is what all the US domestic industry associations'
office in Washington are engaged in most of the time. They spend most of
their time and other resources producing their positions on various issues
and conveying them to the policy makers.
In domestic lobbying, however, money may sometimes buy influence by
way of campaign and political contributions. In contrast, as referred
repeatedly earlier, that is prohibited in the case of foreign lobbying. Under
such circumstance, it is not only impossible to buy influence through money
but also it is extremely risky to try to do so.
What about spending for foreign lobbying and representation? The
bottom line is that the money spent shows the amount of efforts put in to
deal with issues. More efforts through representation will increase the
chances for specific views heard. But, the size of money itself can not
guarantee the success of efforts, as the previous section discussed. The
following are the important factors for successful lobbying in the United
States.
106 See Choate, Prestowitz and Tolchin in fn. 8.
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ii) There has to be a long-term strategy, coherent and consistent
Israel and Taiwan, as discussed above, have had clear and consistent
goals, which made them stand out as successful case. When there is a
simple message repeated coherently, the change for success is high. Of
course, being able to produce such message depends in significant part on
the situation a cotuntry faces. It is easier for a countly to do so, when there is
an overriding security concern such as the cases of Taiwan and Israel. For
the countries with top priorities mainly in economic dimensions, it is more
difficult to do so. It is because issues often differ in nature and the issues
may be in competition with one another. Thus, the messages will have to be
tailored differently each time. The case of Japan may belong to such
category. However, two points need emphasized. First, even in the case of
various issues in competition for attention and resources, overall
coordination of a country's messages should be sought-to .le extent it is
possible-in order to minimize the cases of messages canceling each other
off. Secondly, even when there are different messages, important ones need
to be repeated consistently. This is difficult since doing so requires
resources. As this study demonstrates as a key point, most foreign lobbying
and representation occurs ex-post. Effective lobbying efforts are preventive
ones. Consistent attention makes preventive efforts possible.
iii) Key is to be heard, not to manipulate
Many people share the perception that lobbying is an effort to buy off or
manipulate/deceive the targeted audience. The previous part has argued that
the buying off is not the case. It is neither the case of manipulation or
deception. The winners in lobbying-both foreign and domestic-often the
winners are the ones who conveyed their straight forward messages most
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clearly and repeatedly. Manipulative and deceptive tactics are usually
unrewarding, at best, counterproductive and disastrous at worst.
iv) Highlight mutual interests
Direct opposition or confrontation can not easily produce any results. To
persuade the party listing, one needs to highlight the points where mutual
interests overlap. It is always more effective to begin any issue campaign,
keeping in mind the mutual interests shared with the targeted audience,
rather than the points in opposition with the audience. Especially in foreign
lobbying it is important to seek US domestic groups that share same
interests. One case in point was Japan's auto dispute with the United States
where the country highlighted the mutual benefit of stable and uninterrupted
trade relationship and mobilized the support of auto dealers that sold
Japanese import cars.
v) Link with domestic voters, if possible
In seeking the US domestic groups that share mutual interests, it is best
to look for groups that can exercise direct influence on specific policy
makers through votes. In that regard, foreign businesses with investment in
the US-especially in the form of production sites with large employment-
can enjoy clear advantage, because the size of local employment can directly
translate into votes. Near the end of the 1995 auto dispute, when the US
announced trade sanctions, the targets of sanctions included the Japanese
cars produced inside Japan and not the ones produced locally in the United
States. In the times of no salient issues, it is important to continuously
emphasize job and tax revenue creation by the local production and various
public services the local production provides. Having a sympathetic ethnic
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group provides similar advantage, as long as the relationship with the group
is well maintained. The Israel's example is a case in point.
While having US local procduction or supportive ethnic groups offer best
advantage, when there are no suci? resources available, a country still has to
address their positions i terms of mutual interests shared with key
constituents for the directly involved policy makers.
vi) Do not overlook the Congress
For foreigners, the most difficult Washington political institution to
understand is the US Congress. Therefore, quite easily, many foreign
representatives in Washington shun from the Capitol Hill, even when they
face issues directly involving the Congress. A famous such case has been
China. Two common problems call for attention.
First, foreigners often have hard time understanding how the Congress is
involved in a particular issue, for instance, at what point of a particular
process the Congress can enter or exercise influence officially and
unofficially. Without clear knowledge of this, it will be difficult to prepare
for dealing with the Congress. Professionals in foreign representation try
hard to educate their foreign clients, but they often acknowledge the
difficulty in doing so.
Second, foreigners often forget to consider how the Congress or its
individual members can exercise influence even over the issues that seem to
have little to do with the Capitol Hill. Foreign representatives face many
restrictions in providing Congressional members with incentives (i.e. no
votes, no campaign contributions, etc.) But, even an ,dequate acquaintance
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with Congressional members and/or their staffs can make a big difference.
Countries such as Israel and Taiwan work on such relationships on the




This study has sought to explain why foreign countries are engaged in
foreign lobbying in the U.S in the ways they are. This study has generated
data sets, showing widely varying cowuntry differences of foreign lobbying in
the United States. In explaining the country differences, the study has
produced five major findings. 1) Most importantly-assuming ceteris
paribus-the more frequently bilateral issues are raised in the United States
about a specific country, the more time and money that country will spend
to lobby in the United States. 2) The more knowledge the general public of a
country has about the United States, the more active that country's advocacy
lobbying to the US Congress will be. 3) The wealthier the country is, the
more it will focus on advocacy lobbing to the Congress. 4) The more
pluralistic a country is, the more active it will engage in trade lobbying. 5)
The more similar a country's business practices are to American business
practices, the more that country will be engaged in active advocacy lobbying
to the US Congress and overall trade lobbying.
To illustrate the most important of the five-point 1) above-the
research has found that issue salience-how often a specific country is
mentioned in the US media-has the most influence in determining how
active a country becomes in foreign lobbying in the United States-when
measured in terms of foreign lobbying expenditures. Simply put, countries
spend money in foreign lobbying, first and foremost, when issues about
them become highly-and often negatively-publicized. Therefore, the
issue-driven "Reaction Model" works best in explaining-and even
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predicting-country behavior in foreign lobbying in the US.'0 7 At the same
time, it is worth noting the indications that the capability-driven "Resource
Model" and the norm-driven "Norms Model" matter too.
It is hoped that this study makes contributions in two dimensions. First,
the study constructs and explains the overall picture of foreign lobbying i.n
the United States, a subject area that has been widely speculated and talked
about but rarely studied and poorly understood. The data obtained during
the process of this research present a wide range of promising opportunities
for various further analyses on foreign lobbying in the United States.
Secondly, this study employs a regression method to compare issue,
capability and norm variables simultaneously in order to explain behavior of
different countries. Beyond the issue areas of foreign lobbying, this
methodology may be applied to explaining other behaviors of social actors
(including the states), where the interplay of issues, capabilities and norms
often collectively determine behavioral outcomes of those social actors.
107 For the discussion of different models, see from page 19.
131
Appendix Design and Results of the Main Regression
APPENDIX I: DETAILED DISCUSSION ON
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION OF THE CROSS-
SECTIONAL DATA
1. THE DESIGN OF TH4E MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL
Continuing the discussion of chapter IV, Section 3, the following table
of next page summarizes the entries for Y, S, C, and N. As the rows of the
Tables 10.1 and 2 show, there were five equations (Yal, Ya2, Yb, Yc Yd)
to work with, depending on the patterns and sizes of foreign presentation.
The second column (Y) includes dependent variables that indicate
patterns and sizes of different countries' Washington representation.
Columns three though five (S, C, N - CK & C should be counted as one
column.) show the expected independent variables. The choice of
independent variables for each corresponding dependent variable is not
identical and therefore not random. Each independent variable was
included in each equation, based on careful consideration and reasoning,
which has been laid out in pages 55 through 63.
Based on the four-row breakdowns shown in the Tables 10, the
following five equations (3) through (7) were used, continuing from the first
two equations of chapter VI, section 3 on page 63. The size of "n" for each
equation was determined, in each row of the Tables 10.1 and 10.2, by
multiplying the number of variables in each of the Y, S, C, N columns. 108
108 For instance, the "n=120" of equation (6) results from: two variables (TrdLbTotMth and
TrdLbTot$) of the Y column and the row six (Yc) in Table 10 times three variables
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Yial = 13 ia + BsiMal + 3ciCal + niNal + Cial
Yia2ia2 Oa2 + 3siMa2 + 3ciCa2 + 13niNa2 + ia2
Yib = Boib + 3 siMb F 1 3ciCb 3niNb + ib
Yic = f3oic + 3siMc + 3ciCc + 3niNc + gic





The problems common to regression analyses, such as multicollinearity
or simultaneous equation problems, were not seriously anticipated with this
design.109 Possible time lag problems between independent and dependent
variables were carefully considered and dealt with. Altogether, the results of
this research should be generally replicatable. And, its findings may be
further tested with new Attorney General Reports covering periods after
1991, when available.
(IssFrqTrd, TrdVolUs, TrdActCas) of the S column times five variables (DplTieYrs,
NwkCrtTot, FrnStdUs, GrsNtnPrd, PerCapGnp) of C column times four variables
(PolAsnTot, CrpldxRtn, PerCapCam, PrvAsnTot) of the N column.
109 For problems of regression methods, see Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) pp. 40-44; and A. H. Studenmund and Henry J.
Cassidy, Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1987).
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Table 10.2. Variables Table (2) 10
Dependent Independent Variables
Variables __ _
Y S C N
Capabilities Nornms
Behavior in Issues CK) Knowledge CE) Economic Familiarity with
ForeignFobbigng Plural Politics at
Lobbying Capabilities Capabilities Plural Poitics at
____________ home _____home
Yc) Trade Sc) Reasons for CcK) CcE ) Nc)Lobby: Action: Dli~s cLobby: Action: DpIlTieYrs, GrsNtnPrd and PolAsnTot,
Time Bilateral trade NwkCrtTot, and , PerCapGnp, as PrvAsnTot,
(TrdLbTot issues FrnStdUs, as included above CrpldxRtn, &
Mth) and frequency included above PerCapCam as
money (IssFrqTrd), included above
(TrdLbTot$) Trade Volume
spent with the US
(TrdVolUs),
US trade
· .~ >actionscr. (TrdActCas)
Yd) Political Sd) Reasons for CdK) CdE) Nd)
Representatio Action: DplTieYrs, GrsNtnPrd and PolAsnTot,
n: Non-trade issue NwkCrtTot and PerCapGnp, as PrvAsnTot,
Time frequency FrnStdUs, as included above CrpldxRtn, &
(PolLbTotM (NonTrdlss), included above PerCapCam as
th) and Total aid from included above
money Toa!idfo
o $ US (BItAidUs)(PolLbTot$)
invested
The following shows the examples of the actual regressions. The number
"68" indicates that it is the 6 8th regression whose resulted in summarized in
column no. 68 of the Table 14 shown later. TLTM is the dependent variable
110 1) See pg. 54-63 for how different variable codes denoting different independent and
dependent variables. 2) For Sb above, the logic in relating IssFrqGen to AdvLb/InfCntLb
was the following. Under the normal circumstances where a bilateral relationship between
the US and a country was not publicized, the representatives in the US would probably be
engaged in ordinary information collection and contacting building activities. On the other
hand, when the bilateral relation attracted media attention, it probably meant that there were
contentious issues on the table and therefore it was more likely the situation where more
advocacy lobby was needed.
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("total lobbying measured in terms of total months"). Causal variables that
are measured and controlled in turn are; TIF ("total issues frequency" - an
issues variable), GNP ("gross national product" - a capabilities variable),
and NPT ("number of' private associations total" - a norms variable). The
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2. DETAILED RESULTS OF THE REGRESSIONS
This section presents detailed results of the multivariate regression. The
most notable point is that the tables 14, 16, and 17 show the exceptional
importance of issues variables and therefore the supremacy of the Reaction
model. However, other findings with regard to capability variables
(Resource Model) and norm variables (Norms Model) also call for attention.
In the following tables, I listed only those results where F ratio of the
whole model or t-ratio of any of the three parameters recorded a
significance level of 90 percent or higher. I omitted the regression with
less significance, in order to simplify the large size of findings into a
manageable size. I set the threshold of the significance to 90 percent, a
rather high level, in order to maximize the validity of the findings.

























































































No. 7 8 9 10 11 12
Independ LbTotC LbTotC LbTotC LbTotC LbTotC LbTotC
ent Y ong/Ex ong/Ex ong/Ex ong/Ex ong/Ex ong/Ex
Variable
Depende S IssFrqC IssFrqC IssFrqC IssFrqC IssFrqC IssFrqC
nt ong/Iss ong/Iss ong/Iss ong/Iss ong/Iss ong/Iss
Variables FrqEx FrqEx FrqEx FrqEx FrqEx FrqEx
C NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd FrnStd FrnStdTot Tot Us Us Us Us
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn
Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole R 0.7 0.72 0.7
Model Square
n size 10 9 10
F Ratio *4.67 *4.36 *4.67
Estimate S 0.75 0.32 0.81
S
C 0 0 0
N 0.01 0.02 0
T Ratios S 1.63 0.44 1.34
C *2.19 *2.37 *2.27
N 0.13 0.38 -0.13
* p<0.10 , ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
No. 9, 10 and 12 of table 11 tell us--despite their relatively small n
sizes-that the more knowledgeable a country is about the US system-
indicated by the number of foreign students studying in the US
(FmStdUs)-the more likely it is that the country would direct its foreign
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(LbTotCong/Ex). Such probability is more than 90 percent in three (no. 9,
10 and 12) out of four regressions where FmrnStdUs is included.
Table 12. Congress-Executive Balance in Advocacy Lobby (AdvLbCong/Ex)
no. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Independ AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCAdvLbCo AdvLbCo
ent Y ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex
Variable
Depende S IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo
nt ng/IssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/lssFrq
Variables Ex Ex Ex Ex E Ex Ex
C DpiTieYr DplTieYr DplTieYr DplTieYr NwkCrtT NwkCrtT NwkCrtT NwkCrtT
s s s s o t ot ot
N PolAsnT CrpldxRt PerCapC PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxRt PerCapC PrvAsnT
ot n am ot ot n am ot
Whole R Square 0.2 0.11 0.2 0.11
Model n size 34 43 33 44
F Ratio *2.54 1.64 *2.42 1.76
Estimate S 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.19
C
_ N ' 0.07 0.02 0.06 0
t Ratios S 0.74 1.03 0.62 1.09
C 0.03 *1.91 0.61 *1.79
N **2.70 0.17 *1.99 0.12
no. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Independ AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCoAdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo
ent Y ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex
Variable
Depende S IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo IssFrqCo
nt ng/IssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/IssFrq
Variables Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex
C FmStdU FmStdU FrnStdU FrnStdU GrsNtnPr GrsNtnPr GrsNtnPr GrsNtnPr
s s s s d d d d
N PolAsnT CrpldxRt PerCapC PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxRt PerCapC PrvAsnT
ot n am ot ot n am ot
Whole R Square 0.83 0.73 0.15 0.22
Model n size 8 9 30 29
F Ratio **6.71 *4.52 1.62 *2.48
Estimate S -0.05 0.67 0.2 0.12
S
C 
N 0.07 0 0.51 0.08
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t Ratios S 0.1 1.1
~C ~ 2.11 *2.0E
N _1.61 - 0.24N.....
no. 29 30 31 32
Independ AdvLbCo AdvLbCo AdvLbCo
ent Y ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex ng/Ex
Variable
Depende S IssFrqCo IlssFrqCo IlssFrqCo IlssFrqCo
nt ng/lssFrq ng/lssFrq ng/IssFrq ng/lssFrq
Variables Ex Ex Ex Ex
C PerCapG PerCapG PerCapG PerCapG
np np npnp
N PolAsnT CrpldxRt PerCapC PrvAsnT
ot n am ot
Whole R Square 0.14 0.14
Model
n size 34 34
F Ratio 1.72 1.69
Estimate S 0.25 0.25
S
s C o0 0
N -0.04 0
t Ratios S 1.1 1.1
C **2.09 **2.05
____ N -0.32 -0.14N




According to no. 29 and 32, countries with higher per capita GNP
(PerCapGnp) are likely to channel more of its advocacy lobby to the
Congress than to the executive branch (AdvLbCong/Ex). Such probability is
more than 95 percent in those two out of four regressions where PerCapGnp
is included (no. 29-32).'1
1"' There may be different possibilities for explaining this. One possible explanation is that
richer countries-with higher per capital GNP-possibly have better understanding of the
US system, because they may have more opportunity to interact with the United States.
Whatever the reason is, it is not because advocacy to the Congress is more expensive. I
calculated monthly average cost for advocacy cases. For advocacy to the Congress the cost
was $25,830.06, while the advocacy cost for the executive branch was $33,768.67.
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Countries with higher scores in the Corruption Index (CrpIdxRtn)-the
"cleaner" countries-seem to focus more of their advocacy lobby to the
Congress than to the executive branch (AdvLbCong/Ex). Such probability
is 95 percent or higher in two cases (no. 14 and 26), and 90 percent or
higher in one case (no. 18), out of total four regressions where CrpldxRtn is
included. This finding supports the possibility that those countries with high
scores in the Corruption index-the "clean" countries-are more like the
United States in terms of their socio-political systems. This makes sense,
because the index is based on interviews with Western-mostly
American-business executives about their perception of how easy it is to
do a business in different countries.
When the Newsweek Magazine's circulation (NwkCrtTot) was chosen
as a variable measuring the knowledge about the United States, it was
expected that the higher the NwkCrtTot measurement for a country, the
more likely it is that the country would be savvy in Washington lobbying.
According tc no. 17 and 20, higher NwkCrtTot is indeed found to be related
to more advocacy lobby to the Congress than to the executive branch
(AdvLbCong/Ex). Such probability is 90 percent or higher in those two out
of four cases where NwkCrtTot is considered.
Table 13. Advocacy Lobby Vs. Information and Contact Lobby(AdvLb/InfCntLb)
no. 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
Independ AdvLb/I AdvLb/I AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/I AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/I AdvLb/I AdvLb/l
ent Y nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb
Variable
Depende S |lssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq
nt Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Vrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn_ Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
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t Ratios S t he__ _ __
no. 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52
Independ A A A b/Lb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l AdvLb/l
ent Y nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLbntfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLbnfCntLb nfCntLb nfCntLb
Variable
Depende S IssFrq lssFrq lssFrq lssFrq IssFrq IssFrq IssFrq lssFrq IssFrq lssFrq
nt Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen Gen
Variables c FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd p Gp Gnp G p







t Ratios S 0.19
C **-2.93
N *-1.98
* p<0.1O, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
As the table 13 indicates, the results of regressions with the mPamber of
advocacy lobbies divided by the number of information collection and
contact assist activities (AdvLb/InfCntLb) were generally weak in
comparison with other regression results. This may possibly indicate poor
choice in selecting AdvLb/InfCntLb as the dependent variable (and/or
IssFrqGen as an independent variable.)
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Table 14. Trade Lobby Measured in Months
No. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62
Independ TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IlssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT
nt rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn CrpldxTot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
Whole R 0.81 0.85 0.98 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.99 0.99
Model Square
n size 50 41 10 51 50 40 9 51 11 10
F Ratio ***66.4 ***71.6 ***147. ***103. ***86.6 * **79.4 ***134. ***122. ***268. ***433.
7 8 74 49 9 1 12 42 58 79
Estimate 2.6 2.57 2.93 2.54 2.18 2.27 2.86 2.26 2.79 2.7
s S
C 2.76 2.5 0.24 1.21 17.61 13.7 2.56 11.74 0.06 0.05
N 11.26 88.63 -161.88 0.43 7.98 61.98 -157.77 0.36 31.1 57.2
tRatios S ***13.6 ***13.9 ***19.9 ***16.3 ***11.1 ***11.0 ***14.5 ***13.3 ***25.8 **28.1
2 1 0 5 2 1 8 6 6 0
C **2.13 **1.94 0.12 1.11 ***4.10 ***2.95 0.55 ***2.98 **3.07 **3.23
0.09 ***2.91 -1.8 ***4.47 0.07 *1.85 -1.69 ***3.88 0.23 1.56
No. 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
Independ TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S IssFrqT IlssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IssFrqT IlssFrqT IlssFrqT IlssFrqT IlssFrqT IssFrqT
nt rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd rd
Variables FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsnCam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole R 0.99 0.82 0.87 0.99 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.93
Model Square
n size 11 35 34 7 36 39 35 10 39
F Ratio ***284. ***48.5 ***70.3 ***4645 ***129. ***102. ***86.9 ***164. ***158.
03 8 3 .39 07 16 3 19 62
Estimate 2.75 3.13 2.98 3.54 3.47 2.37 2.68 2.88 2.59
s S
C 0.05 0.38 -0.39 -0.68 -0.75 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 0.28 265.22 135.03 -67.69 0.59 -410.72 45.64 -160.04 0.42
t Ratios S ***22.0 ***8.47 ***9.47 ***52.1 ***14.1 ***12.5 **'13.2 **1 9.3 ***17.8
5 9 1 7 9 2 6
C **2.79 -1.53 *-1.89 ***- ***-4.43 ***3.79 0.91 0.82 *1.79
10.59
N 0.68 0.85 ***3.67 **-3.46 **6.57 **-2.70 0.38 *-2.06 ***5.31
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No. 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 8
Independ _ TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMtl'I
Variable
Depende S TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol
nt Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PoLAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtr
Whole R 0.13 0.26 0.56 0.21 0.45 0.43 0.46
Model Square _ 
n size 50 41 10 51 50 40 51
F Ratio *2.39 **4.39 2.55 ***4.34 ***'12.6 ***9.22 ***13.5
.__ _ _ _ _ 1 _ _  9
Estimate S 1736.1 3007.8 8183.7 1913.6 469.16 787 592.05
s 2 1 3 7
C 1.87 2.68 18.02 0.69 39.61 37.11 37.08
N -322.24 149.35 694.47 0.6 -116.32 35.48 0.23
t Ratios S **2.05 ***2.98 **2.50 **2.41 0.69 0.72 0.87
C 0.67 0.93 1.37 0.26 ***5.29 ***3.40 ***4.79
_ N -1.26 **2.18 1.46 **2.56 -0.5' 0.48 1.15
No. 83 84 85 861 87 88 89 90 91 92
ndepend y TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable 
Depende S TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol TrdVol
nt Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us Us
Variables c FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn
__ _Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole R 0.6 0.69 0.93 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.63 0.5
Model Square
n size 35 34 7 36 39 35 10 39
F Ratio ***15.7 ***23.2 *14.33 ***17.2 ***17.4 ***9.62 *3.55 ***11.7
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _9 0 4 1 0
Estimate S 3307.7 3228.7 4048.3 2965.9 2951.8 3272.2 6834.3 3104.4
s __1 1 7 3 7 2 1
C 1.38 1.22 1.96 1.22 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.06
N 576.37 192.79 54.83 0.3 -961.57 -97.3 350.18 0.3
tRatios S ***3.82 ***4.41 *2.45 ***3.77 ***3.78 **3.41 **2.58 ***3.69
C ***5.97 ***6.10 **3.84 ***5.47 ***6.36 **3.47 1.89 ***4.29
N 1.16 ***337 0.16 1.54 **338 -0.88 0.9 1.52,| N ~~~1.16 **3.371 0.16 1,54 **-3.38 -0.88 0.9 :1.52
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No. 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102
Independ TrdLbT rdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbTTrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent Y otMth otMtn otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct
nt Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas
V2iables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx Perap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
Whole R 0.47 0.79 0.85 0.97 0.93
Model Square
nsize 9 9 9 6 6
F Ratio 1.53 **6.40 **10.14 **23.48 *9.46
Estimate S 1636.3 1177.6 1263.5 2317.6 2095.7
s 2 7 9
C -7.61 0.53 -46.88 0.24 0.16
N 3911.6 687.36 1318.6 7471.2 141.193 1 4
tRatios S *2.07 *2.38 **3.07 **7.84 *3.63
C -0.51 0.06 -1.52 *3.64 1.3
N 1 *0.36 *2.82 **2.87 1 1.8 0.45
No. 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
Independ TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT TrdLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct TrdAct
nt Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas Cas
Variables C FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsnCam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole R. 0.93 0.86 0.97 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Model Square 
nsize 6 9 9 9 9 9 9
F Ratio *9.72 **11.02 ***71.9 ***20.0 ***21.7 ***21.9 ***20.3
11 1 1 6 7
Estimate 2152.7 -28.76 113.3 -47.18 405.39 577.34 507.44
s S 7
C 0.18 2.54 1.89 2.24 0.17 0.14 0.16
N 11439.7 431.98 2.53 -2792. 173.38 0.77
_ _ _ _  _2 56 
tRatios S **4.37 -0.05 0.48 -0.11 1.11 1.66 1.47
C 1.67 **3.98 ***6.37 ***4.36 ***5.70 3.11 ***4.41
N 0.51 0.27 ***4.94 1.91 -0.68 0.81 0.52
,,* p<.0, ** p..l_ 
* p< 0. 10,
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Regressions in the table 14 show significant correlation with many of
the variables chosen for all three categories; issues, capabilities, and norms.
First and foremost, table 14 shows that the degree to which bilateral trade
issues are reported in the US media (IssFrqTrd - bilateral trade issues
frequency) can significantly affect how much trade lobby a country carries
out in the U.S. In 19 out of 20 cases (no. 53-72), such probability was 99
percent, a very significant level of confidence. TrdLbTotMth may even be
approximately predicted with IssFrqTrd times 2.74 (standard deviation 0.37,
Upper 95% Mean - 2.92, Lower 95% Mean - 2.56). This seems to provide
sufficient evidence that countries do in fact react to the level of US media
attention they get for their country's bilateral trade relationship with the US.
At a glance, more trade with the United States (TrdVolUs) may seem to
produce more trade lobby (with more than 90 percent confidence level in no.
73-76 and 85-92). But, note that when knowledge (capability)
measurements-Newsweek Magazine circulation (NwkCrtTot) and the
number of foreign students in the US (FmStdUs)-are controlled, such
relationship disappears (no. 77-84). In fact, Newsweek Magazine's
circulation (NwkCrtTot) seems to be significantly related to more trade
lobby (TrdLbTotMth). Such probability is 99 percent in six (no. 57, 58, 60,
77, 78, and 80) out of twelve regressions where NwkCrtTot is included.
This is a very interesting finding. All of these together indicate that besides
the immediate reasons to act, such as the media attention to bilateral trade
relationship (IssFrqTrd), knowledge of the US system matters more, than
sheer volume of trade, for the activism in trade lobby. 1 2
112 The assumption for this research so far has been that, with more circulation of the
Newsweek Magazine, a country will have better understanding of the United States and
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Both larger GNP (GrsNtnPrd) and higher per capita GNP (PerCapGnp)
seem also related to larger size of trade lobby. GrsNtnPrd shows correlation
with TrdLbTotMth, with more than 95 percent confidence level in seven (no.
69, 85-88, 105, 106, and 108) out of 12 regressions where GrsNtnPrd is
included. PerCapGnp shows correlation with TrdLbTotMth, with more than
90 percent confidence level in eight (no. 69, 72, 89, 90, 92, 109, 110, 112)
out of 12 cases where it is considered. One may argue that higher income
level will result in higher volume of trade with the United States (acting
through total bilateral trade with the US - TrdVolUs) and therefore will
produce higher level of trade lobby activities. However, even when
TrdVolUs is controlled, these correlation largely remained intact. Thus, it
would be safe to conclude that the richer economies do more active trade
lobby in the United States, regardless of their bilateral trade volumes.
Regressions in the table 14 show importance of two of the four norm
variables chosen. First of all, corruption index (CrpIdxRtn) shows the
confidence level of more than 90 percent in eight (no. 54, 58, 66, 74, 86, 94,
98, 106) out of 15 regressions where CrpldxRtn is included. Also, the total
number of private associations (PrvAsnTot) shows the confidence level of
more than 95 percent in five (no. 56, 60, 68, 72, 76) out of 15 cases where it
is considered. This significance of some the norm variables is important,
especially because it has been confirmed while other issue and capability
therefore will be more actively engaged in the trade lobby, as noted earlier in fn. 71. An
alternative explanation would be that NwkCrtTot could be just an indicator, and not a cause,
of bilateral interaction. However, such alternative explanation seems unsupported, since
one of such indicators of interaction size, TrdVolUs, has been shown above to be less
powerful than NwkCrtTot. Thus, the original assumption for this research seems sustainable.
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variables are controlled. It shows that socio-political conditions and norms
at home do affect the degree of activism in trade lobby.
Table 15. Trade Lobby Measured in Dollars (TrdLbTot$)
no. 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t $ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr lssFrqTr IssFrqTr I ssFrqTr IssFrqTr issFrqTr
nt d  d d dl d d d d
Variables C DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStdU
rs rs rs rs Tot Tot Tot Tot s
N PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT
ot tn Cam ot ot tn Cam ot ot
Whole Rsquare 0.95 0.97 0.96
Model N size 10 9 11
F Ratio ***42.24 ***68.87 ***75.18
Estimate S 80015.4 89844.4 81048.7
s 5 3
C 89270.0 -368855 458.59
9
N -865387 -4.18 -598177
t Ratios S ***1 0.40 ***11.73 ***14.12
C 0.84 -2 0.43
-0.18 -1.13 -0.08
no. 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr IssFrqTr
nt d d d d d d d d d
Variables FrnStdU FrnStdU FrnStdU GrsNtnP GrsNtnP GrsNtnP GrsNtnP PerCap PerCap
s s s rd rd rd rd Gnp Gnp
N CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxRtn Can ot ot tn Cam ot ot tn
Whole Rsquare 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.12
Model N size 10 11 7 35
F Ratio ***63.90 ***1 09.0 ***32.32 1.44
5
Estimate S 81934.4 86433 77444.4 115624.
s 7 2 2
C 592.57 1089.08 -540.97 16385.3
N -612573 - 246742 661854
33550.1 5 55
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tRatios S **1 1.62 ***1 5.22 **3.37 0.91
C 0.51 1.21 -0.02 *-1.94
N -0.23 -1.75 0.37 *1.98
no. 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo rdLbToTrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLb TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S IssFrqTr IssFrqTr TrdVolU TrdVoIU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU
nt d d s s s s s s s
Variables C PerCap PerCap DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt
Gnp Gnp rs rs rs rs Tot Tot Tot
N PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCapCam ot ot tn Cam ot ot tn Cam
Whole Rsquare 0.95






t Ratios S ***9.39
C 0.74
N -0.51
no. 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo rdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU
nt s s s s s s s s s
Variables C NwkCrt FrnStdU FrnStdU FrnStdU FrnStdU GrsNtnP GrsNtnP GrsNtnP GrsNtnP
Tot s s s s rd rd rd rd
N PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT
ot ot tn Cam ot ot tn Cam ot
Whole Rsquare 0.89
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no. 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdVolU TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC
nt s s s s as as as as as
Variables C PerCap FerCap PerCap PerCap DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY DplTieY NwkCrt
Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp rs rs rs rs Tot
N PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT
ot tn Cam ot ot tn Cam ot ot
Whole Rsquare 0.51 0.7 0.6
Model N size 9 9 9
F Ratio 1.76 *4.04 2.53
Estimate S 496478 395504 413048
s 87 19 95
C -117149 63813.8 94201.5
6 1
N 753446 155478 99751.9
26 37 3
t Ratios S *2.24 *2.32 *2.05
C -0.28 0.19 0.23
N 0.25 1.85 1.09
no. 158 159 160 161 162 163
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC
nt as as as as as as
Variables c NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStdU FrnStdU FrnStdU
Tot Tot Tot s s s
N CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap
tn Cam ot ot tn Cam
Whole Rsquare 0.81 0.59 0.92 0.91
Model N size 9 9 6 6
F Ratio *7.14 2.49 8.02 7.19
Estimate s 428064 418967 700090 728648
s 47 32 93 70
C -1.71 - 5217.18 5563.64
85850.8
N 384085 100913. 1.17E+0 0
44 7 8
t Ratios S **3.09 *2.08 **4.75 *3.71
C -1.66 -0.06 1.58 1.27
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no. 167 168 169 170 171 172
Independ TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo TrdLbTo
ent Y t$ t$ t$ t$ t$ t$
Variable
Depende S TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC TrdActC
nt as as as as as as
Variables C GrsNtnP GrsNtnP PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
rd rd Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsnT PolAsnT CrpldxR PerCap PrvAsnT
Cam ot ot tn Cam ot
Whole Rsquare 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92
ModelN size 9 9 9 9
F Ratio ***41.48 ***21.35 ***19.95 ***19.38
Estimate S -242245 161890 176698 190881
s 16 11 77
C 72398.5 4908.86 5330.82 4973.6
1
N 32038.8 0 -5 9.5E+07 17676.9
t Ratios S -0.03 1.54 1.68 1.86
C ***6.85 ***5.39 **3.75 **4.51
N . 1.18 -0.8 -0.55 -0.4
* p<0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01
The results of TrdLbTot$-based regressions are-slightly less robust
than, but still-largely similar to those of TrdLbTotMth-based regressions.
One of the most noticeable difference from the TrdLbTotMth
regressions is that numbers of section 301 actions (TrdActCas) seem to have
more effect on TrdLbTot$ than it did on TrdLbTotMth. TrdActCas shows
correlation with the confidence level of more than 90 percent in eight (no.
153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164) out of 20 cases where it is
considered. A possible explanation for this is that countries designated-or
those correctly anticipated designation-under section 301 may have been
desperate enough to pay more for-the same or more intensive-trade
lobbying activities.
The size of the total GNP (GrsNtnPrd) and per capita GNP (PerCapGnp)
seem to have slightly less significant relationship with TrdLbTot$ than it
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was the case with TrdLbTotMth. GrsNtnPrd shows correlation with the
confidence level of more than 95 percent in four (no. 147, 165, 166 and
168) out of the 12 regressions where GrsNtnPrd is considered. PerCapGnp
shows correlation with the confidence level of more than 95 percent in three
(no. 169, 170 and 172) out of the 12 cases where it is considered. The data
from the table 14 have shown that richer countries are simply more actively
engaged in trade lobbies regardless of their sizes of trade with the US.
Regressions in the table 14 and 15 together show bilateral trade volume
with US (TrdVolUs) has little effect on the size of trade lobby. 13
Like issue and capability variables, norm variables also show generally
lower level of significance for TrdLbTot$-based regressions than it has been
the case with TrdLbTotMth-based regressions. However, the norm variables
show some signs of significance that should not be missed. The Corruption
Index (CrpIdxRtn)-a "similarity" measurement-shows correlation with
the confidence level of more than 90 percent in three (no. 130, 158, 166) out
of the 15 regressions where CrpldxRtn is included.
Table 16. Political Lobby Measured in Months (PolLbTotMth)
no. 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182
Independ PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depened S NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd
nt Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn ;PolAsn CrpldxTot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
113 In addition to the regressions laid out in these tables, I have also ran regressions with
measurement of countries export dependence on the US market (total export to the US
divided by the country's total export abroad), as mentioned in fn. 70. But, I did not find any
indication of significant correlation with either TrdLbTotMth or TrdLbTot$.
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Whole Rsquar 0.34 0.28 0.6 0.3 0.27 0.37 0.71 0.28 0.67 0.67
Model e
n size 50 41 10 51 50 40 9 51 11 10
F Ratio ***8.23 ***5.01 3.05 ***6.75 ***5.90 ***7.32 *4.22 ***6.27 **4.97 *4.20
Estimate S 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.2 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.18 0.44 0.39
_ C -0.09 0.04 0.75 0.01 1.79 2.22 2.53 2.16 0.01 0.01
N -46.7 4.46 42.96 0 -11.18 -0.7 39.19 -0.01 33.13 10.92
t Ratios ***4.84 ***3.87 *1.95 ***4.49 ***3.60 ***3.62 1.76 ***3.64 *3.05 *2.42
C -0.35 0.14 0.79 0.05 *1.85 **2.30 1.78 **2.19 *2.53 1.68
N *-1.91 0.64 1.01 0.32 -0.4 -0.09 1.05 -0.17 0.61 0.57
no. 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192
Independ PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd
nt Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss
Variables FrnStd FmStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn
Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole Rsquar 0.66 0.31 0.28 0.98 0.28 0.5 0.4 0.63 0.36
Model e
N size 11 35 34 7 36 39 35 10 39
F Ratio **4.57 *4.67 *3.89 ***72.5 -4.19 **1 1.8 ***7.00 *3.44 ***6.59
5 0
Estimate S 0.41 0 0.07 0.85 0.02 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.26
C 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0 0 0 0
N 0.01 -79.59 6.27 9.92 -0.01 -108.14 -6.93 23.41 0
t Ratios S "2.66 0.03 0.56 *4.42 0.22 ***5.45 ***4.22 *2.13 ***4.07
C *2.05 *2.03 1.5 -0.22 **2.04 "2.64 1.25 1.06 1.37
N 0.06 1.3 0.68 0.83 -0.51 ***-3.17 -0.58 0.57 -0.2
no. 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202
Independ PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU
nt s s s s s s s s s s
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
Whole Rsquar 0.24 0.24 0.24
Model e 
N size 15 15 15
F Ratio 1.21 1.19 1.19
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Estimate S 0.13 0.15 0.15
s
s C 0.21 0.07 0.65
N 27.48 -0.32 -0.37
t Ratios S 1.54 *1.83 *1.80
C 0.34 0.12 0.15
N 0.69 -0.64 -0.72
no. 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212
Independ PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT PolLbT
ent Y otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth otMth
Variable
Depende S BItAidU BltAidU BltAidU BItAidU BltAidU BltAidUJ BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU
nt s s s s s s s s s s
Variables C FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn








t Ratios S -0.23
C *2.21
N -0.98
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.0
Regressions in the table 16 show that the degree to which bilateral
issues are reported in the US media (NonTrdIss - bilateral issues frequency,
excluding trade-related issues) significantly affects how much political
lobby a country carries out in the U.S., measured in the total months
(PolLbTotMth). In 15 out of 20 cases (no. 173-192), such probability is
more than 90 percent, a significant level of confidence. This provides
sufficient evidence to conclude that countries do in fact react to the level of
US media attention they get for their country's bilateral political
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relationship with the US, as it has been the case with trade issues shown in
the table 14.
The knowledge of the US system-measured in Newsweek Magazine's
circulation (NwkCrtTot)-seems to affect the size of the political lobby
(PolLbTotMth). Such probability is more than 90 percent in three (no. 177,
178 and 180) out of eight cases. Regressions on the number of foreign
students (FmStdUs) show more than 90 percent of confidence level in two
(no. 181 and 184) out of eight cases. This is another interesting
phenomenon. All of these together indicate that, besides the immediate
reasons to act such as the media attention to bilateral political relationship
(NonTrdlss), better understanding of the US system results in activism in
political lobby.
The regressions show that a larger economic capability results in a larger
size of political lobby. The total GNP (GrsNtnPrd) and per capita GNP
(PerCapGnp) each shows more than 90 percent confidence in two (no. 185
and 188 for GrsNtnPrd, and no. 189 and 212 for PerCapGnp) out of eight
regressions where they are considered respectively.
Table 17. Political Lobby Measured in Dollars (PolLbTot$)
No. 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222
Independ y PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb
ent Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$
Variable
Depende S NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd
nt Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss
Variables C DplTie DplTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
Whole R 0.34 0.28 0.6 0.3 0.27 0.37 0.71 0.28 0.67
Model Square
N size 50 41 10 51 50 40 9 51 10
F Ratio ***8.23 *5.01 3.05 ***6.75 ***5.90 ***7.32 *4.22 *6.27 *4.20
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Estimate S 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.2 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.18 0.39
C -0.09 0.04 0.75 0.01 1.79 2.22 2.53 2.16 0.01
N -46.7 4.46 42.96 0 -11.18 -0.7 39.19 -0.01 10.92
t Ratios S ***4.84 "*3.87 *1.95 ***4.49 ***3.60 ***3.62 1.76 ***3.64 *2.42
-0.35 0.14 0.79 0.05 *1.85 **2.30 1.78 *'2.19 1.68
N *-1.91 0.64 1.01 0.32 -0.4 -0.09 1.05 -0.71 0.57
No. 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 23 1 232
Independ PolLb PolLb Polb PolLb PolLb PolLb PlLb PoILb PolLb PoILb
ent Y Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$
Variable
Depende S NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd NonTrd
nt Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss Iss
Variables C FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gnp Gnp Gp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn
Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot
Whole R 0.31 0.28 0.98 0.28 0.5 0.4 0.63 0.36
Model Square
n size 35 34 7 36 39 35 10 39
FRatio ***4.67 **3.89 *72.5 *4.19 **11.8 ***7.00 *3.44 ***6.59
5 43
Estimate 0 0.07 0.85 0.02 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.26
s S
C 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0 O 0 0
N -79.59 6.27 9.92 -0.01 -108.14 -6.93 23.41 0
t Ratios S 0.03 0.56 "4.42 0.22 ***5.45 ***4.22 *2.13 ***4.07
C *2.03 1.5 -0.22 **2.04 **2.64 1.25 1.06 1.37
N -1.3 0.68 0.83 -0.51 ***-3.17 -0.58 0.57 -0.2
No. 233 234 235 236 237 238 2391 240 241 242
Independ PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb Po lLb PolLb
ent Y Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$
Variable
Depende S BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BitAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU
nt s s s 5 s s s s s s
Variables C DplTie DpTie DplTie DplTie NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt NwkCrt FrnStd FrnStd
Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Tot Tot Tot Tot Us Us
N PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx
Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn Cam Tot Tot Rtn
Whole R 0.24 0.24
Model Square I I I I
nsize 15 15
F Ratio 1.19 1.19
Estimate S 0.15 0.15
s 0.07 0.65
N | l l I -0.32 -0.37
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t Ratios S *1.83 *1.80
Rais 0.12 0.15
N -0.64 -0.72
No. 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252
Independ Y PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb PolLb
ent Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$ Tot$
Variable
Depende S BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU BltAidU
nt s s s s s s 5 s s s
Variables FrnStd FrnStd GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn GrsNtn PerCap PerCap PerCap PerCap
Us Us Prd Prd Prd Prd Gn p Gnp Gnp
N PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn PolAsn Crpldx PerCap PrvAsn










t Ratios S 0.62
C ..***9.10
p N _ _ o_ _ _ _ _
* p<o.10, ** p<o0.05, *** p<o.ol
Regressions in the table 17 show results that are similar to those of the
table 16. The degree to which bilateral issues get attention in the US media
(NonTrdIss - bilateral issues frequency, excluding trade-related issues) seem
to increase activism in political lobby. In 13 out of 20 regressions (no. 213-
232) where NonTrdIss is included, such probability is more than 90 percent,
a significant level of confidence.
The knowledge of the US system-measured in Newsweek Magazine's
circulation (NwkCrtTot)-shows significance of more than 90 percent in
three (no. 217, 218 and 220) out of eight regressions where NwkCrtTot is
included. Curiously, the number of foreign students (FmStdUs) does not
show such relationship. Each of the economic capability variables again
shows significance in two cases (no. 225 and 228 for GrsNtnPrd, and no.
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229 and 252 for PerCapGnp) with more than 90 percent confidence.
Number of political parties (PolAsnTot) seems to affect PolLbTot$ in
no.213 and 229; while, unlike the cases of trade lobby, PrvAsnTot does not
show such effect or similar level of significance. These findings altogether
indicate that the degree of pluralism at home may affect countries'
characteristics of political lobby in the US, in the manner and degree that
are quite different than the case of trade lobby."4
"l4The significance of NwkCrtTot, a familiarity variable, and the economic capability
variables and the weakness of the pluralism variables together indicate that, in political
lobby, countries are believed to act more like unitary actors. This makes sense. In trade
lobby a wide range of private entities firom a country may be involved, but in political
lobbies such involvement is limited. The regression results introduced so far show that.
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APPENDIX II. OTHER REGRESSIONS AND
CORRELATION MEASUREMENTS
1. US SUBSIDIARIES' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS* AND THE EFFECT ON SIZE
OF TRADE LOBBYING *
a. 1) Trade Lobby Size (measured in months) and Political Contribution by
US Subsidiaries:
Regression without Japan
* The political contribution here means the combined amount of PAC and soft money
contributions for 1996 elections (Source: Center for Responsive Politics Web Page, Global
Connections 3/5/98)
"Trade Lobby: 1988-91 combined
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- Linear Fit i
Llnear Fit}
TLTM - 382.345 + 0.00053 USSUBPolCont(95-6)
(Sumnary of Ft 
RSquare 0.609
RSquare dj 0.5699
Root Mean Square Error 604.3807
Mean of Response 897.9167
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 1
Analyss of Variance 
Source DF Sum ofquares Mean S quare F Ratio
Mode1 1 5689340.5 5689341 15.5755
Error 10 3652760.4 365276 Prob>F
C Total 11 9342100.9 0.0027
Parameter Estimates. )
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl Loer 95% Upper 95%
Intarcept 382.34503 217.9585 1.75 0.1099 -103.2997 867.98978
USSUBPolCont(95-6) 0.000526 0.000133 3.95 0.0027 0.000229 0.000823
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a.2) Regression including Japan














- Linear Fit I
Linear Fit I
TLTM = 938.439 + 0.00045 US
|Sumnmary of Fit |
FRSquare
RSquare Pdj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response








Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 4252833 4252833 1.1537
Error 11 40550410 3686401 Prob>F




























 '------ ---------------- ---------- ---------------------
--- ------- '-I- ---- I-- -- --




- _ _ _ _ _ _ ~-
-- - " ---- I-- "I`-----
Appendix II. Other Measurements
b.1) Trade Lobby Size (measured in $) & Political Contribution by US
Subsidiaries: Regression excluding Japan



















TLTD = 1.223e7 + 9.05015 USSUBPolCont(95-6)








jAnalysis of Variance |













C Total 11 3.23841e15 0.0081
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 12227608 4495894 2.72 0.0216 2210068.3 22245148





-_-. .__--_.L___I________L --- "   -- '- '-----'-` ---'--   -` ---  - --  `----'-----
r - --~-~ = =-~·--1
_~~ .
.- . .
-- -- ---~~~--------- ----- --- - --- - - - - - -
.
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b.2) Regression including Japan








- Linear Fit 
Linear Fit|
TLTD = 2.881e7 + 6.90614 USSUBPolCont(95-6)
Summary cf Fit I
RSquare 0.027815
RSquare Adj -0. 06057
Root Mean Square Error 55904487
Mean of Response 35448223
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
|Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 9.83581e14 9.836e14 0.3147
Error 11 3.43784e16 3.125e15 Prob>F
C Total 12 3.5362e+16 0.5860
|Paraneter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 28813775 19500470 1.48 0.1676 -14106634 71734184
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Appendix II. Other Measurements
Key Observations:
1) Japan is an exceptional outlier, as it has been the case in most other
aspects dealt with in this study.
2) Without Japan, the set of correlation shows relatively tight positive
slope. This contradicts the initial expectation: There is no trade-off
between spending in hired trade lobby and affiliated US subsidiaries'
political contribution. There is no reverse correlation between the two.
Rather, the more a country spends on trade lobbying, the more political
contribution its affiliated US subsidiaries make.
3) As it has been the case in most parts of this study, monthly
measurements again produce tighter fit in this set of correlation. This is
probably because the dollar amounts fluctuate more in different cases
for a wide variety of reasons.
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2. NUMBER OF 301 CASES AND CHANGES IN SIZE OF TRADE LOBBYING
The following set of correlation produced no observations that could be
applied across different countries. Country-specific observation is provided
Argentina
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Appendix II. Other Measurements
for each case. In the first case of Argentina, one may see that a constant
increase of trade lobby worked to reduce 301 cases.
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More spending seems to have worked for Brazil. The spending in 1989 and
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For Canada, the expenditure seems
the monthly measurement, a sudden
to improve the situation in 1991 and
to be correlated with the 301 cases. In
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China's centralized decision making system seems to have reacted fairly
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India (2 Super 301 Cases Designated in 1989)
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These data support the general perception that India is exceptionally
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Japan seems to have increased its spending quite responsively.
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Korea reacted quite responsively and reasonably effectively. This may have
had something to do with Korea's relatively centralized decision making
system on trade issues. The office of the President dealt with trade issues
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3. BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE AND TRADE ISSUES
As noted earlier, this research has found that the more often trade issues
are raised in the United States about a particular country, the more active
trade lobby the country is likely to do. Then, what causes the frequency of
trade issues (TIF) to rise in the first place? The correlation analysis below
shows that trade balance plays an absolutely critical role in increasing media
reporting of the bilateral trade relations. The first graph includes Japan and
the second excludes it. In both cases, the correlation between the two





















TIF = 105.567 + 0.04592 TrdBalUS
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.755097
RSquare Ad] 0.750199
Root Mean Square Error 186.254
Mean of Response 184.5577
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 52
[Analysis of Variance|
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 5347996.4 5347996 154.1628
Error 50 1734528.4 34691 Prob>F
C Total 51 7082524.8 <.0001
Parameter Estimates I
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>Ilt
Intercept 105.56741 26.60074 3.97 0.0002
TrdBalUS 0.0459247 0.003699 12.42 <.0001
r- ~ ~ ~ ~ - I~~' -~ -1 --- - 1·1 -- · 1 -I
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E FittincfE - Linear Fit
[Linear Fi~
TIF = 120.226 + 0.02247 TrdBalUS
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.158152
RSquare Adj 0.140972
Root Mean Square Error 167.8427
Mean of Response 139.2549
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 51
(Analysis of Variancej
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 259323.9 259324 9.2053
Error 49 1380387.8 28171 Prob>F
C Total 50 1639711.7 0.0039
iParameter Estimates i/
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltI
Intercept 120.22579 24.32515 4.94 <.0001
TrdBalUS 0.0224725 0.007407 3.03 0.0039
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4. TRADE BALANCE AND TRADE ACTIONS
Does a larger bilateral trade imbalance result in more frequent trade
actions (e.g. unfair trade practice designations under the Section 301 of US
trade law)? As the following graphs show, the correlation between the two
variables is significant only when Japan is included (the first of the
following two graphs).











0.0- I I I I I I
-10000 10000 30000 50000
TrdBalUS
F FittingE - Linear Fit
|Linear Fi4
TAC (Sec301, 85-90avg) = 0.97764 + 0.00005 TrdBalUS
1Summary of Fit J
RSquare 0.594882
RSquare Ad] 0.527362
Root Mean Square Error 0.682912
Mean of Response 1.3975
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 8
IAnalysis of Variance|
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 4.1089367 4.10894 8.8105
Error 6 2.7982133 0.46637 Prob>F
C Total 7 6.9071500 0.0250
(Parameter Estimatesl[
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt
Intercept 0.977642 0.279829 3.49 0.0129
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-5000 0 5000 10000 15000
TrdBalUS
jFittinc[ - Linear Fit
|Linear Fi~
TAC (Sec301, 85-90avg) = 0.9562 + 0.00006 TrdBalUS
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.15961
RSquare Adj -0.00847
Root Mean Square Error 0.746621
Mean of Response 1.144286
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 7
(Analysis of Variance)
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 0.5293592 0.529359 0.9496
Error 5 2.7872122 0.557442 Prob>F
C Total 6 3.3165714 0.3746
IParameter Estimates j 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>lt
Intercept 0.9562026 0.341887 2.80 0.0381
TrdBalUS 0.0000557 0.000057 0.97 0.3746
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5. DOMESTIC MILITARY SPENDING AND POLITICAL LOBBYING IN THE US
The following data analysis produced two important findings. 1) Both of
domestic military spending measurements, one per capita and the other per
GNP, show significant correlation with political lobbying expenditure in the
US measured in dollar terms (the graphs c and d). However that is not the
case with time measurement (the graphs a and b). 2) The finding in 1) led
me to check another set of correlation. I have found that the big military
spender spend large amounts of money in small number of political
lobbying cases, as the graph e) and f) show.
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PLTM = 130.276 + 0.01261 MilEx/Cap91
Sumrry of FLt 
RSquare 0.001285
Rquare Adj -0.02646
Root Mean Square Error 147.2303
Mean of Response 134.5
Oservat1ors (or Su Wgts) 3
I Pnalysis of Variance I
Source DF Sum of Squares Man Square F Ratio
Model 1 1003.99 1004.0 0.0463
Error 36 780363.51 21676.8 Prob>F
C Total 37 781367.50 0.8308
(pPaeter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl
Intercept 130.27606 30.91367 4.21 0.0002
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b) Military Spending per GNP and Political Lobby (months), excluding
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
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rra . . 5
Linear Fit 




Root Mean Square Error 148.6213
Man of Response 133.1081
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
(Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 5553.02 5553.0 0.2514
Error 35 773090.54 22088.3 Prob>F
C Total 36 778643.57 0.6192
Parameter Estimates I
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl 
Intercept 106.08086 59.18263 1.79 0.0817
MilEx/GNP91 8.3682686 16.68983 0.50 0.6192
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c) Military Spending per Capita and Political Lobby ($), excluding Kuwait
PLTD By MilEx/Cap9l )





















Root Mean Square Error 7524786
Mean of Response 4040678
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 3
!Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 5.82197e14 5.822e14 10.2821
Error 36 2. 03841el5 5.662e13 Prob>F
C Total 37 2.6206e+15 0.0028
| Paramneter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl
Intercept 824139.86 1579965 0.52 0.6051
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d) Military Spending per GNP and Political Lobby ($), excluding Kuwait
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MilEx/GNP91
- Linear Fit I
Linear Fit 




Root Mean Square Error 7567478
Man of Response 4040678
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 3
IAnalysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 5.59002e3 4 5.59e+14 9.7614
Error 36 2.0616e+15 5.727e13 Prob>F





I I I I I I I
Parameter Estimat s I
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltI
Intercept 703881.27 1627163 0.43 0.6679
MilEx/GNP91 848149 271466.8 3.12 0.0035
I -
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e) Military Spending per Capita and Political Lobby Spending per Case














Pl$/case - -3460 + 1588.67 MilEx/Cap91
|Sumary of Fit |
FSquare 0.492534
Rquare Pdj 0.477156
Root Mean Square Error 690623.7
Mean of Response 514491.5
O| servatlons (or Sum Wgts) 3
JAnalysis of Variance |
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean
Model 1 1.52766el3 1
Error 33 1.57397e13 4











I Paraneter Estimates J
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>It 
Intercept -3460.022 148335.6 -0.02 0.9815
MilEx/Cap91 1588.6691 280.7127 5.66 <.0001
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Pl$/case =-8.49e4 + 151469 MilEx/GNP91
I Sumrrary of Fit
RSquare 0.571185
RSquare Pdj 0.558191
Root Mean Square Error 634852.4
Mean of Response 514491.5
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 3'
uAnalysls of Variance 
ISource DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
c Model 1 1.7716e+13 1.772e13 43.9563
Error 33 1.33002e13 4.03e+11 Prob>F
C Total 34 3.10163e13 <.0001
i Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl
Intercept -84891.2 140315.6 -0.61 0.5493
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g) Military Spending per GNP and Political Lobby Spending per Case
without Saudi Arabia









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Mi 1 Ex/GNP91
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- Linear Fit 
| |Linear Fit|




Root Mean Square Error 644503.3
Mean of Response 397672. 3
Otservations (or Sum Wgts) 3
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 1 1.48437e12 1.484e12 3.5735
Error 32 1.32923e13 4.154ell Prob>F
C Total 33 1.47767e13 0.0678
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>ltl
Intercept -54271.39 263391.7 -0.21 0.8381
MilEx/GNP91 141622.9 74918.27 1.89 0. 0678
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APPENDIX III: DEPENDENT VARIABLE
MEASUREMENTS
See Chapter V. Section 2. for detailed description of the dependent variables
1. PATTERN VARIABLES
Dependent LbTotCong/E AdvLbCong/Ex AdvLb/lnfCntLb
variables x
Sweden 2.00 Sweden 2.00 Angola 2.75
Chile 1.50 Switzerland 1.67 Egypt 1.33
Switzerland 1.50 Chile 1.50 Panama 1.15
Pakistan 1.33 Germany 1.33 El Salvador 1.00
Canada 1.21 Pakistan 1.33 Nicaragua 1.00
Costa Rica 1.00 Canada 1.30 Yugoslavia 1.00
El Salvador 1.00 Turkey 1.20 Italy 0.94
Finland 1.00 Australia 1.13 South Africa 0.91
Nicaragua 1.00 Philippines 1.10 Great Britain 0.83
Philippines 1.00 Costa Rica 1.00 Pakistan 0.83
Poland 1.00 El Salvador 1.00 Colombia 0.82
Romania 1.00 Finland 1.00 Philippines 0.82
Saudi Arabia 1.00 New Zealand 1.00 Honduras 0.80
Turkey 1.00 Nicaragua 1.00 Mexico 0.78
Taiwan 0.93 Poland 1.00 Netherlands 0.75
Germany 0.93 Romania 1.00 Kuwait 0.70
Australia 0.92 Saudi Arabia 1.00 Australia 0.63
Great Britain 0.86 Taiwan 1.00 Taiwan 0.61
Italy 0.81 Great Britain 0.94 Venezuela 0.60
South Africa 0.80 France 0.93 Hong Kong 0.56
Egypt 0.75 South Africa 0.89 Israel 0.56
Honduras 0.75 Hong Kong 0.88 Sweden 0.55
Hong Kong 0.73 Italy 0.86 Turkey 0.55
France 0.71 Japan 0.83 Finland 0.50
Japan 0.70 Egypt 0.75 Greece 0.50
Angola 0.67 Honduras 0.75 Indonesia 0.50
T'hailand 0.67 Thailand 0.75 Ireland 0.50
Yugoslavia 0.67 Angola 0.67 Romania 0.50
Argentina 0.60 Argentina 0.67 Brazil 0.46
Mexico 0.56 Israel 0.63 Canada 0.44
Colombia 0.56 USSR 0.60 Thailand 0.44
Israel 0.56 Yugoslavia 0.60 Germany 0.43
Czechoslovakia 0.50 Colombia 0.57 Malaysia 0.40
Indonesia 0.50 Mexico 0.52 Saudi Arabia 0.40
Jamaica 0.50 Czechoslovakia 0.50 Chile 0.38
Jordan 0.50 Greece 0.50 France 0.36
New Zealand 0.50 Indonesia 0.50 Austria 0.33
USSR 0.50 Jamaica 0.50 Costa Rica 0.33
Venezuela 0.50 Jordan 0.50 Czechoslovakia 0.33
Panama 0.38 Malaysia 0.50 Switzerland 0.33
Malaysia 0.33 Spain 0.50 Jamaica 0.29
Netherlands 0.33 Venezuela 0.50 Japan 0.29
Spain 0.33 Panama 0.31 Argentina 0.25
Greece 0.25 Netherlands 0.27 Poland 0.25
Kuwait 0.25 Kuwait 0.25 Singapore 0.25





Japan 207647380.79 Japan 7172
France 100213459.04 Canada 3124
Canada 53438425.69 Great Britain 2135
Great Britain 44851679.52 France 1448
Australia 31748533.38 Korea 1105
Hong Kong 24256770.99 Taiwan 998
Indonesia 20199392.56 Germany 854
Korea 19018476.53 Mexico 819
Germany 17833590.33 Italy 766
Netherlands 17242885.12 Australia 582
Austria 15907317.98 Israel 494
Mexico 14145675.19 Hong Kong 463
Taiwan 12018360.12 Netherlands 462
Italy 11528767.18 Colombia 428
Ireland 11280060.14 Switzerland 402
Venezuela 10258039.30 Sweden 317
Israel 7904623.91 Costa Rica 306
Saudi Arabia 7597748.23 Philippines 264
Colombia 5173865.22 Thailand 248
Sweden 4223842.92 Jamaica 240
New Zealand 3997559.45 Austria 216
Switzerland 3490459.81 Venezuela 215
Finland 2896991.97 Brazil 199
Philippines 2609566.58 South Africa 186
Chile 2366418.69 New Zealand 169
Jamaica 2234860.31 Finland 162
Brazil 1689502.54 Chile 149
Malaysia 1627323.23 Indonesia 144
Argentina 1556465.11 Malaysia 139
India 1473764.46 Spain 125
Spain 1440225.08 Argentina 113
Costa Rica 1248740.23 Singapore 108
Thailand 1158816.00 China 107
South Africa 1 56271.66 Panama 102
Greece 1134858.32 Ireland 100
Honduras 987964.10 Honduras 90
Kuwait 863182.16 Saudi Arabia 88
Singapore 854426.58 Kuwait 85
Turkey 729899.28 India 78
China 486591.80 Turkey 72
USSR 482398.38 Czechoslovakia 66
Romania 387000.00 USSR 57
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China 0.20 Korea Ex Only - 6 Spain 0.22
Brazil 0.11 Austria Ex Only - 1 New Zealand 0.20
Austria 0.00 Hungar Ex Only - 1 Korea 0.17
Hungary 0.00 Ireland Ex Only - 1 China 0.08
Ireland 0.00 Singapore Ex Only - i India InfCnt Only- 3
Singapore 0.0011ndia CgOnly - 1 Jordan Adv Only - 2
India Ex Only - 1 China N/A Hungary N/A
Panama 276769.37 Greece 53
Pakistan 200005.50 Poland 43
Poland 148919.54 Pakistan 36
El Salvador 107949.10 El Salvador 28
Czechoslovakia 55589.38 Romania 23
Egypt 46327.28 Egypt 12
PolLbTot$ PolLbTotMth
Israel 42162543.45 Japan 533
Saudi Arabia 22431723.72 South Africa 427
Kuwait 21749483.97 Germany 387
Canada 21275338.08 Nicaragua 351
China 11149108.39 Israel 348
Turkey 8054309.85 Turkey 261
South Africa 7552572.77 Canada 222
Jamaica 6442254.20 China 196
Colombia 4573259.90 Saudi Arabia 186
Philippines 4189723.74 Taiwan 185
Korea 2811993.40 USSR 171
Nicaragua 2776657.77 Panama 161
Mexico 2647246.66 Pakistan 152
Japan 2272770.06 Colombia 144
Panama 1909582.16 Venezuela 143
Venezuela 1860959.67 Philippines 141
Great Britain 1845849.82 Jamaica 139
Egypt 1807757.49 France 132
Germany 1801054.23 El Salvador 116
Pakistan 1443273.29 Korea 113
Taiwan 1374192.88 Mexico 90
El Salvador 1352749.01 Kuwait 86
USSR 1163684.40 Hong Kong 84
Jordan 1161694.00 Egypt 80
Hong Kong 1077805.63 Austria 76
Sweden 996273.61 Italy 74
Thailand 729940.00 Jordan 72
Yugoslavia 575701.15 Yugoslavia 67
Greece 341098.43 Finland 66
Italy 256160.56 Spain 66
Chile 252000.50 Great Britain 64
Honduras 223949.30 Greece 57
Netherlands 216125.59 Angola 48
Spain 203181.77 Sweden 48
Angola _ 183934.72 Switzerland 48
Finland 176679.81 India 42
France 173969.08 Netherlands 37
Austria 92487.01 Chile 36
Romania 51500.00 New Zealand 36
Hungary 41811.25 Honduras 34
Switzerland 40690.86 Thailand 33
Australia 32750.00 Romania 30
India 21000.00 Australia 18
Indonesia 20000.00 Hungary 18
New Zealand 17222.77 Indonesia 6
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